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THE POLITICS OF LOCAL TAXATION: A STUDY OF COMMUNITY
LEADERSHIP IN REVENUE MATTERS
CHAPTER I
TAX LEADERSHIP IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS 
Introduction
Easton defines politics as "the authoritative alloca­
tion of values for a society," and he endorses a "post- 
behavioral revolution" which challenges political science to 
become more socially relevant and oriented toward action on 
problems.! Taxation certainly appears to fall within the 
scope of a socially relevant problem dealing with authorita­
tive allocations of values. This line of thinking seems to 
be particularly useful for studying politics at the state and 
local level. Indeed, Campbell suggests that state and local 
politics tax politics.^ Wade and Curry note that tax
^David Easton, The Political System: An Inquiry into
the State of Political Science (2d ed.; New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1971), p. 129; David Easton, "The New Revolution in 
Political Science," American Political Science Review, LXIII 
(December 1969), pp. 1051-1061.
^Alan K. Caitpbell, "Metropolitan Organization, Poli­
tics, and Taxation," Proceedings of the Academy of Political 
Science. XXVIII (1968), pp. 560-571.
burden allocations among community members are a major govern­
mental policy element. Moreover, "individual tax costs are 
among the primary political concerns of most citizens and have 
a tremendous impact on political behavior." In addition, 
equity and fairness questions arise over levels and incidence 
of taxation.
One need not look far for signs of empirical evidence 
to back up such assertions. Every day, newspapers and maga­
zines carry numerous stories about such things as the finan­
cial difficulties of the states and cities, revenue sharing, 
state supreme court rulings on property tax financing of 
public schools, the value-added tax, campaign rhetoric about 
tax reform, and a somewhat ominous sounding "taxpayers' 
revolt.
^L. L. Wade and R. L. Curry, Jr., A Logic of Public 
Policy; Aspects of Political Economy (Belmont, California: 
Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1970), p. 7.
^A 1973 Louis Harris poll found that 60 per cent of 
the respondents sympathized with the idea of a "taxpayers' 
revolt." See Timothy D. Schellhardt, "Taxing Job," The Wall 
Street Journal (Southwest ed.), January 24, 1974, p. 6. And 
the recent dramatic rises in rejection rates for public school 
tax and bond issues strongly suggest that citizens are putting 
their votes where their sympathies lie. See, for example, 
Charles L. Schultze et ^ . , Setting National Priorities: The
1973 Budget (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution,
1972), p. 324; Robert E. Jennings and Mike M. Milstein, 
"Citizens' Attitudes in School Tax Voting," Education and 
Urban Society. V (May 1973), p. 300.
Considering Easton's influence and the social rele­
vance of the issue, I initially expected to find a sizable and 
well developed body of scholarly literature on the politics of 
state and local taxation. Yet a survey of the literature 
revealed that no such corpus exists.^ Of course, a few 
notable works have appeared.^ But in general, political sci­
entists have focused on the expenditure side of subnational 
governmental finance and have left tax and revenue analysis 
to economists, professional educators, public opinion poll-
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sters, and mission-oriented public administrators.
%or corroboration of this point, see Robert R. Pealy, 
"Public Policy and Property Taxation," Public Administration 
Review, XXXI (January/February 1971), pp. 86-92; Larry L.
Wade, The Elements of Public Policy (Columbus, Ohio: Charles
E. Merrill Publishing Coitpany, 1972), p. 13; Ernest A. 
Engelbert, "The Political Aspects of Real Estate Taxation in 
Relation to Metropolitan Growth and Planning," in Land and 
Building- Taxes— Their Effect on Economic Development, ed. by 
Arthur P. Becker (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press,
1969), pp. 97-114; Arnold J. Meltsner, The Politics of City 
Revenue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p.
2; F. Ted Hebert, "The Politics of Revenue Raising," Public 
Administration Review. XXXIII (September/October 1973), pp. 
473-478.
Gsee, for example, Alvin Boskoff and Harmon Zeigler, 
Voting Patterns in a Local Election (Philadelphia: J. B.
Lippincott Company, 1964); Meltsner, The Politics of City 
Revenue; Ronald G. Claunch, "Voter Reactions to Missouri Sales 
Tax Referenda: The Role of Self-Interest, Public-Regarding-
ness and Political Trust" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. 
University of Missouri, Columbia, 1972).
^For a representative sample of the political science 
orientation, see Thomas R. Dye, Politics, Economics, and the
Public; Policy Outcomes in the American States (Chicago:
Rand McNally & Company, 1966); Ira Sharkansky, The Politics of 
Taxincr and Spending (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc.,
1969); Robert L. Lineberry and Ira Sharkansky, Urban Politics 
and Public Policy (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1971),
Chapter 7. Compare such works with, for example, Bernard P. 
Berber, Modern Public Finance: The Study of Public Sector
Economics (rev. ed.; Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin,
Inc., 1971); John F. Due and Ann F. Friedlaender, Government 
Finance: Economics of the Public Sector (5th ed.; Homewood,
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1973); James M. Buchanan
and Marilyn Flowers, "An Analytical Setting for a 'Taxpayers' 
Revolution,'" Western Economic Journal, VII (December 1969), 
pp. 349-359; Dick Netzer, State-Local Finance and Intergovern­
mental Fiscal Relations (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1969); Jesse Burkhead. Public School Finance—  
Economics and Politics (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse Univer­
sity Press, 1964); Carl Richard Ashbaugh, "Stra:egies for 
Building Constituent Support: A Comparison of School System
and Municipal Government Efforts to Acquire Increased Opera­
ting Revenue" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State 
University, 1969); Eva Mueller, "Public Attitudes Toward 
Fiscal Programs," Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXVII (May 
1963), pp. 210-235; U.S., Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare, Office of Education, Influence of Voter Turnout on 
School Bond and Tax Elections, by Richard F. Carter and 
William G. Savard, OE-22012, Cooperative Research Monograph 
No. 5 (Washington, D.C.; U.S. Government Printing Office,
1961); Charles L. Willis, "Analysis of Voter Response to 
School Financial Proposals," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXXI 
(Winter 1967-1968), pp. 648-651; Elizabeth L. David, "A Com­
parative Study of Tax Preferences," National Tax Journal, XXI 
(March 1968), pp. 98-102; "City Taxes and Services: Citizens
Speak Out," An Urban Observatory Report (Washington, D.C.: 
National League of Cities, 1971), expanded and reprinted from 
an article by the same title in Nation's Cities, IX, No. 8 
(August 1971), pp. 9-24; Maurice A. Lohman and William C.
Sayres, "Why People Vote No": Case Study Observations (n.p.:
Division of Research, The State Education Department, The Uni­
versity of the State of New York, April 1960); Advisory Commis­
sion on Intergovernmental Relations, The Commuter and the 
Municipal Income Tax— A Background Paper (Washington, D.C.:
The Commission, 1970); Advisory Commission on Intergovernmen­
tal Relations, Public Opinion and Taxes (Washington, D.C.:
The Commission, May 1972).
Moreover, the existing political science literature 
touching on taxation— especially at the state and local level—  
presents a number of problems. For instance, some writers use 
financial problems merely as part of a framework for advoca­
ting such things as better land use planning and metropolitan 
integration.® Others turn out case studies devoid of concep­
tual frameworks.® Still other case studies provide good
1 n
conceptual schemes,but bring to mind much of the community 
power structure literature in that they (1) offer little or no 
comparative analysis and (2) focus almost exclusively on the 
interactions of leaders. In contrast, a recent work offers a 
conceptually rich and methodologically impressive survey of
®For example, see Engelbert, "The Political Aspects of 
Real Estate Taxation . . Robert C. Wood, 1400 Governments:
The Political Economy of the New York Metropolitan Region 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1961).
®See, for example, Ann H. Elder and Glenn W. Fisher,
An Attempt to Amend the Illinois Constitution: A Study in
Politics and Taxation (Urbana: Institute of Government and
Public Affairs, University of Illinois, 1969); Robert L. Pea­
body, "Seattle Seeks a Tax," in State and Local Government: A
Case Book, ed. by Edwin A. Bock (n.p.: University of Alabama
Press, 1963), pp. 493-514.
^®See, for instance, Thomas J. Anton, "The Politics of 
State Taxation: A Case Study of Decision-Making in the New
Jersey Legislature" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton 
University, 1961); Elias Bertram Silverman, "Constraints on 
Innovation: A Classified Income Tax for Pennsylvania" (unpub­
lished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1970); 
Meltsner, The Politics of City Revenue (which is a little- 
revised version of his dissertation, incidentally).
voter attitudes (with something of a comparative perspective), 
but seems to rely too heavily on citizen attitudes and opinions 
expressed "after the fact" of the tax elections and to eschew 
any systematic study of the leadership's role in the refer­
enda.^^
A comparison of Meltsner's The Politics of Citv Revenue 
and Claunch's "Voter Reactions to Missouri Sales Tax Referenda" 
reveals an interesting difference in research orientation. 
Meltsner, in essence, argues that Oakland can solve its revenue 
problems through some sort of ill-defined "stronger leadership" 
since the people are willing to pay more taxes to solve com­
munity problems than city officials perceive them to be. In 
other words, the citizenry really has not reached the psycho­
logical limit on taxes; the problem is that the leaders 
perceive the citizenry as having arrived at this limit. 
Accordingly, Meltsner calls on city officials to sound out 
public opinion on not-too-clearly defined "big" revenue 
issues. But this advice seems somewhat incongruous since he 
draws many of his own conclusions about citizen attitudes and 
opinions on the basis of interviews with a fairly small sample 
of positional "citizen-leaders." Moreover, at other times, he
l^Claunch, "Voter Reactions to Missouri Sales Tax
Referenda. "
urges the leaders to avoid the public and the issues. One gets 
the feeling that he wants city officials to hoodwink the dull 
clods whenever they can get away with it. And he concludes 
with the remarkable statement that "the politics of city reven- 
ue is mostly a nonpolitics . .
Where Meltsner says that the public would gladly dis­
pose if only the leaders would propose, Claunch generally 
ignores the proposing aspects of tax policy-making and concen­
trates instead on the disposing. In other words, he focuses 
on a presumed overriding importance of voter attitudes and 
opinions in determining tax referenda outcomes. He finds that 
voter behavior seems most influenced by self-interest, although 
this may be modified somewhat by attitudes of public-regarding- 
ness and political trust of public officials. The politics of 
city revenue is anything but a nonpolitics, and it operates 
through a self-interested, cost-benefit analysis made by the 
individual voter. "A [campaign] strategy which emphasizes 
community needs and the need for personal sacrifice in terms 
of higher taxes would probably not be a highly successful 
strategy; for even if persons were to think the community would 
benefit a great deal, they tend to vote negatively if they
12Meltsner, The Politics of Citv Revenue. See Chapters 
1, 6, and 7, especially. Quote on p. 285.
8anticipate few personal benefits or high personal costs. 
Elsewhere, Claunch puts it more bluntly: regardless of the
average citizen's expressed preferences, he "is probably only 
really concerned about solving the needs of the community if 
it will not cost him a n y t h i n g . I n  contrast with this bleak 
image of the general public, Meltsner uses his citizen-leader 
survey and a summary of earlier research to argue that in many 
cases the average citizen is issue-oriented and can be persuad­
ed to pay more taxes to solve community problems.
Claunch and Meltsner appear to have done the most 
extensive recent political analyses of local taxation. They 
differ markedly as to the relative importance assigned to
^^Claunch, "Voter Reactions to Missouri Sales Tax 
Referenda," Chapter 8. Quote on p. 247. These conclusions 
clash sharply with some of those found in James Q. Wilson and 
Edward C. Banfield, "Public-Regardingness as a Value Premise in 
Voting Behavior," American Political Science Review. LVIII 
(December 1964), pp. 876-887. For comparable findings on voter 
self-interest, see, for example, Angus Campbell et a_l.. The 
American Voter (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1960), pp.
204-205; Lewis Bowman, Dennis S. Ippolito, and Martin L. Levin, 
"Self-Interest and Referendum Support: The Case of a Rapid
Transit Vote in Atlanta," in People and Politics in Urban 
Society, ed. by Harlan Hahn, Urban Affairs Annual Reviews,
Vol. 6 (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1972),
pp. 119-136.
l^Ronald Claunch, "How Voters Decide in a Sales Tax 
Election," Missouri Municipal Review. XXXVI. No. 7 (July 1971), 
p. 7. Dr. Claunch.'s name was misspelled as "Glaunch" in the 
article.
^^Meltsner, The Politics of Citv Revenue, Chapter 6 and 
pp. 256-260.
leaders and followers in determining tax policy. And they 
suggest, although they approach the matter from different 
angles, that tax-proposing officials and civic leaders are not 
representative of the citizenry with respect to perceptions of 
the psychological limits of tax increases to meet real or 
alleged community n e e d s . T h i s  line of thought indicates 
that one might fruitfully compare and contrast the tax beliefs, 
attitudes, and opinions of leaders and followers— looking for 
the impact of points of congruence or noncongruence on the 
outcome of tax referenda. And, accordingly, I initially out­
lined this study along such lines.
Further research and reflection on the problem, how­
ever, indicated that perhaps I should focus on tax leadership 
instead of undertaking the more ambitious project of actually
^^For examples of studies showing considerable differ­
ence between leaders and followers' attitudes and policy 
preferences, see Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Con­
stituency Influence in Congress," American Political Science 
Review. LVII (March 1963), pp. 45-56; Norman R. Luttbeg, "Pat­
terns of Leadership Policy Preference: A Study of Some
Assumptions in Community Research," in Public Opinion and Pub­
lic Policv: Models of Political Linkage, ed. by Norman R.
Luttbeg (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1968), pp.
355-364. For differences specifically over taxes, see David 
Reid Morgan, "Suburban Differentiation and Metropolitan Polit­
ical Integration" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University 
of Oklahoma, 1969), pp. 265-267; Citizens and Local Govern­
ments in Iowa: Problems, Participation, and Attitudes, Working
Paper No. 3 of Local Government in Iowa: Problems and Perspec­
tives (Iowa City: Institute of Public Affairs, The University
of Iowa, 1971), Chapters 3 and 4.
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surveying and comparing leader-follower tax attitudes. What 
were some of the reasons for this conclusion? First of all, 
as Paige points out, although one can find a sizable body of 
literature devoted to various aspects of political leadership, 
the subject remains seriously neglected as a focus of inquiry. 
Paige found, for instance, that from 1906 through 1963, only 
about 3 per cent (85 of 2614) of the articles in the American 
Political Science Review had titles with words relating direct­
ly either to the concept of leadership or to leadership roles, 
even within the context of the American political system.
Such theoretical neglect becomes even more critical when one 
considers its implications for policy analysis and prescrip­
tion. Eyestone, for example, found that San Francisco Bay 
area councilman perceived lack of leadership as a key cause of 
municipal problems.^® The political scientist can hardly 
analyze and prescribe effectively when he is dealing with con­
cepts and phenomena which he barely appreciates, much less 
understands.
^"^Glenn D. Paige, "Overview; Introduction," in Politi­
cal Leadership: Readings for an Emerging Field, ed. by Glenn 
D. Paige (New York: The Free Press, 1972), pp. 1-17.
IQ
Robert Eyestone, The Threads of Public Policv: A
Study in Policv Leadership (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill
Company, Inc., 1971), p. 45.
11
A second reason was that other studies of referenda 
leadership deal with less "visible" forms of taxation, e.g., 
property taxes, school bonds, or with other community issues, 
e.g_., fluoridation, metropolitan reorganization. Nobody has 
studied the leadership in local sales tax matters. For in­
stance, in a local sales tax referendum, the proposing leaders 
must directly confront the citizens with the idea of a tax 
increase— a highly visible and historically unpopular issue 
that will hit the public in the pocketbook everyday. Moreover, 
a study of local sales tax leadership seems especially rele­
vant for Oklahoma, which has a long state sales tax tradition.
Third, just a cursory review of methodological problems 
involved in public opinion surveys produced some nagging doubts 
about what I would really learn from the average citizen's 
responses to tax and revenue questions. And the voting studies
and numerous other attitude and opinion surveys amply document
19the concept of the uninformed and uninterested citizen.
^^For an excellent survey of much of this literature, 
see David 0. Sears, "Political Behavior," in The Handbook of 
Social Psychology, ed. by Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, 
Vol. 5 (2d ed.; Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Pub­
lishing Company, 1969), pp. 324-337. For empirical studies 
showing a low level of citizen tax knowledge and consciousness, 
see James M. Buchanan, Public Finance in Democratic Process: 
Fiscal Institutions and Individual Choice (Chapel Hill: The
University of North Carolina Press, 1967), Chapter 13, and 
Robin Barlow, Harvey E. Brazer, and James N. Morgan, Economic 
Behavior of the Affluent (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1966), Chapter 11.
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Indeed, Hennessy cites an impressive body of literature to
justify his contention that the masses lack consistent belief
systems or attitudes, and that political scientists should
therefore quit wasting their time on the general public and
20instead focus on elites and their attitudes. This position 
seems a bit extreme. But it does suggest (1) that one should 
have a good understanding of the role of tax leaders before he 
attempts to assess leader-follower similarities and differences 
as they actually exist, and (2) that for limited research pro­
jects such as this one, the only "safely" meaningful measure 
of the citizenry's tax attitudes and opinions may be their 
behavior at the polls.
Fourth, although one must eventually come to grips 
with citizen attitudes and opinions when dealing with any sort 
of direct legislation problem, the simple fact of the matter 
is that the leaders, not the masses, bring tax and revenue 
policy questions to the formal agenda. A grassroots demand for
20Bernard Hennessy, "A Headnote on the Existence and 
Study of Political Attitudes," Social Science Quarterlv. LI 
(December 1970), pp. 469-472.
21On this latter point, a recent book challenges the 
conventional wisdom of The American Voter on the very grounds 
that one should study voter behavior, not voter self-percep­
tion and self-description. See Walter De Vries and Lance 
Tarrance, Jr., The Ticket-Sulitter: A New Force in American 
Politics (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Pub­
lishing Company, 1972).
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increased taxes seems most unlikely. This situation may
result from citizen apathy or citizen opposition. But in
sales tax referenda, it really does not matter either way.
From the standpoint of effective political initiatives and
other actions, unless local tax leaders perceive differences
with their followers and consider them truly important, any
actual differences will have little bearing on their tax-
22related predispositions and behavior.
Finally, and more to the point of this study, the his­
tory of the local sales tax in Oklahoma suggests that the views 
of both Meltsner and Claunch should be further studied and 
perhaps modified. In 1965, the state legislature authorized 
Oklahoma municipalities to levy voter-approved additional 
sales taxes as high as 2 per cent. By November 1973, some 309 
cities and towns were receiving revenue from this source. And 
of this number, about 12 per cent were collecting the levy at 
the 2 per cent rate.^^ In terms of political economy, this 
means that some Oklahoma cities rely more heavily on the local 
sales tax than others do. From a political psychology stand­
point, it suggests, contrary to Meltsner, that in many cities
22Betty H. Zisk, Local Interest Politics, a One-Way 
Street (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1973),
pp. 6-7.
23Oklahoma, Tax Commission, news release, October 12, 
1973. (Mimeographed.)
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political leaders are not afraid to go to the public for 
noticeable tax increases. Further, it points up a shortcoming 
in Claunch's approach, viz., no systematic analysis of why the 
leadership proposed the tax in the first place.
At any rate, in many Oklahoma cities and towns, voters 
have responded to leadership appeals by approving sales tax 
increases; at the same time, in other places, they have over­
whelmingly rejected the leadership's tax-increase proposals. 
This suggests, in turn, that tax leaders often do but sometimes 
do not represent the citizenry with respect to revenue prefer­
ences, perceptions of community needs, the psychological limits 
of taxation, and so on. In short, Oklahoma municipalities 
appear to differ distinctly on such matters as degree of re­
liance on the city sales tax for revenue, the role of tax 
leaders, and acceptance of tax-proposing leadership. This 
dissertation seeks to explore certain aspects of these differ­
ences .
At this point, I should note that although this study 
deals with an aspect of local leadership, it generally avoids 
the approaches taken in much of the community power structure 
literature and limits itself to municipal public officials.^4
For those interested in the voluminous community 
power structure literature, a good recent review is Willis D. 
Hawley and James H. Svara, The Study of Community Power— A
15
One can readily find justifications for such a limitation. 
Morgan, for instance, observes that city councils must take 
the final action on local public policy no matter where com­
munity decisions originate. And he points out that works such 
as Dahl's Who Governs? and Presthus’ Men at the Top convincing­
ly demonstrate that municipal officials frequently exercise 
real political p o w e r . ^5 Lineberry and Sharkansky— calling 
attention to the impact of constitutional, statutory, and 
administrative constraints, particularly in the area of finan­
ces— argue that power structures probably influence community 
political system outputs very l i t t l e . A n d  Williams and 
Adrian complement this argument by showing that most of the 
community power structure studies have underestimated a criti­
cal locus of power, viz., the electoral majority's enormous 
veto power because of the peculiarly American emphasis on 
community referenda. In many cases involving money, city 
officials must, by law, obtain the people's direct approval of
Bibliographic Review (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO,
Inc., 1972). This work identifies and annotates a substantial 
part of the writing (including doctoral dissertations) pro­
duced between 1920 and 1970.
Z^Morgan, "Suburban Differentiation and Metropolitan 
Political Integration," p. 147.
^^Lineberry and Sharkansky, Urban Politics and Public 
Policv, p. 162.
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their proposals. Accordingly, a Hunter-like power elite (if 
one exists) may secretly arrive at vital decisions, but it 
still faces the monumental task of convincing both public 
officials and an electoral majority to permit it to rule as it 
wishes. In other words, any group of dominating leaders must 
at some point openly try to "sell" officials and the general 
public on their p r o g r a m s .2? Hence, elected and appointed 
officials— in their role as official tax-proposing leaders of 
a community— must perforce play a pivotal part in policy­
making, especially in areas dealing with local taxes and 
revenue.
Research Questions 
Since this is an exploratory study, I am posing no 
formal hypotheses to test. Instead, I am raising one basic 
and a large number of subordinate questions to examine and try 
to answer from a variety of perspectives.
The basic question to be answered is simply this: what
in the Oklahoma municipal tax and revenue process encourages 
and enables leaders in some cities to rely more on the local 
sales tax than leaders in other cities can and do? Some cities.
27Oliver P. Williams and Charles R. Adrian, Four 
Cities: A Studv in Comparative Policy Making (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963), pp. 117-118.
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for instance, have no local sales tax; others, 1 per cent; 
still others, 2 per cent. Some have passed 1 per cent taxes, 
but have not tried for the second penny; others have tried to 
increase their levy from 1 to 2 per cent, but have failed to 
obtain the necessary voter approval. Many other possible 
situations exist. But they all lead back to the basic ques­
tion and the need to look for patterns which might help to 
explain these differences.
In his recent review article, Hebert proposes an 
interesting model of the revenue policy-making process which 
appears to offer helpful guidance for answering this question. 
This two-part representation features several "predispositional" 
variables (constitutional and legal constraints, the social and 
economic environment, the nature of interest group activity, 
policies of other governmental entities, the nature of the 
decision-making process, and historical precedents and tra­
ditions) and a "black box" diagram of the policy process itself 
which links and interrelates public attitudes, leader attitudes, 
leader perceptions of public attitudes, and revenue policy.
The predispositional variables impact on and influence the 
policy process variables and their interrelationships. A 
feedback loop completes the scheme.
28Hebert, "The Politics of Revenue Raising," p. 474.
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In a dissertation of limited scope, I cannot hope to 
study all of these variables. But in modified form, the 
Hebert model serves admirably well as a tool for ordering 
exploratory research such as this.^ Accordingly, this study 
seeks to answer a number of questions raised by the model 
variables.
a. How do tax traditions, precedents, and constitu­
tional/legal constraints interrelate and impact on the munici­
pal tax and revenue process in Oklahoma? How are these factors 
related to the political economy of Oklahoma municipalities?
b. Do selected social characteristics of tax leaders 
appear to be in any way associated with differences in local 
sales tax policy and reliance? Most socio-economic status 
variables have received thorough study. Consequently, they
get relatively little attention in this study. But as Prewitt's 
masterful research on San Francisco Bay area councilman amply 
demonstrates, some appreciation of characteristics bearing on 
political socialization and recruitment seems essential to 
understanding the psychology of local policy-makers.^^
29part of the politics of dissertation-writing entails 
having the common sense to use models proposed by one's thesis 
director.
30Kenneth Prewitt, "Political Ambitions, Volunteerism, 
and Electoral Accountability," American Political Science Review, 
LXIV (March 1970), pp. 5-17; Kenneth Prewitt, The Recruitment of 
Political Leaders: A Studv of Citizen-Politicians (Indianapolis :
The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1970).
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c. What makes tax leaders "tick" psychologically?
Can one relate differences in psychological orientations to 
differences in the revenue sources of municipal political 
economies? For instance, do leaders seem to he more timid and 
public-avoiding in some places than in others? "Do cities 
without much political muscle rely more on indirect rather than 
direct forms of financing?"How do differences in the tax 
leadership's motivations, preferences, attitudes, and percep­
tions relate to differences in reliance on the local sales 
tax? Can one detect, for example, differences in perceptions 
of the general political/civic culture and the community "tax 
climate"? Several authors contend that "style of life" and 
cultural traditions probably hold the key to understanding tax
O O
and revenue outcomes. Do tax leaders differ from place to 
place in attitudes toward and about constituents? Do they 
differ in motivations for assuming tax leadership? Why do 
tax-proposing leaders associate themselves with a highly 
visible and traditionally unpopular political cause? Meltsner
31Meltsner, The Politics of Citv Revenue, p. 284.
32
Boskoff and Zeigler, Voting Patterns in a Local 
Election, pp. 138-144; David, "A Comparative Study of Tax 
Preferences"; Clara Penniraan, "The Politics of Taxation," in 
Politics in the American States— A Comparative Analysis, ed. by 
Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines (2d ed.; Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1971), pp. 520-555.
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argues that they "join the cause" most unwillingly, that they 
try at all costs to avoid the tax-increase question. But the 
large number of Oklahoma cities which have adopted the local 
sales tax indicates that this is not always the case. At any 
rate, one can find an extensive literature on various types of 
motivation to participate in public a f f a i r s .^3 For the pur­
poses of this study, however, Prewitt poses a particularly 
intriguing question: "Might not the leaders, since they know
so much more about how the community is managed and so much 
more about its problems, come to believe that they know more 
about how it should be governed?Finally, how do the 
leaders' tax-related attitudes and preferences compare with 
their perceptions of the citizens' attitudinal set? Are dif­
ferences in sales tax reliance levels somehow associated with 
varying degrees of perceived congruence between their own and 
the public's attitudes?
d. Does political structure, e.£., council-manager vs. 
mayor-council form of government, seem to make any difference 
in the tax and revenue attitudes and policy-making approaches
33
For a good introduction to the topic, see Wendell 
Bell, Richard J. Hill, and Charles R. Wright, Public Leadership: 
A Critical Review with Special Reference to Adult Education 
(San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1961), Chapter 8.
Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders, p. 207. 
(Italics his.)
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of local leaders? According to most of the literature on the 
subject, the city manager tends to be highly influential in 
tax and revenue policy-making.^^ This suggests that a city 
manager/non-city manager framework might prove useful for anal­
ysis. One might, for example, examine tax and revenue informa­
tion-gathering and dissemination processes. Do city managers' 
tax attitudes, information, and innovative ideas tend to come 
through professional lines of communication connecting managers 
across the state and nation? If this is the case, do other 
tax leaders tend to take their own policy cues more from pro­
fessionally diffused innovative information than from apprai­
sals of constituency opinion? In short, do the leaders'
35
See, for instance, Meltsner, The Politics of City 
Revenue, Chapter 2; or, more generally, Ronald 0. Loveridge, 
Citv Managers in Legislative Politics (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-
Merrill Company, Inc., 1971).
^^For exploratory study along these lines, see Jack L. 
Walker, "Innovation in State Politics," in Politics in the 
American States, ed. by Jacob and Vines, pp. 354-387; Jack L. 
Walker, "The Diffusion of Innovations among the American 
States," American Political Science Review, LXIII (September 
1959), pp. 880-899. An interesting study of the spread of the 
city sales tax in Oklahoma is Don K. Lange, "Patterns of Adop­
tion of the City Sales Tax in Oklahoma" (unpublished research 
paper. Department of Political Science, University of Oklahoma, 
July 1972). Perhaps the most definitive recent work on the 
theoretical aspects of the diffusion of innovation is Everett 
M. Rogers, with F. Floyd Shoemaker, Communication of Innova­
tions— A Cross Cultural Approach (2d ed.; New York: The Free
Press, 1971).
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attitudes and information-gathering processes differ according 
to city manager/non-city manager form of government? Indeed, 
do the managers themselves differ in their policy-related 
attitudes and behavior? And can one relate the answers to 
such questions to differences in actual tax and revenue policy­
making and policy outcomes?
Methodological Overview 
In subsequent chapters, I discuss specific research 
techniques and problems in somewhat greater detail. But at 
this point, I want to comment briefly on what information I 
collected, how and why it was gathered, and how it has been 
used.
Initially, I devoted some time to library research on 
such background factors as the economic theory of taxation 
and the general setting and impact of taxation both nation­
wide and in Oklahoma. This effort led me to investigate pre­
cedents, traditions, and constitutional/legal provisions 
associated with state and local taxation in Oklahoma. Before 
long, however, I decided to give these matters only passing 
attention. Several factors influenced this decision. First,
I was primarily interested in the political psychology of 
local tax leadership and therefore wanted to avoid becoming 
bogged down in complex areas of scholarship which are
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important but nonetheless peripheral to my topic. Second, 
these areas are well covered in other sources. And third, 
some of the information— particularly that dealing with sta­
tistics on taxes and revenues— is both misleading and 
contradictory from one source to the next. Accordingly, the 
reader will find little or no discussion of such esoteric 
subjects as tax equity, burden, incidence, and shifting, and 
a somewhat superficial treatment of tax and revenue statistics, 
constitutional/legal constraints, and historical traditions 
and precedents. I believe, however, that the information 
presented provides an adequate backdrop for the subsequent 
analysis.
As indicated earlier, I wanted to explore differences 
in reliance on the local sales tax in Oklahoma. Hence, my 
next step was to draw samples of Oklahoma municipalities with 
each of the three possible sales tax rates.
After familiarizing myself with municipal financial 
documents and the rudiments of the accounting procedures used 
to produce them, I then collected raw data on the gross 
receipts of the cities and towns in the sample. I had origin­
ally intended to study the finances of the municipalities over 
a ten-year period so as to obtain something of a "before and 
after" perspective on the city sales tax. But serious 
limitations on the availability of documents soon forced me
24
to restrict this part of the research to data for fiscal year 
(FY) 1972 alone.
Next, I classified and scaled the financial data 
according to a simple and somewhat arbitrary scheme designed 
to illustrate the political economy of municipal taxes and 
revenues in Oklahoma. To accomplish this, I had to vary a 
great deal from the municipal revenue classification systems 
which one ordinarily encounters. And political scientists, as 
well as accountants and economists, might take me to task for 
the sorting system which I used. Nevertheless, I believe that 
the results of this effort do in fact help to show politically 
oriented variations in reliance on different revenue sources.
Once I had completed this part of the analysis, I sent 
a fairly long questionnaire to public officials in the cities 
in the sample. The questionnaire was designed primarily to 
probe the officials' beliefs about community traditions and 
culture, attitudes on current tax and revenue matters, and 
perceptions of their constituents' tax-related knowledge, 
attitudes, and opinions.
I then correlated some of the data from the question­
naires with the information which I had obtained from the 
analysis of municipal financial documents. I used the rest 
of the questionnaire data to explore a variety of psychological 
factors which seem to bear on the local tax policy formulation
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process. The results of this effort provided interesting and 
oftentimes surprising insights into why some cities rely on 
the local sales tax more than others do.
To round out the study, I wanted to get a firsthand 
look at tax-proposing leaders in action. Accordingly, I 
decided to do observations of two typical but sharply con­
trasting cities during the final week or so before a sales 
tax referendum. My main interest was to examine the psychol­
ogy of tax-proposing leadership "under pressure," so to speak, 
and thus to avoid the perceptual screening which would 
inevitably occur after the campaign and election. Since both 
of the cities studied were in my sample, the public officials 
there completed the questionnaire. In addition, I conducted 
fairly lengthy interviews with them and with a cross-section 
of civic leaders reputed to be active in the sales tax cam­
paign. The interview schedule contained questions designed 
to get at sources and diffusion of tax and revenue information; 
motives for assuming tax-proposing leadership; perceptions of 
community climate; and similarities and differences between 
the interviewees' tax-related beliefs, attitudes, and 
opinions and their perceptions of the citizenry's tax-related 
attitudinal set. In between interviews, I used both on-the- 
spot observation and documentary analysis to cross-check the
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results obtained from the interviews. This entailed such 
things as observing campaign tactics; attending city council 
and civic organization meetings; and examining city council 
meeting minutes, newspaper accounts, and municipal financial 
and election records. I was particularly interested in evi­
dence indicating whether or how tax-proposing leaders modify 
their behavior as a result of perceived attitudinal differences 
with the general public.
These campaigns, though not directly used in my 
analysis, greatly improved my understanding of the other data 
which I had obtained. This part of the study proved to be 
extremely useful in tying up a number of "loose ends" which 
had appeared during the analysis of the financial and ques­
tionnaire data which I had gathered earlier. The observations 
also provided valuable insights into the relationship between 
tax-proposing leadership activities and electoral turnout and 
outcome.
Summary
Although local taxation represents a socially rele­
vant problem dealing with authoritative allocations of values, 
political scientists have largely ignored the topic— focusing 
instead on the expenditure side of subnational government 
finance and leaving tax and revenue matters to scholars in
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other disciplines. Recently, however, a few political scien­
tists have dene soïr.e work in this area. The results which 
they have obtained raise a number c.t questions about the part 
played by municipal leaders in the tax and revenue policy 
process, ^^rticularly with respect to constituency relations. 
Accordingly, this exploratory study attempts to address some 
of these questions. Municipalities in Oklahoma seem to offer 
an excellent setting for such a study because they have local 
sales tax rates varying from 0 to 2 per cent and there­
fore vary in their reliance on the tax. Since Oklahoma law 
requires voter approval of local sales tax levies, these 
differences in tax reliance may well relate to differences in 
tax leaders’ attitudes, perceptions, and behavior. The 
research design for exploring this matter entails classifica­
tion and analysis of financial data from a sample of cities 
vitl yach of the three possible tax rates and a questionnaire 
survey of public officials in these cities. Observations of 
tax-proposing leadership just before two local sales tax 
referenda supplement the research design.
Subsequent chapters report the results of this research 
effort. In particular. Chapter II outlines something of the 
background and setting of the local sales tax in Oklahoma and 
analyzes municipal financial data for possible political
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implications. It seeks to answer the questions raised about 
certain predispositional factors in the local tax and revenue 
polity process. Chapter III looks at some predispositional 
socialization characteristics of municipal officials to see 
how they relate to differences in sales tax reliance. Chapter 
IV examines how municipal tax leaders’ attitudes, preferences, 
and perceptions relate to differences both in degree of reli­
ance on various sources of revenue and in the sales tax rate. 
Chapter V explores whether governmental structure— specifically, 
city manager/non-city manager status— relates in any significant 
way to differences in officials' attitudinal set. This chapter 
also discusses city managers' responses to some additional 
questions concerning their views on professionalism, diffusion 
of tax and revenue innovations, and policy-making role. And 
finally. Chapter VI summarizes the implications of the findings, 
offers some policy recommendations for local tax leaders 
elsewhere, and suggests areas for future research— drawing on 
observations made during two sales tax election campaigns to 
illustrate many of the problem areas which merit further study.
CHAPTER II
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MUNICIPAL REVENUE
The Revenue Setting 
A sizable body of literature focuses on the problems 
facing the residents of the large urban or metropolitan areas 
throughout the country. This is understandable since the 1970 
census figures reveal that 73.5 per cent of the American people 
live in areas classified as urban. Yet this impressive fact 
tends to obscure another, viz., that incorporated cities of 
less than 50,000 population, unincorporated parts of urbanized 
areas, and rural "places" of 2,500 or less account for almost 
87 million persons or 42.8 per cent of the total United States 
populace.1 This suggests, in turn, that a great many Americans 
live in cities and towns with a different, still somewhat rural 
perspective on the problems of urban life. As compared with 
the larger cities, these small and medium sized municipalities 
frequently confront problems every bit as difficult to resolve- 
given the resources available to them. And perhaps their most
lu.S., Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of 
the United States; 1972 (93rd ed.; Washington, D.C.: U;S.
Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 17.
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critical problem of all is securing enough financial resources
2to meet demands for services.
The cities and towns of Oklahoma seem to fit this 
pattern. According to 1970 census figures, only four cities 
in the state have a population exceeding 50,000, whereas 361 
or 64 per cent of the 560 municipalities have fewer than 1,000 
inhabitants. Of a total state population of approximately 2.5 
million, only about 825,000 citizens reside in the four 
largest cities.^ From these data, one might speculate that 
local political leaders and average citizens throughout much 
of the state have distinctly rural outlooks and values. And 
much of the literature dealing with local politics indicates 
that such a value system includes a low-tax ideology.^ This 
problem receives considerable attention in later chapters.
But for the moment, let it suffice to point out that financial
^Walter F. Scheffer, "Problems in Municipal Finance," 
Western Political Quarterly, XV (September 1962), pp. 522-523.
^U.S., Bureau of the Census, Census of Population;
1970. Vol. I, Characteristics of the Population, pt. A, Number 
of Inhabitants, sec. 2, Missouri-Wyoming, Puerto Rico, and 
Outlying Areas (Washington, B.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1972), p. 38-9.
^See, for example, Arthur J. Vidich and Joseph Bensman, 
Small Town in Mass Society; Class. Power and Religion in a 
Rural Community (rev. ed.; Princeton, New Jersey; Princeton 
University Press,1968). Apparently officials in larger cities 
hold similar views. See Arnold J. Meltsner, The Politics of 
City Revenue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971).
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statistics suggest that in Oklahoma, tax policy seems to 
reflect such an ideology. In FY 1967, for example, Oklahoma 
ranked 27th among the 50 states and the District of Columbia 
in total state and local revenue and 29th in total state and 
local tax revenue. On a per capita basis, Oklahoma ranked 
39th in its use of state and local taxes as a source of gen­
eral revenue.^ Taxes of local governmental entities through­
out the nation amounted to some 45 per cent of total local 
revenue from all sources; in Oklahoma, local taxes yielded 
about 39 per cent of the total.^ And most important— for this 
study, at least— city taxes accounted for some 44 per cent of 
all municipal revenue in the nation, whereas in Oklahoma,
^U.S., Bureau of the Census, Census of Governments, 1967, 
Vol. VII, State Reports, no. 36, Oklahoma (Washington, D.C.;
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 8. Statistics for 
FY 1967 are somewhat dated, but are particularly useful for 
this study since they show the financial situation just as the 
first Oklahoma cities were beginning to collect the local sales 
tax. And at the state level, at any rate, the situation appears 
to have changed little. For instance, in FY 1972, Oklahoma 
ranked 37th among the states in collections of per capita state 
taxes. See Jack L. Robinson, "Facts and Figures on Oklahoma; 
Oklahomans Paying Less Taxes Than Most," The Sunday Oklahoman, 
Section A, October 14, 1973, p. 23.
. ^Computed from Tax Foundation, Inc., Facts and Figures 
on Government Finance, 1971 (16th biennial ed.; New York: Tax
Foundation, Inc., 1971), Table 183, pp. 234-235.
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comparable levies brought in only about 28 per cent of total 
municipal revenue.^
Constitutional/Legal Constraints 
Fisher and Fairbanks observe that the political system, 
i_.e,., the framework for decision-making, results from past 
political decisions which have been translated into custom and 
law and which therefore put constraints on the policy behavior 
and strategies of political actors.® As elsewhere, then, 
municipal tax and revenue policy in Oklahoma is closely related 
to state-imposed constitutional and legal constraints. These 
constraints and their impact on municipal revenue sources are 
well covered by Scheffer's article and a group of theses pre­
pared by master's degree candidates in the Department of 
Regional and City Planning at the University of Oklahoma.®
7
Computed from U.S., Bureau of the Census, Census of 
Governments. 1967, Vol. IV, no. 4, Finances of Municipalities 
and Township Governments (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1969), p. 9; U.S., Bureau of the Census, Cen­
sus of Governments. 1967. Vol VII, State Reports, no. 36, 
Oklahoma, Table 19, p. 26.
8Glenn W. Fisher and Robert P. Fairbanks, "The Politics 
of Property Taxation," Administrative Science Quarterlv. XII 
(June 1967), pp. 49 and 51.
®Scheffer, "Problems in Municipal Finance"; Joseph Lee 
Rodgers, Jr., "Financing Small Cities in Oklahoma" (unpublished 
Master’s thesis. University of Oklahoma, 1953); Forrest Glen 
Erickson, "The Revenue Patterns of Small Oklahoma Cities" 
(unpublished Master's thesis. University of Oklahoma, 1965);
33
Accordingly, this study does not go into the details of the 
provisions of the Oklahoma Constitution and the state statutes. 
Instead, it draws on the excellent analyses cited above to 
highlight the consequences of these provisions for municipal 
tax and revenue policy-making.
In general, constitutional/legal constraints on Okla­
homa municipalities strongly discourage use of the property 
tax and deficit financing and just as strongly encourage public 
enterprise financing (especially through utilities) and a 
continuing quest for alternative sources of revenue.
In FY 1970, city-imposed taxes provided $13.6 billion 
or about 42 per cent of all municipal revenues ($32.7 billion). 
The property tax supplied $9.1 billion or approximately 67 per 
cent of the tax r e v e n u e . T h e  situation in Oklahoma, however, 
is quite different. To illustrate, Johnstone compiled revenue 
data on 44 Oklahoma cities in the population range 5,000-50,000.
William T. Johnstone, "An Analysis of Municipal Revenue for 
Selected Small Oklahoma Cities; Fiscal Year 1969-70" (unpub­
lished Master's thesis. University of Oklahoma, 1971); Phillip 
Simon, "The Legal Implications of Financing the Municipal 
Operations in Oklahoma" (unpublished Master's thesis. Univer­
sity of Oklahoma, 1964); Louis Douglas Hailey, "Municipal 
Trust Financing in Oklahoma" (unpublished Master's thesis. 
University of Oklahoma, 1964).
^®U.S., Bureau of the Census, Citv Government Finances 
in 1969-70. Series GF-70, no. 4 (Washington, B.C.: U.S. Gov­
ernment Printing Office, 1971), Table 1, p. 5. Percentages 
computed.
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He found that in FY 1970 property taxes produced less than 14 
per cent of the total revenue of the cities s t u d i e d . C o n ­
stitutional/legal constraints largely account for the striking 
difference between the percentage for the nation and that for 
Oklahoma. For all practical purposes, state law excludes most 
cities and towns from any meaningful share of property taxes 
for current operations, restricts property tax financing to 
capital improvements, and permits low property valuations. In 
addition, Oklahoma municipalities must run their current opera­
tions on a cash basis, and they must, in general, limit bonded 
indebtedness for capital improvements to 5 per cent of assessed 
valuation— the notable exception to this limitation being 
indebtedness for public utilities. Finally, city and town 
governments may issue no revenue bonds.
The results of these constraints are predictable. 
Whereas property taxes are far less important to Oklahoma 
cities than they are to cities in other parts of the country, 
utilities are much more important revenue sources than they are 
elsewhere. In FY 1970, nationwide, utility revenue amounted to 
$5.0 billion or approximately 15 per cent of the $32.7 billion
lljohnstone, "An Analysis of Municipal Revenue . . 
p. 106. As will be shown later in this chapter, the 14 per 
cent figure is probably too high.
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t o t a l . 12 For the same period, Johnstone found that utilities
in his sample of 44 Oklahoma cities produced some 45 per cent
13of total revenue.
In addition to encouraging Oklahoma cities and towns to 
rely heavily on utilities, constitutional/legal provisions also 
allow city officials to expand public enterprise activities 
through municipal public trust financing. The trust, authorized 
by overlapping and somewhat contradictory legislation in 1951 
and 1961, serves as a device for circumventing restrictions on 
issuing revenue bonds to finance capital improvements, par­
ticularly utilities.
The city council can create the trust authorities, 
composed of city officials or others, who act as 
trustees for the beneficiary, that is, the city.
These authorities, according to the terms of their 
incorporation, have the power to issue bonds for 
the particular purpose for which they were created 
[je.2 ., building or improving electrical power 
plants, water and sewer facilities, airports, hos­
pitals] and to provide the method of payment from 
the property or operation of the trust.
In other words, the city establishes a governmental corporation
"outside" of city government to develop or expand familiar and
productive revenue sources, viz.. public enterprises. The
l^u.s., Bureau of the Census, Citv Government Finances 
in 1969-70. Table 1, p. 5. Percentage computed.
13johnstone, "An Analysis of Municipal Revenue . . .,"
p . 106.
14
Scheffer, "Problems in Municipal Finance," p. 532.
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municipal public trust, ordinarily run by city officials 
"wearing other hats," escapes the constitutional/legal restric­
tions on indebtedness and revenue bonds. Through it, accord­
ingly, officials get around a lack of funds as well as voter 
antipathy toward additional bond issues and higher property 
taxes by issuing revenue bonds to pay for public enterprise 
capital improvements. Revenue from the public enterprise 
retires the indebtedness, and any profits go into further 
improvements or— as is often the case— the general operating 
fund of the city.
In passing, one should also note that local officials 
often use trust arrangements in conjunction with grants-in-aid, 
various "nickel 'n dime" operations, and the recently authorized 
city sales tax.
State and Local Sales Taxes 
"Without question, the most important individual 
revenue source added to Oklahoma municipal revenue listings in 
recent times has been the [city] sales t a x . I n  a sense, the 
local sales tax represents the offspring of a generally happy 
marriage between tradition and constraints. Accordingly, its 
background and development deserve some attention.
p . 111.
^^Johnstone, "An Analysis of Municipal Revenue . .
37
A Short History of the Sales Tax 
In the United States, the federal government has never 
used the retail sales tax, and this particular levy has devel­
oped as a grassroots phenomenon.^® Little influenced by sales 
tax experiences in other nations, it represents the first 
significant use of retail sales taxation in the world.
The forerunner of the American sales tax was a low- 
yielding business occupation tax levied by several states—  
notably Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Delaware— in the 19th 
century. In 1921 and 1930 respectively. West Virginia and 
Mississippi imposed higher-yielding, multiple-stage business 
occupation taxes. But these levies were economically discrimin­
atory and administratively complicated. Consequently, they 
never proved to be major revenue-raisers and soon were largely 
superseded by the retail sales tax.
The Great Depression of the 1930s precipitated the 
rapid spread of the state sales tax, with 29 states— led by 
Mississippi— adopting it between 1932 and 1937. On the revenue 
side, the depression reduced existing-tax yields and stiffened
, ^®Except as otherwise noted, the discussion in this 
section relies on John F. Due, Sales Taxation (Urbana: Univer­
sity of Illinois Press, 1957), Chapters 14 and 15; John F. Due, 
with a chapter on local sales taxes by John L. Mikesell, State 
and Local Sales Taxation— Structure and Administration (Chicago; 
Public Administration Service, 1971), Chapters 1 and 10.
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opposition to rate increases. At the same time, expenditures 
for participation in federal relief programs tended to rise.
In addition, local government financial difficulties necessi­
tated larger state grants to localities and brought pressures 
on the- states to reduce their reliance on the property tax.
Left with few major sources for additional revenues, many 
states quickly embraced the sales tax, which combined the 
attractive features of a seemingly low rate, a large yield, and 
a relatively painless and easily administered collection system.
Chiefly because of the prosperity of the war years, no 
more states adopted the sales tax from 1937 to 1947. But
almost immediately after the war, the sales tax movement
revived as state tax yields lagged behind inflation-produced 
cost increases and steadily expanding demand for more services. 
Accordingly, by 1971 only five states (Alaska, Delaware,
Montana, New Hampshire, Oregon) were still without a sales tax. 
In 1970, these five states had only about 2 per cent of the 
total population of the nation. Thus roughly 98 per cent of 
the population— and of sales— came under some sort of state 
sales tax at that time. This situation was still in effect in
the early part of 1973.
17Prentice-Hall, Inc., State and Local Tax Service. All 
States Unit, March 6, 1973 (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973), p. 105. (Looseleaf.)
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At present, the retail sales tax represents the single
most important source of state tax revenue. In FY 1971, it
yielded some $15 billion to state governments. This amounted
18to 30 per cent of total state tax revenues.
As with state sales taxes, the local sales tax has 
developed and spread as a result of the financial difficulties 
of the 1930s, inflationary pressures, rising demands for gov­
ernmental services, reluctance to raise existing tax rates, and 
dissatisfaction with the property tax.^^ New York City pio­
neered the city sales tax in 1934, and New Orleans followed 
suit a couple of years later. Several states authorized the 
levy in the 1940s and 1950s. During this period, Mississippi 
introduced state administration of local sales taxes— a tech­
nique greatly facilitating effective use of the tax. The sales 
tax spread most rapidly in the 1960s, when 12 more states 
authorized it. By early 1971, the local sales tax was either
18John F. Due and Ann F. Friedlaender. Government 
Finance; Economics of the Public Sector (5th ed.; Homewood, 
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1973), pp. 208-209.
^^Interestingly, despite the relative "popularity" of 
the retail sales tax in relation to the property tax, the two 
levies are at least "kissin' cousins" in an economic sense. As 
Berber observes: "If the tax base is defined in terms of the
monetary value of the purchased item or items, like state 
retail sales taxes, the tax is ad valorem in nature." Bernard 
P. Berber, Modern Public Finance: The Studv of Public Sector
Economics (rev. ed.; Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin,
Inc., 1971), p. 197.
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in use or authrorized in 25 states. At that time, an estimated
2,552 local government entities (2,178 municipalities and 474
20other units) were collecting some sort of sales tax.
Although the property tax remains the mainstay of local
government tax revenue across the nation, the local sales tax
is quite important. According to one estimate, for example,
municipalities— the chief users of the local sales tax— derive
about 11 per cent of their revenues from this source. Indeed,
some cities, e.g., Phoenix, Arizona, obtain up to 45 per cent
21of their revenue from the sales levy.
The Municipal Sales Tax in Oklahoma 
Until a few years ago, the city sales tax had no 
impact in Oklahoma because none was authorized. This situation 
represented but another part of the constitutional/legal con­
straints which forced Oklahoma cities and towns to derive their 
revenue mainly from public enterprises such as utilities. At 
the same time, rising costs and expenditures necessitated a 
search for additional sources of revenue. In Oklahoma as
20These figures are calculated from Mikesell's Table 
10.3, pp. 300-303, of State and Local Sales Taxation. Another 
author indicates that about 3,000 localities were imposing a 
sales tax in 1970. See Willard A. Heaps, Taxation, U.S.A.
(New York: The Seabury Press, 1971) , p. 54.
21uue and Friedlaender, Government Finance, p. 211.
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elsewhere, however, local officials had few truly new revenue 
sources available to them.^Z At this point, the long, pioneer­
ing tradition of state-level sales taxation entered the picture. 
In 1965, the state legislature authorized Oklahoma municipali­
ties to take advantage of this tradition, and since that time, 
a great many of them have done so- This move has given local 
officials a new source of revenue; it has also taken advantage 
of the conventional wisdom that the public is more likely to 
accept a seemingly small increase in an old tax than the impo­
sition of a new one. In short, at the local level in Oklahoma, 
the city sales tax represents a "new" old tax.
With voter approval, Oklahoma cities and towns may levy 
a state-administered local sales tax up to the rate permitted 
to the state (2 per cent) . Beginning with adoptions in the 
Oklahoma City area which became effective in January 1966, the 
city sales tax has spread rapidly across the state. The cumu­
lative fiscal year totals of cities and towns receiving
22F. L. VanVoorhees, The Citizen and Taxes (Kalamazoo: 
The Institute of Public Affairs, Department of Political Sci­
ence, Western Michigan University, 1968), p. 43.
23gtate administration is actually at local option, but 
thus far, all cities passing the tax have chosen to use the 
services of the state.
42
disbursements from the Oklahoma Tax Commission^^ are as 
follows:
196 6-------------- 13
196 7-------------- 38
196 8-------------- 87
196 9--------------151
197 0--------------215
197 1--------------253
197 2----------  279
19 73 92
1974(four months)-309
As of November 1, 1973, only 15 municipalities of 1,000 or more
population were not levying a local sales tax. In 37 cities,
voters had approved sales tax referenda raising their local
rate to 2 per cent and their combined state and city sales tax
to a total of 4 per cent. Data on rejections are not available.
But the information director of the Oklahoma Tax Commission
estimates that the rejection rate has declined from somewhat
less than 50 per cent of all referenda in the early years to a
25current rate of approximately 10 per cent.
^^Municipalities begin receiving payments two months 
after their tax has become effective or, generally, about three 
months after voter approval.
25oklahoma, Tax Commission, Information/Research Sec­
tion, "City Sales Tax Collections: Fiscal Year 1965-1966
through Fiscal Year 1972-1973," Oklahoma City, n.d. (Mimeo­
graphed.); Oklahoma, Tax Commission, news release, October 12, 
1973 (Mimeographed.); Henry Ayres (information director, Okla­
homa Tax Commission), interview held in his office, Jim Thorpe 
Building, Oklahoma State Capitol Complex, Oklahoma City, Okla­
homa, November 1, 1973.
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The city sales tax has proved to te a lucrative source 
of revenue for Oklahoma municipalities. Statewide receipts 
(after the state collection fee of 2.5 per cent for cities with 
a 1 per cent levy and 1.5 per cent for those with a 2 per cent 
rate) by fiscal year are as follows:
1966-- — $ 2,576,535.34----13 cities
1967— —  12,298,430.70— --38 cities
1968— —  22,893,188.61----87 cities
1969-- —  28,532,677.47----151 cities
1970-- —  33,575,917.65— --215 cities
1971— —  38,375,357.27----253 cities
1972-- —  50,797,061.54----279 cities
1973— —  62,564,945.43----292 cities26
The local sales levy certainly seems to be increasing 
in importance in relation to other revenue sources, too. John­
stone, for instance, found that as early as FY 1970, the sales 
tax ranked second only to utilities as a producer of revenue—  
raising over 17 per cent of the total revenue of the 44 cities 
which he surveyed (only five of which did not have a local 
sales tax at the time).
The discussion thus far suggests that several factors 
combine to encourage Oklahoma municipalities to adopt the local 
sales tax. It offers a means of getting around constitutional/ 
legal constraints, fits nicely into the tax traditions of the
26Oklahoma, Tax Commission, Information/Research Section, 
"City Sales Tax Collections."
27johnstone, "An Analysis of Municipal Revenue . . .,"
p. 83.
44
state, appears to meet relatively little voter opposition over­
all, and provides a new and lucrative source of revenue. Given 
these circumstances, one might suppose that most city officials 
would agree with Mikesell;
If the local government is going to have responsi­
bility for raising revenue, it might as well use 
an effective tax. The local sales tax, especially 
in the form of a local supplement administered by 
the state, is just such a tax.^®
And, indeed, several cities have taken full advantage of the
fiscal opportunities which the tax affords. At the same time,
however, many municipalities either have not opted for the city
sales tax or have limited their usage of it. As an initial
step in trying to account for these differences in reliance on
the local sales tax in Oklahoma, the remainder of this chapter
attempts to explore the economy of local public revenue from a
political perspective.
The Political Economy of Oklahoma Municipalities 
Conceptual and Methodological Approach 
Engelbert notes that political scientists have disre­
garded the politics of local taxation largely because "the 
subject falls in a twilight zone between economics and political 
science so that neither discipline has given it the attention
28John L. Mikesell, "Local Sales Taxes in North America," 
Municipal Finance. XLIII (February 1971), p. 140.
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which it deserves."29 This statement is true but misleading. 
Although political scientists have undeniably neglected the 
topic, economists have been studying it extensively. Unfor­
tunately, however, the latter tend to approach the political 
process as an exercise in abstract model-building. Conse­
quently, they produce a political system populated with self- 
interested voters trying to satisfy individual public-goods 
preference schedules and responsive political leaders seeking 
to maximize vote-garnering ability and reelection chances.
Most political scientists would find such a model vastly over­
simplified and conceptually undernourished, particularly at the 
local level.
Having captured the theoretical field, the economists 
have been in a good position to more or less dictate the
^^Ernest A. Engelbert, "The Political Aspects of Real 
Estate Taxation in Relation to Metropolitan Growth and Plan­
ning, " in Land and Building Taxes; Their Effect on Economic 
Development, ed. by Arthur P. Becker (Madison: The University 
of Wisconsin Press, 1969), p. 99.
29gee, for example, the discussions in Herber, Modern 
Public Finance. Chapter 5, and Due and Friedlaender, Government 
Finance. Chapter 3. For more specifically political analyses 
along these lines, see Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of 
Democracy (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1957);
James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: 
Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (Ann Arbor: The
University of Michigan Press, 1962); Robert L. Bish, The Public 
Economy of Metropolitan Areas (Chicago: Markham Publishing Com­
pany, 1971); L. L. Wade and R. L. Curry, Jr., A Logic of Public 
Policy: Aspects of Political Economy (Belmont, California:
Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1970).
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format of empirical analysis. In other words, tax and revenue
data tend to be sorted out and analyzed by categories oftentimes
more meaningful to economists and accountants than to political
scientists. For example, one can see this quite clearly in the
broad aggregate categories used in U.S. Bureau of the Census
publications dealing with local tax and revenue data. Yet as
Meltsner aptly observes;
The social scientist who treats urban revenue in 
terms of aggregates, such as property tax and "other," 
will miss most of the action. Local revenue decisions 
are in the category of "other.
Meltsner seems to indicate that the political scientist 
would benefit from a politically oriented classification and 
analysis of municipal taxes and revenues. With such informa­
tion, he could perhaps better appreciate the extent to which 
tax and revenue sources are related to policy decisions such as 
those concerning differences in reliance on the local sales tax. 
This would appear to be a worthwhile effort, for, as Williams 
and associates point out, such decisions represent "a distinct 
and significant form of political c h o i c e . "^2
S^Meltsner, The Politics of City Revenue, p. 23. On 
pp. 19-37, Meltsner skillfully describes the varieties and com­
plexities of city revenue in Oakland.
32oiiver P. Williams et ^ . , Suburban Differences and 
Metropolitan Policies: A Philadelphia Story (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1965), p. 163.
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Defining policy as "the relationship of a governmental 
unit to its environment," Eyestone argues that one specifies 
the policy of a city by determining how it relates to its 
environment along explicit and limited dimensions. Accord­
ingly, any sort of theory-building approach to municipal tax 
and revenue policy might concern itself with the interrelation­
ships of such things as varying sales tax rates, relative 
reliance on various sources of revenue, governmental policy 
roles (e,.a., Williams and Adrian's typology: economic growth,
amenities, small government, arbitration),^^ and the attitud- 
inal set of policy-makers.
With this general theoretical guidance in mind, I then 
"wallowed around in the data" for a while. As a first step,
I drew a sample of politically relevant cities— defined here as 
those with a population of over 1,000— stratified according to 
sales tax rate as of June 30, 1972, the latest date for which 
relatively complete financial records were available. At that 
time, 15 Oklahoma cities were collecting a 2 per cent local 
sales tax. Since these cities seemed especially important to
33Robert Eyestone, The Threads of Public Policv: A
Study in Policv Leadership (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill
Company, Inc., 1971), p. 18.
^^Oliver P. Williams and Charles R. Adrian, Four Cities: 
A Study in Comparative Policv Making (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 1963), pp. 22-31.
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the analysis, I included all of them except Tulsa in one sub­
sample— Tulsa being excluded because its large size and complex 
political system made it atypical of Oklahoma cities and their 
politics. At the other end of the tax rate spectrum, some 28 
cities and towns were levying no municipal sales tax. To bal­
ance off the 14 2 per cent cities, I used a table of random 
numbers to select one-half of these 0 per cent municipalities 
for a second subsample. Finally, a third subsample of 16 1 per 
cent sales tax cities (likewise selected through a table of ran­
dom numbers) brought the total sample to 44 cities. As with 
Tulsa, I omitted Oklahoma City from the universe of 1 per cent 
cities because of its large size and unusual political complex­
ity.
Next, I spent some time going over municipal financial 
documents on file with the State Board of Equalization at the 
capitol in Oklahoma City. I not only needed to acquaint myself 
with municipal accounting procedures, but also wanted to look 
for recurring patterns of revenue-raising which seemed to have 
political policy and leadership implications. And after a few 
days of this sort of work, I concluded that Oklahoma municipal 
revenues tended to fall into four major categories with possi­
ble policy and leadership connotations:
(1) Direct impact taxes. This category isolates those 
levies which have a high political visibility and presumably
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impact directly on local pocketbooks and, particularly, on 
political perceptions. Although it includes the little-used 
municipal property tax, it mainly reflects reliance on the local 
sales tax.35
(2) Sales and services. As noted earlier, all Oklahoma 
cities rely heavily on public enterprises, especially utilities. 
This category expands the public enterprise concept to include 
all sales of public goods and services which the cities and 
towns have chosen to handle themselves rather than to turn over 
to private enterprise. The bulk of the revenues in this class 
comes from sales of electricity, water, and sanitation services. 
But appreciable amounts are derived from such diverse "entre­
preneurial" activities as sales of cemetery plots, rentals of 
municipal property, fire protection services provided to rural 
residents and other localities, swimming pool and park opera­
tions, weed-cutting, and— to cite one fascinating entry—  
"agriculture."
(3) Intergovernmental grants and transfers. Revenues 
from grants-in-aid and tax-sharing are becoming increasingly 
important to local governments. But some Oklahoma municipalities
O  C
^^Economists call the retail sales tax an indirect tax 
because it is collected from businesses selling goods and ser­
vices and then is shifted forward to purchasers. But I am 
including it in this category because I am interested in the 
political and perceptual, not the economic, impact of the sales
tax.
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rely on such revenues more than others do. Practically all 
the cities and towns share in state taxes on alcoholic bever­
ages, gasoline, and commercial vehicles, for instance. Many 
get state assistance for police and fireman pension funds. But 
a few stand out with respect to obtaining small amounts of 
county-controlled property tax money and oftentimes sizable 
special grants from the state and federal governments. The 
revenues in this category come chiefly from the sources noted 
in this paragraph.
(4) Indirect charges and revenues. Relatively few 
cities obtain appreciable amounts from this residual "nickel 
'n dime" category. But this class does contain an almost 
limitless variety of sources. The revenues tend to come from 
"hidden" charges and taxes, e..£., sewer tap fees; levies dis­
criminating against special groups of citizens, ^.g., fines for 
lawbreakers, licenses for pet owners and business operators; 
"fringe benefits" of revenues in the other categories, e,.g., 
interest on invested grant money; and the inevitable "mis­
cellaneous" entry.
Having developed this admittedly rough but at least 
politically functional classification scheme, in late 1972 I 
started collecting and categorizing raw data in accordance with 
the sources and amounts of revenue coming into the three groups
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of cities in the sample. Since Oklahoma cities must, by law, 
conduct current operations on a cash basis, I attempted to 
obtain information on each city's FY 1972 gross receipts from 
all sources. Once categorized, such data would, I hoped, pre­
sent a picture of the relative reliance on different types of 
revenue passing before and standing out in the mind's eye of 
city officials in the municipalities making up each of the 
three tax rate groups. And this information, in turn, might 
well reveal consistencies among cities in each group which I 
could later relate to officials' motives, opinions, perceptions, 
preferences, and policy orientations. As Williams and associ­
ates observe:
If all municipalities were so specialized that each 
was sui generis, generalizations about municipal 
characteristics and political responses could not 
be attempted. However, there are certain regular­
ities among municipalities, which, through classi­
fication and analysis, can be related to the manner 
in which they define their policies and react to 
their environment.^^
These words of scientific inspiration sounded great 
when I first read them long ago. But the difficulties which I 
encountered in actual data collection and classification make 
me wonder whether meaningful classification of tax and revenue 
information is really possible— or, indeed, worth the effort!
^^Williams et £l., Suburban Differences and Metropolitan 
Policies, p. 73.
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For instance, by state law, all Oklahoma municipalities have
annual statements of financial condition on file at the state
capitol. These documents offer a good starting point for
analyzing municipal revenues, and previous research in this
37area has tended to rely on them almost exclusively. Such an 
approach, however, creates numerous problems in classification 
and produces misleading analytical results as well. For 
example, the financial statements have more than 20 preprinted 
uniform categories for reporting revenue. But they also have 
many blank spaces for listing additional revenue sources.
These blank spaces permit those completing the statements to 
indulge in a form of fiscal "creative writing" which effectively 
obscures the source(s) of revenue for many entries. How, for 
instance, is one to interpret an entry such as "translator 
fund"? Or what is to be done with $164,710.93 of "miscell­
aneous" funds— a single entry accounting for more than 5 per 
cent of one city's total revenue? Such problems pale into 
insignificance, however, when compared with the difficulties 
of sorting out and eliminating reserves carried over from 
previous reporting periods, duplications resulting from inter­
fund transfers, and so on. But the worst part of all about
37See, for example, the Rodgers, Erickson, and John­
stone theses cited in footnote 9 of this chapter.
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the financial statements is that they oftentimes omit vast sums
of money flowing into city coffers through such vehicles as
municipal public trusts and assorted pension and trust funds.
To obtain relatively accurate information on such monies, one
must analyze city audit reports and separate municipal trust
audit reports. Unfortunately, at any given time, many of these
documents will not be on file at the state capitol despite the
38requirements of state law. Accordingly, the researcher must 
devote many hours (and dollars!) to seemingly endless attempts 
to borrow such documents from suspicious local officials if he 
wants to obtain a fairly complete picture of the finances of 
numerous Oklahoma municipalities. And in spite of all these 
efforts, some gaps in coverage will still remain. In a few 
cases, omissions can be covered to some degree by extrapolating 
data from reports for previous fiscal years— a technique used 
occasionally in conducting this research.
Basically, I wanted to get at the gross amounts which 
city officials were handling in one way or another. But I 
also wished to establish a sort of "current or usual operations"
^®For example, I found some documents on file with the 
Oklahoma Municipal League, Oklahoma City, which were not avail­
able at the state capitol. And, incidentally, since municipal 
public trusts are corporations, the trust audit reports which 
are available are filed with the State Corporation Commission, 
not the State Board of Equalization— a constitutional/legal 
constraint on scholarly research!
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context for municipal revenue. As a result, I had to exclude 
a few revenue sources from the final tallies. For example, 
only a few of the cities in the sample had hospital trusts or 
other forms of municipal hospital financing. Consequently, I 
omitted hospital receipts to avoid tremendously inflating the 
gross receipts of some cities. I applied the same sort of 
reasoning to the few cities which happened to get sizable pro­
ceeds from bond issues. Another excluded source was money 
received from liquidations of investments since such money 
represented revenue from earlier years and was practically 
always offset by immediate purchases of new investments. I 
did, however, include the profits from such transactions. 
Finally, for the sake of consistency, I adjusted the sales tax 
receipts of each tax-levying city to coincide with the amount 
which the Oklahoma Tax Commission returned to the city after 
deducting the state collection and administration fee. About 
two-thirds of the tax-collecting cities in the sample used 
this figure; the rest apparently entered gross tax receipts in 
their financial documents.
Such problems by no means exhaust the numerous diffi­
culties of data collection and classification. I have devoted 
considerable space to them, not to bore the reader with "war 
stories," but to illustrate the limitations on the data base
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and the reasons why this phase of the research consumed about 
four months of intensive and often frustrating effort. Over­
all, the results of this effort appear to be reasonably 
accurate, complete, and consistent. Nevertheless, Williams 
and Adrian's admonitions about municipal data seem to be a 
remarkably appropriate conclusion to this part of the dis­
cussion:
The data . . . were developed under conditions 
less than ideal. Anyone who has endeavored to work 
with municipal statistics should appreciate this 
fact. Municipal records are often poor and are 
rarely kept in uniform fashion. Central recording 
services . . . are not completely reliable. In 
the face of these odds the researchers can only 
report that they did the best they could.
Municipal Revenue in Political Perspective 
To conclude the analysis, I summed the receipts falling 
into each city's four functional categories. I then computed 
the percentages of total receipts for each category. Tables 
2-1, 2-2, and 2-3 indicate the relative importance of these 
revenue sources according to city sales tax rate. Finally, I 
arrayed the percentages in the 176 data cells of these three 
tables (44 cities times four categories = 176) from the lowest 
to the highest figure. Roughly one-third of the total number 
of items fell into each of the following ranges: 0-10 per cent.
^^Williams and Adrian, Four Cities, p. 225.
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11-30 per cent, and 31-100 per cent. I designated these three 
ranges as low, medium, and high respectively. I used these 
ranges as a scale to see how cities with different sales tax 
rates vary in their reliance on the four categories of revenue. 
Table 2-4 shows these summarized variations.^®
With respect to Tables 2-1, 2-2, and 2-3, the percen­
tages in the "direct impact taxes" category are derived mainly 
from city sales tax collections. The "direct impact" figures 
for the 0 per cent cities— reflecting only the property tax—  
are generally typical of property tax collections in the 1 per 
cent and the 2 per cent cities. This suggests that in Oklahoma 
the local sales tax contributes appreciably more to total 
municipal revenue than the 11 per cent national figure cited 
by Due and Friedlaender. Moreover, some Oklahoma cities are 
approaching the extreme 45 per cent reliance on the sales tax 
which these authors m e n t i o n . I n  addition, the sales tax 
appears to be rapidly increasing its relative importance in 
the total municipal revenue picture. The "direct impact"
arrayed the data this way rather than along four 
"within category" scales because I wanted to see how each 
revenue category of each city stacked up in relation to each 
of the various revenue categories of all the other cities in 
the sample. In passing, I might add that "within category" 
arrays do not change the reliance-ranking proportions a great 
deal in most cases.
^^See footnote 21 of this chapter.
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TABLE 2-1
REVENUE SOURCES AS PER CENT OF TOTAL, 14 OKLAHOMA MUNICIPALITIES
WITH 0 PER CENT LOCAL SALES TAX, FISCAL YEAR 1972
(1970 population in parentheses after each city)
Municipality
Direct
Impact
Taxes
Sales
and
Services
Inter-
govt
Revenue
Indirect
Revenue Total
Arkoma(2,098) 0% 44% 32% 24% 100%
Barnsdall(1,579) 0 60 27 12 99
Boise City(1,993) 9 38 43 9 99
Chouteau(1,046) 0 72 15 12 99
Cushing(7,529) 0 87 4 9 100
Edmond(16,633) 3 77 7 12 99
Fairview(2,894) 8 78 12 3 101
Geary(1,380) 0 81 9 10 100
Jones (1,666) 12 69 10 9 100
Mangum(4,066) 6 85 5 4 100
Okeene(1,421) 5 85 8 1 99
Pryor(7,057) 3 84 7 6 100
Ryan(1,Oil) 0 81 11 8 100
Walters(2,611) 0 78 16 7 101
Average 3 73 15 9
NOTE: Percentages for some cities do not total 100 because of
rounding.
SOURCE: Computed from statements of financial condition, city
audit reports, and municipal public trust audit reports 
of the 14 cities.
Population figures taken from U.S., Bureau of the Cen­
sus, Census of Population; 1970. Vol. I, Characteris­
tics of the Population, pt. A, Number of Inhabitants, 
sec. 2, Missouri-Wyoming, Puerto Rico, and Outlying 
Areas (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1972), pp. 38-10 through 38-13.
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TABLE 2-2
REVENUE SOURCES AS PER CENT OF TOTAL, 16 OKLAHOMA MUNICIPALITIES
WITH 1 PER CENT LOCAL SALES TAX, FISCAL YEAR 1972
(1970 population in parentheses after each city)
Municipality
Direct
Impact
Taxes
Sales
and
Services
Inter-
govt
Revenue
Indirect
Revenue Total
Altus(23,302) 18% 69% 5% 8% 100%
Beggs(1,107) 22 10 50 18 100
Checotah(3,074) 28 42 20 10 100
Clinton (8,513) 30 42 11 18 101
Cordell (3,261) 36 24 25 15 100
Davis(2,223) 22 61 9 9 101
El Reno(14,510) 33 46 10 11 100
Guthrie (9,575) 24 42 13 21 100
Hominy(2,274) 9 76 6 9 100
Madill(2,875) 20 50 15 15 100
Midwest City 
(48,114)
33 45 6 16 100
Stigler(2,347) 28 34 25 13 100
Tahlequah(9,254) 13 60 21 6 100
Temple(1,354) 32 33 25 10 100
Tipton(1,206) 19 50 21 10 100
Wright City(1,068) 9 52 22 17 100
Averaae 23 46 18 13
NOTE: Percentages for some cities do not total 100 because of
rounding.
SOURCE: Computed from statements of financial condition, city
audit reports, and municipal public trust audit reports 
of the 16 cities.
For source of population figures, see source note.
Table 2-1.
59
TABLE 2-3
REVENUE SOURCES AS PER CENT OF TOTAL, 14 OKLAHOMA MUNICIPALITIES
WITH 2 PER CENT LOCAL SALES TAX, FISCAL YEAR 1972
(1970 population in parentheses after each city)
Municipality
Direct
Impact
Taxes
Sales
and
Services
Inter-
govt
Revenue
Indirect 
Revenue Total
Anadarko(6,682) 17% 68% 7% 8% 100%
Henryetta(6,430) 25 38 25 12 100
Hugo(6,585) 36 28 12 24 100
Idabel(5,946) 27 35 20 19 100
Krebs (1,515) 23 53 12 12 100
Lawton(74,470) 34 41 9 16 100
McAlester(18,802) 22 22 50 6 100
Poteau(5,500) 33 19 43 5 100
Sand Springs 
(11,519)
32 44 10 14 100
Sayre (2, 712) 32 42 13 13 100
Seminole(7,878) 38 33 9 20 100
Stilwell(2,134) 17 64 13 6 100
Talihina(1,227) 33 48 11 8 100
Waurika(1,833) 29 33 34 5 101
Average 28 41 19 12
NOTE: Percentages for some cities do not total 100 because of
rounding.
SOURCE: Computed from statements of financial condition, city
audit reports, and municipal public trust audit reports 
of the 14 cities.
For source of population figures, see source note.
Table 2-1.
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TABLE 2-4
REVENUE RELIANCE RANKING BY SOURCE AND SALES TAX RATE, 44 OKLA­
HOMA MUNICIPALITIES, FISCAL YEAR 1972
Sales Tax Rate
Revenue Source
0% 
Cities
1% 
Cities
2% 
Cities Total
and Reliance 
Rankin? Are; N % N % N % N %
Direct impact 
taxes
High 0 0 4 25 7 50 11 25
Medium 1 7 10 63 7 50 18 41
Low 13 _93 _2 12 _0 0 15 34
Total 14 100 16 100 14 100 44 100
Sales & Services
High 14 100 14 88 11 79 39 89
Medium 0 0 1 6 3 21 4 9
Low _0 __0 _1 __6 _0 __0 2
Total 14 
Intergovernmenta1
100 16 100 14 100 44 100
revenue
High 2 14 1 6 3 21 6 14
Medium 4 29 10 63 7 50 21 48
Low _8 _5 _31 _4 29 17 38
Total 14 100 16 100 14 100 44 100
Indirect revenue
High 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Medium 4 29 9 56 8 57 21 48
Low 10 71 _7 44 _6 43 23 52
Total 14 100 16 100 14 100 44 100
SOURCE: Derived from Tables 2-1, 2-2, and 2-3
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figures for the 1 and the 2 per cent cities— even after allow­
ing for the inclusion of the property tax— are indicative of 
a notable rise in reliance on the sales tax since FY 1970, 
when Johnstone found that the sales tax produced about 17 per 
cent of total r e v e n u e . A n d  the two-year differential would 
probably be even greater if the data for this study included 
only the sources which Johnstone used.
The "direct impact" cells of Table 2-4 underscore the 
importance of the local sales tax as a major revenue-raiser, 
particularly for cities with a 2 per cent levy. Although an 
overwhelming majority of all cities in the sample rely heavily 
on public enterprises for revenue, reliance on this source 
tends to decline noticeably as the sales tax rate increases. 
The figures for the "intergovernmental" and "indirect" cate­
gories suggest that the sales tax may possibly provide new 
avenues for expanding revenues from these sources. The sales 
tax also seems to be associated with an expansive and a more 
diversified "mix" with respect to the various revenue sources.
A majority of the 0 per cent cities have low reliance on all 
categories except "sales and services," whereas most 1 per cent 
and 2 per cent cities rank medium or high in all categories.
42see footnote 27 of this chapter.
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One should not try to make too much of the four pre­
ceding tables from the standpoint of policy implications. But
they do nevertheless suggest some interesting lines of specu­
lation which will be pursued in subsequent chapters.
To start with governmental policy roles, for instance, 
one might speculate that promoting economic growth and pro­
viding amenities would be associated with higher sales tax 
rates and relatively more reliance on direct impact and inter­
governmental revenue sources. For example, Williams and 
Adrian say that a policy orientation toward promoting economic
growth is the one most common at the local level, for the
"booster spirit is the civic incarnation of the ethos of 
American capitalism. If cities and towns want to boost
business and attract industry, they might well favor the sales 
tax as a revenue source, for, as Ecker-Racz points out, one of 
the main reasons that the sales tax has become popular with 
political and civic leaders is that it meets with little 
business opposition since it is perceived not to influence the 
attraction of new industry very much.^^ And grants-in-aid can 
help promote economic growth by providing resources to aid in
^^Williams and Adrian, Four Cities, p. 188.
44L. L. Ecker-Racz, The Politics and Economics of State- 
Local Finance (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1970), pp. 58-59.
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financing industrial parks and similar municipal ventures. 
Whereas economic growth is a producer-oriented policy role, 
amenities are consumer-oriented. Increasing amenities means 
higher expenditures and hence a requirement for greater reven­
ues to pay for them.^S The sales tax can produce large amounts 
of revenue and ease the pain of taxation by exporting part of 
the burden to transients and v i s i t o r s . T h e  same arguments 
would apply to intergovernmental grants and transfers. In 
passing, one might also note that this line of reasoning sug­
gests that relatively high reliance on direct impact and 
intergovernmental revenue sources would tend to be associated 
with the professional and expansive financial sophistication 
commonly attributed to city manager cities.
Williams and Adrian contend that "caretaker government" 
orientations indicate opposition to public (as opposed to 
private) allocations of resources, expansion of governmental 
services, innovations in government, and tax increases. And, 
they continue, arbitrating conflicting interests dominates 
policy "when governmental officials are preoccupied with the 
task of adjusting the varied claims of many interests rather
^^illiams and Adrian, Four Cities, pp. 198-199.
46Ecker-Racz, The Politics and Economics of State- 
Local Finance, pp. 58-59.
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than with combining their energies toward the achievement of 
specific goals."47 Thus a small government orientation might 
well be associated with relatively high reliance on traditional 
sales and services or on indirect revenue sources which repre­
sent only small expansions of government and no sizable tax 
increases. This situation would apply, of course, primarily to 
cities with no sales tax. In any case, it does seem likely 
that the caretaker role would relate to the "amateurism" often 
associated with non-city manager governments. The arbitration 
orientation presents difficulties for this analysis, just as 
it did for Williams and Adrian when they developed it. One 
might speculate that it would be associated with relatively 
high reliance on "indirect" sources (let each interest see that 
other interests carry special or particular revenue burdens) or 
on "intergovernmental" aid (let all interests avoid an immedi­
ate revenue burden). Or it could, through "fringe benefits," 
be ultimately related to relatively high reliance on "sales 
and services" or possibly on "direct impact taxes." The same 
sort of problems arises with respect to relationship to sales 
tax rate and form of government.
47williams and Adrian, Four Cities, pp. 226-251. Quote
on p. 251.
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As for the attitudinal implications of the tables, 
especially Table 2-4, the figures might lead one to speculate 
that officials and citizens in municipalities with relatively 
high reliance on certain revenue sources would tend to prefer 
raising revenue from these sources rather than the other 
sources. To take the most obvious example, officials from the 
2 per cent cities should prefer the sales tax; those from 0 
per cent cities, public enterprises. Or officials from sales 
tax cities might, as suggested earlier, be more likely to 
perceive economic growth and amenities policy roles for their 
governments than might be the case with officials from no-tax 
cities. And if this were the case, it would suggest, in turn, 
that the former group of officials would also tend to perceive 
greater community support and attitudinal congruence with 
constituents and to express views indicative of greater politi­
cal "muscle" and sophistication. Similar thinking might well 
guide research looking for attitudinal differences between 
officials from city manager cities and those from non-city 
manager cities.
Whether such speculation will stand up under empirical 
testing is, however, another question entirely. Research into 
municipal politics oftentimes produces some puzzling results. 
But in any case, subsequent chapters will investigate these 
and other related matters.
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Summary
As with municipalities all across the nation, the 
small and medium sized cities of Oklahoma face critical prob­
lems in securing adequate financial resources to meet rising 
demands for public goods and services. Traditionally, Okla­
homa cities have relied rather sparingly on municipal taxes 
for revenue. A major reason for this has been constitutional/ 
legal constraints which encourage reliance on public enter­
prises, especially utilities. In the mid-1960s, however, the 
state legislature authorized cities and towns to levy a local 
sales tax, and a large number of municipalities throughout the 
state have since tapped this new and lucrative source of 
revenue. But at the same time, many cities have either fore­
gone or only partially used this option. To begin an explora­
tion of why some cities use the sales tax more than others, 
the revenues of a sample of cities with varying reliance on the 
tax were classified and analyzed from the perspective of their 
hypothesized relationship to local tax policy. This effort 
suggests that the sales tax appreciably influences relative 
reliance on other categories of revenue and may well provide 
important clues as to the tax and revenue policies of Oklahoma 
municipalities and to the tax and revenue attitudinal set of 
leaders in these cities and towns. Subsequent chapters attempt
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to relate local tax and revenue patterns to the opinions, per­
ceptions, preferences, and policies of public officials in the 
sample of cities.
CHAPTER III
SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS AND RECRUITMENT OF LOCAL
TAX LEADERS
Introduction
The previous chapter examines the setting of municipal 
taxation and revenue in Oklahoma— focusing on constitutional/ 
legal constraints and their impact on relative reliance on 
various revenue sources, especially the local sales tax. At 
this point, the research effort turns to an exploration of 
possible relationships between these factors and selected 
leadership variables which may bear on the basic question of 
why some Oklahoma cities rely on the municipal sales tax more 
than others do.
Downes' municipal "milieu" or context model offers an 
interesting way to begin approaching this problem. He hypo­
thesizes that the context of local leadership, i,.e_., "those 
tendencies in the composition of the population of a munici­
pality which gave it a characteristic political culture," 
partly determines or influences not only leaders' background 
characteristics but also their policy perceptions, attitudes,
68
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and behavior.1 In keeping with this line of thought, varia­
tions in the local sales tax rate would seem to be affected 
by differences in political culture, values, and other factors 
and, accordingly, to represent a distinctive characteristic of 
the milieu in the Oklahoma municipalities being studied. 
Although this work does not seek to establish causal connec­
tions such as Downes suggests, it does use the contextual 
model to look at associations between, on the one hand, the 
tax rate and other structural factors, e..^ ., form of govern­
ment of the cities, and, on the other hand, tax leaders' back­
ground characteristics and tax-related attitudinal set.
At this point, I want to call attention to a peculiar­
ity of most of the tables in this and subsequent chapters. The 
usual practice is to run percentages in the direction of the 
independent variable if one is trying to explain differences 
in the factor being studied. Throughout this study, however,
I have generally computed percentages along the dependent 
variable, i,.e_., the local sales tax rate. I believe that one 
can justify this practice on several grounds. First, it 
really makes no difference which way the percentages are com­
puted since the interest here is only in showing associations.
Bryan T. Downes, "Municipal Social Rank and the 
Characteristics of Local Political Leaders," Midwest Journal 
of Political Science. XII (November 1968), pp. 514-516. Quote 
on p. 516.
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not analyzing data according to time sequences which would help 
in an effort to establish causality. Second, the research 
design of this study makes it impractical, if not impossible, 
to show causality. For example, many of the present officials 
from cities with a 2 per cent sales tax rate were not neces­
sarily involved in or responsible for the policy factors lead­
ing to the adoption of the 2 per cent tax rate in their cities. 
And third, since the two preceding reasons seem to remove the 
major methodological objections to running percentages in the 
direction of the dependent variable, I think that this prac­
tice helps to simplify the arrangement of the tables, to 
establish a consistent format to assist the reader, and to 
focus attention on the ways in which a wide range of factors 
vary according to the local sales tax rate.
This chapter explores the extent to which variations 
in local sales tax rate are related to differences in certain 
social background and recruitment characteristics of formal 
tax leaders. Subsequent chapters delve into aspects of 
attitudinal differences among leaders from communities with 
varying reliance on certain revenue sources and with differing 
political structures— a main focus being on perceived politi­
cal constraints on local tax and revenue policy.
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Studying Leadership 
"Tax support . . . must start first with the leaders 
of a community; therefore, it is important to understand the
2
conditions under which leaders will support increased taxes."
And the situational setting for local leaders seems like a 
good place to start acquiring such an understanding; for, 
according to most social scientists who study the subject, 
leadership is not so much a matter of "great men" or fixed 
"traits" or isolated "situations" as it is a process of vary­
ing interaction among leaders, followers, and the situation at 
hand.
Dion observes that despite the intense preoccupation 
with the problem of leadership in modern times, political 
leadership remains a most elusive concept to understand. And, 
he adds, given the nature of present day society, the person 
seeking to discover leadership must look for it in large-scale 
organizations.3 This suggests— if one uses the term "large- 
scale organizations" a bit loosely at times— that leadership 
can be fruitfully examined within the context of local commun­
ities and their governments. Another expert, noting considerable
2
Arnold J. Meltsner, The Politics of City Revenue 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. 187.
^Leon Dion, "The Concept of Political Leadership: An
Analysis," Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue cana­
dienne de Science politique, I (March/mars 1968), p. 2.
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disagreement over conceptualizations of leadership, tries to 
synthesize the competing viewpoints by defining leadership as 
"that behavior of an individual which initiates a new struc­
ture in interaction within a social system . . . Leadership 
initiates change in the goals, objectives, structures, proce­
dures, inputs, processes, or outputs of social systems."^
Thus one might— at first glance, at least— expect to find 
community leadership associated with changes in local tax 
rates and reliance on various revenue sources.
This picture of leadership occurring within a setting 
of dynamic organizational vigor fails to tell the whole story, 
however. Isn't maintaining the status-quo a form of leader­
ship? Do cities without a local sales tax lack leadership?
In his study of San Francisco Bay area councils and 
councilman, Eyestone seems to offer a solution to this problem 
through the concept of policy leadership, which he defines as
a special form of political leadership that may be 
exerted in a problematic situation. The policy 
leader is concerned with finding the appropriate 
course of action to deal with the problem in order 
to reach certain desired goals. As a concept, policy 
leadership is explicitly action-oriented and
^James M. Lipham, "Leadership: General Theory and
Research," in Leadership; the Science and the Art Today, ed. by 
Luvern L. Cunningham and William J. Gephart, Twelfth Annual Phi 
Delta Kappa Symposium on Educational Research (Itasca, Illinois: 
F. E. Peacock Publishers, Inc., 1973), p. 6.
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purposive, excluding the affective, symbolic, and 
solidary characteristics that the concept of 
political leadership implies.^
Moreover, this purposive action may be a deliberate choice not 
to try to change things such as the local sales tax rate. 
Accordingly, Eyestone says, "research into the conditions and 
opportunities for policy choice will be at least as rewarding 
as research into the consequences of particular policy 
c h o i c e s . " G  And if "predispositional" factors are as important 
as Hebert indicates,^ one might reasonably conclude that such 
research can ill afford completely to ignore the social back­
ground and recruitment characteristics of local tax leaders.
Data Collection 
In determining the categories of tax leaders to study, 
I decided to limit myself to formal leaders who would, in my 
opinion, tend to be the ones most interested in and familiar 
with the financial problems of their communities and the 
political aspects of resolving these problems. Accordingly, 
between December 1972 and February 1973, I collected names and
^Robert Eyestone, The Threads of Public Policy: A Study
in Policy Leadership (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company,
Inc., 1971), p. 3.
^Ibid., p .  5.
^F. Ted Hebert, "The Politics of Revenue Raising,"
Public Administration Review. XXXIII (September/October 1973), 
p. 474.
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addresses of the mayors, councilman, city managers (as appli­
cable), city clerks, and financial directors (for those few 
cities having a separate financial director) in the 44 cities 
in the sample described in Chapter II. To ensure that I 
obtained current information on the incumbents, I sent letters 
directly to most of the municipalities concerned. In a few 
cases, I visited nearby localities and got the desired infor­
mation from city clerks. Finally, the Oklahoma Municipal 
League provided names and addresses of officials from five 
cities which did not respond to my queries.
Between March and May 1973, I gathered the data used 
in this and subsequent chapters through a questionnaire mailed 
(or, in a few cases, personally delivered) to 323 public 
officials in the 44 cities. A basic questionnaire, with an 
introductory cover letter from the executive director of the 
Oklahoma Municipal League, went to all 323 officials. In 
addition, I sent four additional questions to the 23 city 
managers being queried. Appendix A reproduces the complete 
questionnaire.
I developed most of the items from questions arising 
during the course of background reading and analysis of 
municipal financial data. Several of the questions, however.
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either came directly or were adapted from questionnaires
Q
reproduced in other sources.
To maximize the response, I queried the officials up 
to three times, as necessary, at roughly two-week intervals. 
As indicated in Table 3-1, the overall rate of usable returns 
was 75.5 per cent.^
TABLE 3-1
NUMBER AND PER CENT OF OKLAHOMA MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS RESPONDING 
TO QUESTIONNAIRE, BY SALES TAX RATE OF CITIES
Tax Rate of Offi­
cial's City Is:
Number
Possible
Number
Received Per Cent
0 per cent 82 71 86.5
1 per cent 120 87 71.9
2 per cent 121 86 71.0
Total 323 244 75.5
g
Meltsner, The Politics of City Revenue; David Reid 
Morgan, "Suburban Differentiation and Metropolitan Political 
Integration" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of 
Oklahoma, 1969); Ronald 0. Loveridge, City Managers in Legis­
lative Politics (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc.,
1971) .
Q
The acutal response rate was slightly higher. A few 
officials returned the questionnaire with a note to the effect 
that they had been in office such a short time that they could 
not answer the questions. Others declined to fill out the 
questionnaire because they were no longer in office. And then 
there was the priceless postcard from the mayor of McAlester: 
"Dear Mr. Williams: I have neither the time nor the inclina­
tion to assist you in attaining your Ph.D."
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This return rate stands up fairly well in comparison 
with other mail surveys of municipal officials. For example, 
Morgan got a 78-1 per cent overall return rate from 64 mayors 
and councilman in ten suburban cities within the Oklahoma City 
a r e a . in a statewide survey of 627 Minnesota mayors, 
councilman, city managers, and city clerks, Weidner obtained 
an overall return rate of 62.2 per cent on a questionnaire 
dealing with attitudes on intergovernmental relations.H Even 
with the plus factors of prior acquaintance through interviews 
and personally leaving questionnaires with the officials, the 
San Francisco Bay area researchers managed only an 84 per cent 
return rate.
Table 3-2 shows a breakdown of respondents by office 
held. For the purposes of this study, the 91.3 per cent (21 of 
23) response from city managers was particularly gratifying. 
Well over three-fourths of the respondents are elected offi­
cials since many city clerks run for office.
^^Morgan, "Suburban Differentiation and Metropolitan 
Political Integration," p. 150.
l^Edward W. Weidner, Intergovernmental Relations As 
Seen by Public Officials. Intergovernmental Relations in the 
United States As Observed in the State of Minnesota, Research 
Monograph No. 9 (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota
Press, 1960). Percentage computed from data on p. 157.
l^Kenneth Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Lead­
ers: A Study of Citizen-Politicians (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-
Merrill Company, Inc., 1970), p. 224.
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TABLE 3-2
NUMBER AND PER CENT OF OKLAHOMA MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS RESPONDING TO
QUESTIONNAIRE, BY OFFICE HELD
Office Held
Number
Possible
Number
Received
% of Possible 
Respondents 
in That Office
As
% of Total 
Respondents
Mayor (town 
board 
president) 44 28 63.6 11.5
Councilman 
(town board 
member) 209 156 74.6 63.9
City manager 23 21 91.3 8.6
City (town) 
clerk 44 36 81.8 14.8
Finance
officer 3 3 100.0 1.2
Total 323 244 75.5 100.0
At this point, I want to add one more methodological 
note. In this and subsequent chapters, I usually lump 
together all of the various categories of local officials 
under the analytical heading of formal tax leaders. Some 
readers may object to this practice— preferring instead sep­
arate analyses of, say, mayors and councilmen, city managers, 
and city clerks and finance officers respectively. Such an 
approach obviously has merit. But I do not believe that it 
would best serve the purposes of this study. Here is my
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reasoning. First of all, Ï am focusing on a specific issue, 
viz., municipal taxation and revenue. Both my instincts and 
my observations suggest that these categories of officials 
together make up a sort of "hard-core" or "team" of formal 
leaders most aware of and concerned with the interrelated 
financial and political aspects of this particular issue.
Since I am looking for leadership differences which may help 
to account for variations in reliance on the local sales tax, 
it seems to be reasonable, for the purposes of this study, to 
consider all of the categories of officials as a single group 
of formal tax leaders and then to divide the group according 
to such things as sales tax rate and form of government (Chap­
ter V, incidentally, does give some attention to city managers 
alone).
Background Characteristics of Tax Leaders 
In preparing the questionnaire, I decided to omit most 
of the usual socioeconomic status (SES) variables, e,.g., sex, 
education, income, religion. I had several reasons for doing 
so. First of all, many of these variables did not seem par­
ticularly important to a study of formal leaders in the 
municipal tax policy process. For instance, Meltsner's explor­
ation of tax and revenue leadership in Oakland gives only
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passing attention to SES characteristics.^^ And, with the 
exception of Prewitt's work, the same holds true for the San 
Francisco Bay area studies.Second, the state and local, 
community power structure, and socialization and recruitment 
literature has so intensively analyzed SES variables that I 
deemed it unnecessary to pursue this line of inquiry to any 
great extent. Third, Welsh— citing a number of studies of 
European political leaders— argues that recent career experi­
ences are much more important than social background charac­
teristics in explaining the issue orientations of those in 
political leadership positions.Prewitt and associates 
reach comparable conclusions in an analysis of state legis­
lators and city councilmen.Fourth, my early experiences 
with municipal officials indicated that they would be highly 
suspicious of "outsiders"— especially political scientists—  
who were asking for detailed information about their personal
l^Meltsner, The Politics of City Revenue.
^"^Eyestone, The Threads of Public Policy; Loveridge, 
City Managers in Legislative Politics; Prewitt, The Recruitment 
of Political Leaders; Betty H. Zisk, Local Interest Politics, 
a One-Way Street (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company,
Inc., 1973).
^^William A. Welsh, Studying Politics (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1973), pp. 124-125.
l^Kenneth Prewitt, Heinz Eulau, and Betty H. Zisk, 
"Political Socialization and Political Roles," Public Opinion 
Quarterly. XXX (Winter 1966-1967), pp. 569-582.
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lives. This suggested that they might well be "turned-off" by 
a mail questionnaire from an unknown individual who wanted to 
pry into such things as their income and educational level.
If this were the case, it could jeopardize the return rate. 
Finally, the questionnaire itself seemed too long as it was, 
and I certainly did not want to hurt the response rate by 
adding to its bulk unnecessarily.
Despite these numerous reservations about using SES 
variables, I did feel that I should look at four background 
characteristics which seemed particularly important. These 
characteristics were (1) length of residence in the community, 
(2) occupation, (3) motivation for entering local public office, 
and (4) length of time in local public office. I assumed that 
a request for such information would not appear threatening or 
embarrassing to the respondents. And at the same time, I 
believed that data on these variables might provide valuable 
insights into differences in the innovativeness of the milieu 
of the local tax and revenue process. This latter point was 
suggested by the theoretical generalizing of Rogers and Shoe­
maker. On the basis of content analyses of research publica­
tions in the Diffusion Documents Center at Michigan State 
University, these authors offer impressive empirical evidence 
concerning the relationship of various characteristics to 
innovativeness. They find, for example, that innovations (or
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"earlier adopters") are related to such things as non- 
traditional norms and favorable attitude toward change, cos­
mopolite attitudes and experiences, higher occupational status, 
commercial economic orientation, high achievement motivation, 
favorable attitude toward venturesomeness and risk-taking, and 
a relatively short period between learning about an innovation 
and deciding to adopt it.^^
Length of Residence 
In his study of mayors and councilmen in six California 
communities, Lee found that length of residence averaged 28 
y e a r s . I n  their famous study of Springdale, Vidich and 
Bensman say that the town always elected officials who were 
long-time (at least ten years and preferably lifelong) residents 
And these individuals, the authors continue, invariably sub­
scribed to a low-tax, low-spending ideology which accurately 
reflected community v a l u e s . O t h e r  studies suggest a similar
l^Everett M. Rogers, with F. Floyd Shoemaker, Communi­
cation of Innovations— a Cross-Cultural Approach (2d ed.; New 
York: The Free Press, 1971), Chapters 3-5.
l^Eugene C . Lee, The Politics of Nonpartisanship; A 
Study of California City Elections (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1960), p. 51.
19Arthur J. Vidich and Joseph Bensman, Small Town in 
Mass Society: Class, Power and Religion in a Rural Community
(rev. ed.; Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1968), p. 115.
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conservatism for long-term residents. For example, Bouma did 
a case study of a referendum on a proposal to retain a Kalama­
zoo, Michigan, housing commission established to deal with 
housing problems of low-income families. The commission was 
linked with the threat of "socialistic" public housing during 
the course of the campaign. Bouma found that opposition to the
proposal— which was defeated— was somewhat higher among long- 
20time residents.
In addition, one cannot overlook the "stake in society"
aspect of long residency. A recent review article, for
instance, contends that the long-time resident probably feels
that he has a greater stake in the well-being of the community
01than the newcomer does. If, as suggested above, the old- 
timer tends to be conservative, he might well view his stake 
in the community in terms of low-tax, low-spending values as 
well as preferences for familiar and traditional forms of 
municipal financing. This implies, of course, that the rela­
tively more liberal or "progressive" newcomer would tend to
^^Donald H. Bouma, Why Kalamazoo Voted No; the Defeat 
of a Housing Proposal (Kalamazoo, Michigan: The W. E. Upjohn
Institute for Employment Research, 1962), pp. 1-2, 6-7.
^^Northern Illinois University, Staff of the Center 
for Governmental Studies, "Citizen Participation and Local 
Government in the United States— an Analysis of Recent Research," 
Studies in Comparative Local Government, V. No. 2 (Winter 
1971), p. 88.
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favor higher taxes, more spending, and innovative forms of 
public financing in order to improve his stake in society. In 
short, one might reasonably speculate that as the proportion 
of long-term residents decreases, the local sales tax rate 
increases. Table 3-3 looks at Oklahoma municipal tax leaders 
in terms of this hypothesized relationship.
TABLE 3-3
DURATION OF RESIDENCE IN COMMUNITY FOR OFFICIALS, 
BY LOCAL SALES TAX RATE (in percentages)
Sales Tax :Rate
Years of 
Residence
0%
Cities
1%
Cities
2%
Cities Total
Newcomers
0-5
6-10
Total newcomers
4.3
11.4
15.7
8.1
10.5
18.6
12.8
12.8
25.6
8.6
11.5
20.1
Mid-termers
11-20
21-30
Total mid-termers
20.0
22.9
42.9
31.4
18.6
50.0
15.1
27.9
43.0
22.4
23.1
42.5
Old-timers 
31-40 
41-50 
51 or more
Total old-timers
25.7
11.4
4.3
41.4
16.3
8.1
7.0
31.4
18.6
11.6
1.2
31.4
19.8
10.3
4.1
34.2
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.8
(N) (70) (86) (86) (242)
NOTE: Some percentages do not total 100 because of rounding.
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Table 3-3 generally supports the expected pattern.
The proportion of leaders in the newcomer category is notice­
ably higher in the cities with a 2 per cent sales tax than it 
is in the cities with no sales tax. And the proportions 
decline in almost equal stages as one moves across columns 
from right to left. Roughly comparable relationships appear 
in the opposite direction when one looks at the old-timers. 
Inspecting the table vertically, one finds that the ratio of 
old-timers to newcomers is almost three-to-one in the 0 per 
cent cities, nearly two-to-one in the 1 per cent cities, and 
roughly one-to-one in the 2 per cent cities. And, interest­
ingly, exactly one-half of the officials from cities with a 1 
per cent local sales tax are mid-termers.
Occupation
The literature of political science amply documents
the "Main Street dominance" of local government. Morgan, for
example, cites several older studies to back up this point and
notes that 94 per cent of the officials in his sample indica-
22ted that they were in white collar occupations. Buechner 
reports comparable findings in his study of Colorado city
22Morgan, "Suburban Differtiation and Metropolitan 
Political Integration," pp. 155-159.
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managers and councilmen. According to the results of the 
Stanford University City Council Research Project and research 
sponsored by the Institute of Governmental Studies at the 
University of California, Berkeley, roughly 70 to 80 per cent 
of the councilmen in the San Francisco Bay area were either 
businessmen or professionals.^^ And Downes shows that about 
one-half (49 per cent) of the St. Louis area councilmen whom 
he studied were in occupations classified as proprietory, 
managerial, professional or technical. In addition, roughly 
one-fifth (22 per cent) of these officials were in lower SES 
white collar occupations; nearly three-tenths (29 per cent)
T C
held blue collar jobs or fell into the "other" category.
Table 3-4 reveals a somewhat similar occupational pattern for 
the public officials surveyed in this study.
23john C. Buechner, Differences in Role Perceptions in 
Colorado Council-Manaqer Cities (Boulder: Bureau of Govern­
mental Research and Service, University of Colorado, 1955), 
p. 25.
24Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders, p.
225; Willis D. Hawley, Nonpartisan Elections and the Case for 
Partv Politics (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973), p. 139.
25Downes, "Municipal Social Rank and the Characteristics 
of Local Political Leaders," p. 518.
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TABLE 3-4
OCCUPATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF OFFICIALS, BY LOCAL SALES 
TAX RATE (in percentages)
Sales Tax Rate
Occupational
Classification
0%
Cities
1%
Cities 1
2%
Cities Total
Proprietary 
Managerial, profes­
sional, and
21.1 27.6 37.2 29.1
technical 26.8 21.8 31.4 26.6
Total 47.9 49.4 68.6 55.7
White collar workers 22.5 19.5 16.3 19.3
Blue collar workers 12.7 12.6 8.1 11.1
Retired 8.5 9.2 4.7 7.4
Farmers 5.6 4.6 0.0 3.3
Other 2.8 4.6 2.3 3.3
Total 52.1 50.5 31.4 44.4
TOTAL 100.0 99.9 100.0 100.1
(N) (71) (87) (86) (244)
NOTE: Some percentages do not total 100 because of rounding.
Overall, high SES occupations characterize most of the 
public officials. And businessmen (proprietors) make up the 
dominant category in those cities which have either a 1 or a 2 
per cent sales tax. But only in the 2 per cent cities do offi­
cials with high SES occupations constitute a majority— and a 
substantial one at that. This suggests that occupations and 
sales tax rate are in some way associated, and that occupational 
status can perhaps furnish a clue to differences in reliance on 
the local sales tax.
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Both Meltsner and Vidich and Bensman confirm the gen­
eral pattern of "Main Street dominance" of local politics 
discussed above. They add that these businessmen-politicians 
subscribe to a low-tax ideology. And Prewitt suggests that 
by selecting like-minded replacements, as well as through 
direct teaching and imitation learning, local public officials
tend to perpetuate their preferred community values over
27successive generations of leadership.
The preceding chapter argued that public officials in 
Oklahoma seem to share this low-tax ideology. And at the 
local level, businessmen are apparently a potent, if not pre­
dominant, force in municipal government. But when one looks 
at the proportions of businessmen in the three groups of cities, 
he finds that this presumably "anti-taxes" occupational cate­
gory increases its representation in city government as the 
sales tax rate rises. In some cases, perhaps, as Eyestone 
says, "low-taxes" constitute a part of the officials' formal 
rhetoric, not necessarily their personal preferences and 
values.
Z^Vidich and Bensman, Small Town in Mass Society, pp. 
114-115; Meltsner, The Politics of City Revenue, pp. 61-71.
^^Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders, p. 120. 
28
Eyestone, The Threads of Public Policy, p. 65.
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Why should this be so? One can, of course, speculate 
on any number of explanations. But the data on length of 
residence might possibly suggest that newcomer innovativeness 
and "progressivism" are somehow influencing the businessmen 
in the sales tax cities to break with the low-tax ideology and 
to view the levy as a means of enhancing community well-being 
and their stake in it. Moreover, if "the occupation of bus­
inessman and the role of councilman converge," as Prewitt 
contends,29 perhaps— in keeping with some of Rogers and Shoe­
maker's generalizations concerning innovation— this commerci­
ally oriented group of entrepreneurs or risk-takers becomes 
more "municipal achievement” oriented and hence more willing to 
assume leadership on a politically risky issue such as a tax- 
increase proposal. This would seem, to be particularly true in 
situations where proprietary businessmen can find allies in a 
coalition with a progressive managerial-professional-technical 
class. Within the context of such a "new convergence of power," 
to use Salisbury's phrase, the coalition might actively search 
for innovative solutions to problems regarded as critical to 
the city's growth and readily initiate programs involving major 
allocations of resources.
29Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders, p. 164.
^^Robert H. Salisbury, "Urban Politics: The New Con­
vergence of Power," Journal of Politics. XXVI (November 1964),
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The data in Table 3-4 offer some support for this sort 
of explanation. Almost 70 per cent of the officials in the 2 
per cent cities work in proprietary, managerial, professional, 
or technical occupations. In contrast, about one-half of the 
officials in the other two groups of cities fall into occupa­
tional categories which one might reasonably associate with 
low-tax, low-spending conservatism.
Recruitment Motivation 
Motivation constitutes an important variable in
31accounting for a public official's recruitment into office. 
Citing a substantial body of literature, Morgan points out
pp. 775-797. In keeping with this line of reasoning, it is 
interesting to note that the results of a psychological 
experiment suggest, among other things, that persons with 
strong achievement motives will prefer to undertake moderately 
risky tasks; whereas those motivated mainly by desire to avoid 
failure will select the easiest or safest of all alternative 
tasks. Persons in high SES occupations would seem likely to 
have strong achievement motivation. See John W. Atkinson, 
"Motivational Determinants of Risk-Taking Behavior," Psycholog­
ical Review. LXIV, Part 1 (November 1957), pp. 359-372.
^^John D. Parker, "Classification of Candidates' Moti­
vations for First Seeking Office," Journal of Politics. XXXIV 
(February 1972), p. 268. For a useful overview of the politi­
cal recruitment literature, see Dwaine Marvick, "Political 
Recruitment and Careers," in International Encyclopedia of the 
Social Sciences, ed. by David L. Sills, XII (n.p.: The Mac­
Millan Company & The Free Press, 1968), pp. 273-281. The 
broader area of political socialization is well covered by 
Richard G, Niemi, "Political Socialization," in Handbook of 
Political Psychology, ed. by Jeanne N. Knutson (San Francisco; 
Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1973), pp. 117-138.
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that most of the political recruitment studies have focused on 
partisan political systems. However, he continues, the elu­
sive subject of motivation "seems particularly important in a 
system of nonpartisan elections where the absence of party 
machinery has eliminated the traditional political institution
which ordinarily has the major responsibility for recruiting,
32screening and promoting candidates for elective office."
To see whether recruitment motivation differences 
appear among the three groups of formal tax leaders, I used 
one of Morgan's questions to try to ascertain how the public 
officials first got into office. The question offered four 
structured responses (friend or neighbor, work in a community 
organization, issue-related interest, nature of occupation), 
plus an open-ended "other" category. Table 3-5 shows the re­
sponses to the question.
Perhaps the most striking thing about Table 3-5 is the 
way that the influence of friends and neighbors declines as 
the sales tax rate increases. And with this decline in the 
"politics of acquaintance" comes a slight rise in concern over 
local issues and problems. Looking at the table vertically, 
one can see that among officials in the 0 per cent cities, the 
ratio of "friends and neighbors" to "issues and problems" is
32Morgan, "Suburban Differentiation and Metropolitan 
Political Integration," pp. 166-167. Quote on p. 167.
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TABLE 3-5
RECRUITMENT MOTIVATION OF OFFICIALS, BY LOCAL SALES TAX
RATE (in percentages)
Sales Tax Rate
First got into 
office through:
0%
Cities
1%
Cities
2%
Cities Total
Friend or neighbor 
got me interested 45.1 32.2 25.9 33.7
Work in a community 
organization 7.0 18.4 11.8 12.8
Interest in a parti­
cular issue or 
problem 16.9 16.1 20.0 17.7
Nature of occupation 15.5 9.2 14.1 12.8
Other
Total
15.5
100.0
24.1
100.0
28.2
100.0
23.0
100.0
(N) (71) (87) (85) (243)
about three-to-one; in the 1 per cent cities, two-to-one; and 
in the 2 per cent cities, almost one-to-one.
Putnam may offer a clue to accounting for these differ­
ences. He contends that individuals within a community tend 
to be especially sensitive to friends' opinions, and that the 
political environment of the community strongly influences the 
complexion of friendship g r o u p s . I f  this is the case, it
33Robert D. Putnam, "Political Attitudes and the Local 
Community," American Political Science Review. LX (September 
1966), p. 652.
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suggests that acquaintances holding a low-tax ideology are 
much less influential in the recruitment process in the 2 per 
cent cities than they are elsev^ere. Similarly, since practi­
cally all municipal issues and problems are, in one way or 
another, related to local finances, one might speculate that 
tax leaders in the 1 and 2 per cent cities are appreciably 
more motivated by individualistic concerns for community well­
being and less influenced by a low-tax "community climate" 
than are officials in the 0 per cent group of cities.
The proportions of officials falling into the "other" 
category may also be related to this last point, for respon­
dents indicating appointment to office were coded there. Lee 
found that some 26 per cent of the officials in his survey 
came to office by appointment.^^ Prewitt likewise reports that 
about one-fourth of the San Francisco Bay area councilman were 
appointed to office, and he considers this situation to be a 
key factor in explaining their "volunteerism" and indifference 
to electoral accountability.^^
I cannot make too much of Prewitt's argument for the 
purposes of this study because the "other" category includes
^^Lee, The Politics of Nonpartisanship, pp. 66-67.
35prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders, pp. 
210-211; Kenneth Prewitt, "Political Ambitions,- Volunteerism, 
and Electoral Accountability," American Political Science 
Review. LXIV (March 1970), p. 10.
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appointed city managers and city clerks and because, unfortun­
ately, I failed to ask elected officials specifically whether 
they first came to office by appointment. However, 15 elected 
officials (all councilman) "volunteered" the information that 
they first got into office through appointment. These 15 
individuals represent about 10 per cent of the councilman 
(or 8 per cent of the mayors and councilman) in the sample.
This suggests, at least, that the proportion of appointees 
might well approach Lee and Prewitt's figures if I had raised 
the matter in the questionnaire. This point seems particularly 
significant when one looks at the 15 councilman in relation to 
the sales tax rates in their respective cities, for 12 (80 per 
cent) come from cities with a 1 or 2 per cent local sales 
tax. Hence one might speculate that the "volunteerism" ethic 
is a much stronger force among officials in cities with a 
municipal sales tax. And if this is the case, it suggests that 
an important difference in local tax leadership is associated 
with a relative lack of concern over public opinion and the 
consequences— both electoral and personal— of supporting 
unpopular issues such as tax-increase proposals.
Such speculation is, of course, merely suggestive. 
Subsequent chapters explore tax leaders' motivations in 
greater detail.
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Length of Tenure in Office
Vidich and Bensman indicate that local public officials
are not only old-time residents but also long-term incumbents
in office.36 And Adrian generalizes that nonpartisan electoral
systems tend to produce conservative, long-tenured legislative 
37bodies. In Lee's study of six California communities, the
councilman's average tenure ranged from 5.5 to 9.6 years— the
38average time in office overall being about six years.
Other research efforts have, however, found a tendency 
toward shorter tenure. Huckshorn and Young indicate that 
roughly 60 per cent of the Los Angeles area councilman in their 
survey had been in office less than four years.39 Almost 70 
per cent of the councilman in the San Francisco Bay area had 
first entered office within the preceding five years, and 
nearly 30 per cent of the officials had only two years of
^^Vidich and Bensman, Small Town in Mass Society, pp.
114-120.
37Charles R. Adrian, "Some General Characteristics of 
Nonpartisan Elections," American Political Science Review,
XLVI (September 1952), pp. 774-775.
3®Lee, The Politics of Nonpartisanship, pp. 67-69.
39Robert J. Huckshorn and Charles E. Young, "Study of 
Voting Splits on City Councils in Los Angeles County," Western 
Political Quarterly. XIII (June 1960), pp. 492-493. Percentage 
computed.
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service or less.^O Morgan reports a median length of tenure 
of 3.0 years for 50 office-holders in the Oklahoma City area.^^ 
A 1971 nationwide survey of city councils in municipalities of 
over 5,000 population reveals that more than half of the 
councilman were serving in their first term, and that some 60 
per cent had served four years or less. The survey also notes 
that newcomers predominated in the councils of smaller cities 
(5,000-25,000 population).42
In sum, previous research offers somewhat contradictory 
results. Table 3-6 apparently affords support for the "short 
tenure" school of thought.
The overall figures generally agree with the results 
reported by Huckshorn and Young, Prewitt, and Klevit. And if 
one computes the percentages for mayors and councilman alone, 
the short-termers become even more predominant. For example, 
67.3 per cent of this group of officials report a tenure in 
office of four years or less; in contrast, only 14.2 per cent 
have served nine years or more.
4®Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders, pp.
225-226.
41Morgan, "Suburban Differentiation and Metropolitan 
Political Integration," p. 175.
42aian Klevit, "City Councils and Their Functions in 
Local Government," in The Municipal Year Book, 1972, by Inter­
national City Management Association (Washington, D.C.; The 
Association, 1972), pp. 15-17.
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TABLE 3-6
TENURE IN OFFICE OF OFFICIALS, BY LOCAL SALES TAX RATE
(in percentages)
Tenure in 
Office (years)
Sales Tax Rate
0%
Cities
1%
Cities
2%
Cities Total
0-2 33.8 29.1 43.0 35.4
3-4 11.3 31.4 31.4 25.5
Total 45,1 60.5 74.4 60.9
5-6 9.9 14.0 10.5 11.5
7-8 11.3 11.6 4.7 9.1
Total 21.2 25.6 15.2 20.6
9-10 9.9 2.3 5.8 5.8
11 or more 23.9 11.6 4.7 12.8
Total 33.8 13.9 10.5 18.6
TOTAL 101.1 100.0 100.1 100.1
(N) (71) (86) (86) (243)
NOTE: Percentages do not always total 100 because of rounding.
For purposes of this research effort, however, the most 
significant thing about Table 3-6 is the way in which a rising 
proportion of short-termers accompanies an increase in the local 
sales tax rate. About three-fourths of the officials from the 
2 per cent cities have served four years or less. But for 0 
per cent officials, the short-termer figure drops below one- 
half. In contrast, approximately one-third of the officials 
from the 0 per cent cities have held local office for nine 
years or more, whereas only about one-in-ten of the officials 
from the 1 and the 2 per cent cities falls into this category.
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The data collected from the officials were insuffici­
ent to indicate whether incumbents were frequently defeated 
during reelection bids or whether they simply chose not to run 
again. However, Prewitt forcefully makes the point that San 
Francisco Bay area "volunteers" were generally indifferent 
about reelection and tended to leave office at w i l l H e n c e ,  
one might reasonably speculate that the low tenure rate for 
Oklahoma municipal officials— particularly those from the sales 
tax cities— results mainly from personal choice, not electoral 
defeat.
In any case. Table 3-6 does associate short tenure with 
higher local sales tax rates. And this relationship, in turn, 
suggests that sales tax cities tend to receive more frequent 
infusions of "fresh blood" with respect to innovative tax and 
revenue leadership. Also, in passing, it seems to add weight 
to Prewitt's argument that the "volunteerism" ethic is an 
important factor in local politics.
Summary
Variations in the local sales tax rate seems to repre­
sent a distinctive contextual characteristic of Oklahoma 
municipalities. As such, these differences offer a good frame­
work for studying local tax leadership from a number of
43Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders,
Chapters 8 and 9.
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perspectives. This chapter focuses on selected social back­
ground and recruitment characteristics of local tax policy 
leaders in an effort to gain some insight into differences in 
the innovativeness of the milieu of municipal tax and revenue 
processes. Information on these matters came from a question­
naire returned by 244 formal leaders considered immediately 
interested in and familiar with local tax and revenue problems 
and the political aspects of resolving such problems.
The results of the survey suggest that formal tax 
leaders in cities with relatively high sales tax rates have 
certain social background and recruitment characteristics 
associated with innovativeness and a general lack of concern 
over constraints presumably imposed by the political environ­
ment. More specifically, in comparison with officials from 
cities with no local sales tax, officials in sales tax cities 
tend to have resided in their communities for a much shorter 
length of time, to hold higher SES occupations, to be less 
influenced by friends and neighbors (and, presumably, their 
traditional low-tax ideology) at the time of recruitment into 
public office, and to have much shorter tenure in office.
In short, this chapter offers evidence suggesting an 
overall background pattern of progressiveness and innovative­
ness among officials in sales tax cities. The next chapter
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explores whether this pattern still holds when officials 
indicate their attitudes, perceptions, and preferences con­
cerning a number of different factors bearing on the municipal 
tax and revenue process.
CHAPTER IV
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MUNICIPAL TAX LEADERSHIP 
Introduction
The two preceding chapters examined the political 
economy of local taxation in Oklahoma and selected social back­
ground characteristics of municipal tax leaders. At various 
points, the discussion included speculation as to possible 
relationships between these factors and the attitudinal set 
of the tax leadership in Oklahoma cities and towns. The first 
part of this chapter explores some of these hypothesized 
relationships. The remainder of the chapter uses this initial 
work as a touchstone for analyzing local tax leadership from 
a variety of psychological perspectives.
Psychology and Local Tax Leadership 
Noting that elite attitudes and behavior critically 
influence the operation of the political system. Sears under­
scores the importance of research on "questions that try to 
explain political decisions as a complex function of elite
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dispositions, role requirements, and public opinion."^ The 
interworkings of beliefs, attitudes, values and motivations 
provide political leaders with "operational codes," or frames 
of reference, through which to perceive and act on policies. 
Thus at the local level, as Eyestone points out, municipal 
political leaders serve as "crucial intervening agents" as they 
adopt policies which link problem recognition to problem reso­
lution. Local policy-makers are the focal point for all of 
the influences on city policy. "Their beliefs and interpre­
tations are the ultimate deciding factors in the city policy 
process."3 in short, as a public finance economist observes.
^David 0. Sears, "Political Behavior," in The Handbook 
of Social Psychology, ed. by Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aron­
son, Vol. 5 (2d ed.; Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley
Publishing Company, 1969), pp. 437-438. Quote on p. 438.
^Arnold J. Meltsner, "Political Feasibility and Policy 
Analysis," Public Administration Review. XXXII (November/ 
December 1972), pp. 861-862. For a good discussion of the 
"operational code" construct, see Alexander L. George, "The 
'Operational Code’: A Neglected Approach to the Study of
Political Leaders and Decision-Making," International Studies 
Quarterly. XIII (June 1969), pp. 190-222.
^Robert Eyestone, The Threads of Public Policy: A
Study in Policy Leadership (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill
Company, Inc., 1971), p. 5.
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the real answer to urban financial questions and problems may 
well be rooted in human psychology.^
A Methodological Note
A political scientist comes naturally to the thought 
that the power a group exercises makes it a strategic 
universe for a survey. Surveys of political elites 
seem more consequential than are surveys of ordinary 
men, and the political, as well as the theoretical and 
the practical, provides a principle for locating 
strategic universes. One can easily make elites the 
exclusive object of attention in a survey . . . , but 
such an approach then relegates the rank and file to 
an object worthy of no attention from surveyors. 
Sensibly, the two groups are often incorporated into 
the same large inquiry, the findings about each being 
regarded as complementary parts of the total picture.^
Sears and Hebert, among others, also emphasize the complemen­
tary importance of public attitudes and opinions in arriving at 
an understanding of the policy process.^ This seems particu­
larly true with respect to getting at similarities and differ­
ences between leaders and followers on local tax and revenue 
matters.
^Donald J. Curran, Metropolitan Financing: The
Milwaukee Experience. 1920-1970 (Madison: The University of
Wisconsin Press, 1973), p. xiii.
^Herbert H. Hyman, "Surveys in the Study of Political 
Psychology," in Handbook of Political Psychology, ed. by 
Jeanne N. Knutson (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers,
1973), p. 331. (Italics his.)
®Sears, "Political Behavior," pp. 437-438; F. Ted 
Hebert, "The Politics of Revenue Raising," Public Administra­
tion Review. XXXIII (September/October 1973), pp. 473-478.
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One can attack this problem either through an actual 
comparative survey of leader and public opinion or through 
comparison of leaders' attitudes with their perceptions of 
public attitudes. In recent years, the latter approach has 
received substantial support. Meller, for example, says that 
"it is the legislator’s perceptions of constituency preferences 
which have immediate import, not necessarily the views held by 
constituents nor even constituent knowledge of their repre-
•7
sentative's action." Zisk similarly justifies using San 
Francisco Bay area councilman's perception of reality and their 
reported behavior as a substitute for the reality described by 
other actors or inferred from documentary research. Unless 
councilman perceive and assign importance to similarities and 
differences with others, she says, the "actual" situation will 
scarcely influence their predispositions and behavior. More­
over, she adds, one cannot automatically assume that other 
research techniques, e.jg., interviews with other actors, would 
produce substantially different or qualitatively better
O
results. Alford develops an argument somewhat similar to
^Norman Meller, "'Legislative Behavior Research' 
Revisited; A Review of Five Years' Publications," Western 
Political Quarterly, XVIII (December 1965), p. 788.
p
Betty H. Zisk, Local Interest Politics, a One-Way 
Street (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1973),
pp. 6-7.
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Zisk's first point as he discusses the way in which political 
actors respond to the "climate of opinion.
Some empirical research raises questions about the 
validity of the perceptual a p p r o a c h . B u t  other studies seem 
to lend support for this technique. For instance, a 1969 
survey of 12 local areas in Iowa revealed a high degree of 
shared feelings among authorities, links, and citizens with 
respect to "what was right" for their communities.^^ Morgan 
did an actual comparative survey of councilmen and citizens 
in Oklahoma City area suburbs. In comparing his work with the 
results of the San Francisco Bay area— notably that part of it
^Robert R. Alford, Bureaucracy and Participation: 
Political Cultures in Four Wisconsin Cities (Chicago; Rand 
McNally & Co., 1969), p. 7-
lOgee, for example, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. 
Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," American Politi­
cal Science Review, LVII (March 1963), pp. 45-56; Norman R. 
Luttbeg, "Patterns of Leadership Policy Preference: A Study of
Some Assumptions in Community Research," in Public Opinion and 
Public Policy; Models of Political Linkage, ed. by Norman R. 
Luttbeg (Homewood, Illinois; The Dorsey Press, 1968), pp. 
355-364; Roberta S. Sigel and H. Paul Friesema, "Urban Commun­
ity Leaders' Knowledge of Public Opinion," Western Political 
Quarterly. XVIII (December 1965), pp. 881-895; Carl D.
McMurray and Malcolm B. Parsons, "Public Attitudes toward the 
Representational Roles of Legislators and Judges," Midwest 
Journal of Political Science, IX (May 1965), pp. 167-185.
l^Citizens and Local Governments in Iowa; Problems, 
Participation, and Attitudes, Working Paper No. 3 of Local 
Government in Iowa ; Problems and Perspectives (Iowa City; 
Institute of Public Affairs, The University of Iowa, 1971), 
p. 29.
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pertaining to the "norm of volunteerism"— he suggests that at 
least in Oklahoma City area suburbs, city councilmen appear to 
adhere fairly closely to the policy views of the community-at- 
large.^^ And on the specific question of local taxation and 
revenue, Meltsner used a survey of positional "citizen-leaders" 
as a substitute for general public opinion on the finances of 
Oakland.
In sura, then, the literature seems to provide adequate 
— though not conclusive— theoretical and empirical justifica­
tion for approaching public attitudes and opinions through the 
perceptions of leaders. When one adds to this the practical 
consideration of limited time and resources, the perceptual 
approach becomes very attractive indeed. Accordingly, this 
study uses the "leaders' perceptions" technique in those parts 
attempting to portray citizen attitudes and opinions.
The Environment of Municipal Tax Policy 
Williams and Adrian contend that American municipali­
ties all appear to be pretty much the same because they all 
face similar problems. The perceptive observer can, however.
12
David R. Morgan, "Political Linkage and Public 
Policy: Attitudinal Congruence Between Citizens and Officials,"
Western Political Quarterly. XXVI (June 1973), p. 209.
l^Arnold J. Meltsner, The Politics of City Revenue 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), Chapter 6.
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readily find dissimilarities by looking for variations in 
responses to these problems. And such variations in responses 
or accomplishments indicate that differing sets of values 
appear to guide the policy process from place to p l a c e . I n  
view of the earlier discussion of tax-leadership psychology, 
Williams and Adrian's argument suggests that an exploration of 
certain aspects of the perceived policy environment might pro­
vide some useful insights in trying to account for differences 
in local sales tax policy. Accordingly, this first part of 
the chapter focuses on roles of government (particularly as they 
relate to revenue-raising preferences) , local tax climate, and 
community self-reliance values.
Governmental Roles and Revenue Preferences 
The latter part of Chapter II presented a politically 
oriented classification of municipal taxes and revenues in 
Oklahoma and used this scheme to analyze the finances of a 
sample of 44 Oklahoma cities and towns with varying local 
sales tax rates. In general, the analysis revealed that cities 
with no sales tax tend to rely heavily only on traditional 
"sales and services," but that municipalities with the sales 
tax rank high or medium in reliance on all four revenue
14Oliver P. Williams and Charles R. Adrian, Four Cities; 
A Study in Comparative Policy Making (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 1963), pp. 11 and 22.
107
categories. Of particular interest was that reliance on pub­
lic enterprises tends to decline noticeably as the sales tax 
rate rises.
The results of the analysis led to speculation about 
possible ways in which these varying degrees of reliance on 
different revenue sources might relate to the local policy 
roles formulated by Williams and Adrian and to the revenue- 
raising preferences of formal tax leaders. For example, as 
compared with officials from cities with no sales tax, formal 
tax leaders from sales tax cities might be more likely to 
perceive economic growth and amenities policy roles for their 
governments and to prefer the local sales tax as a source of 
additional revenue. In contrast, one might expect officials 
from the 0 per cent cities to perceive "caretaker" policy roles 
for their governments and to prefer more traditional sources, 
e.g.., public enterprises, for raising more revenue.
Chapter III lent some additional support to this line 
of thought. It suggested, for instance, a tendency for offi­
cials from sales tax cities to have an overall social back­
ground conducive to progressive and innovative attitudes. And 
contrary to what one might expect according to the conventional 
wisdom about a low-tax ideology among businessmen, it showed 
that as the sales tax rate rises, the proportion of presumably 
"anti-taxes" businessmen in city government increases.
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Moreover, this group represents the dominant occupational 
category of officials in cities with a sales tax. As for the 
policy orientation of such officials, Ecker-Racz contends that 
they "yearn for trade and industry . . . And Downes
reports that 84 per cent of the St. Louis area councilmen in 
his survey approved of bringing in new i ndustry.Hence  one 
might reasonably expect to find that officials from sales tax 
cities in Oklahoma are more likely than are their 0 per cent 
counterparts to perceive economic growth and, perhaps—  
twisting the thrust of the Williams and Adrian typology some­
what— industry-attracting amenities roles for their governments, 
In addition, they should have a greater tendency to prefer 
"progressive," innovative, and governmentally expansive means 
of acquiring additional revenues to underwrite these municipal 
policy roles.
As an initial step in exploring these matters, I asked 
the city officials to rank-order the policy orientations of 
their communities according to the Williams and Adrian typology. 
Appendix A, item 4, gives the wording of the question and the
L. L. Ecker-Racz, The Politics and Economics of State- 
Local Finance (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1970), p. 20.
^^Bryan T. Downes, "Municipal Social Rank and the 
Characteristics of Local Political Leaders," Midwest Journal 
of Political Science. XII (November 1968), pp. 531-532.
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possible r e s p o n s e s . Table 4-1 shows how the officials re­
plied to the question; the results indicate that many of the 
expected relationships do indeed appear.
Officials from all three groups of cities stress the 
economic growth role. But as the sales tax rate rises, the 
proportion of those assigning it first place increases notice­
ably. And whereas only about one-in-ten of the officials from 
the sales tax cities give economic growth a low priority 
(third or fourth rank), the comparable ratio for 0 per cent 
officials is better than three-in-ten.
The small government or "caretaker" orientation shows 
a definite trend in the opposite direction. Officials from 
cities with no sales tax divide about evenly on assigning a 
high or a low rating to this policy role. This comment by a 
0 per cent official may well exemplify the feelings of many 
tax leaders in his group:
Our city government has in the past actively sought 
industry— placing themselves in the position of a 
chamber of commerce. However, they have ceased these 
activities because their efforts seemed to be encour­
aging citizens to expect city government to provide 
them with all services— some of which should be com­
munity projects (such as youth centers, senior citi­
zens activities, etc.). (Official 206)
This item is essentially the same as one published 
in Ronald 0. Loveridge, City Managers in Legislative Politics 
(Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1971) pp.
172 and 185.
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table 4 -1
RANK-ORDER OF POLICY ROLES OF GOVERNMENT AS PERCEIVED BY LOCAL 
OFFICIALS, BY LOCAL SALES TAX RATE (in percentages)
Policy Role and 
Rank-Order Are;
Sales Tax Rate
0%
Cities
1% 2% 
Cities Cities Total
Economic growth
First 58.3 73.2 80.3 71.5
Second 10.0 16.9 6 .6 11.1
Third 16.7 7.0 9.2 10.6
Fourth 15.0 2.8 3.9 6.8
Total 100.0 99.9 100.0 100.0
(N) (60) (71) (76) (207)
= 17.521, p<.05 gamma = -0.328
Amenities
First 3.3 9.9 5.3 6.3
Second 48.3 59.2 50.0 52.7
Third 23.3 12.7 19.7 18.4
Fourth 25.0 18.3 25.0 22.7
Total 99.9 100.1 100.0 100.1
(N) (60) (71) (76) (207)
= 6.343 gamma = -0.017
not significant at .05 level
Small government
First 23.3 9.9 7.9 13.0
Second 23.3 14.1 15.8 17.4
Third 46.7 50.7 50.0 49.3
Fourth 6.7 25.4 26.3 20.3
Total 100.0 100.1 100.0 100.0
(N) (60) (71) (76) (207)2
X  = 16.609, p<.05 gamma = 0.310
Arbitration
First 15.0 7.0 6.6 9.2
Second 18.3 9.9 27.6 18.8
Third 13.3 29.6 21.1 21.7
Fourth 53.3 53.5 44.7 50.2
Total 99.9 100.0 100.0 99.9
(N) (60) (71) (76) (207)2
X  = 13.991, P<.05 gamma = -.060
NOTE: Percentages do not always total 100 because of rounding.
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In contrast, more than three-fourths of the officials from both 
the 1 and the 2 per cent cities put little emphasis on a non- 
expansive policy role for their local governments.
The figures for the amenities role are not statisti-
2
cally significant according to the x test, and the gamma score
18indicates no particularly strong trend. Nonetheless, the 
percentages for the 1 per cent officials contrast markedly with 
those for the other two groups of officials. Almost 70 per 
cent of the leaders from 1 per cent cities give amenities a 
high rating, whereas the 0 and 2 per cent officials split 
about 50/50 on this policy role. One might speculate that high 
proportions of all three groups of officials see amenities as 
supplementing economic growth. But perhaps in cities which 
have not "gone all the way" with the sales tax, officials 
sense something of an ambivalence within their communities 
with respect to both the economic growth and the small govern­
ment orientations. The general tenor of the Williams and 
Adrian typology at least suggests this sort of "two-way pull" 
in the amenities role. One official’s comment brings out some 
of the "flavor" of this ambivalence:
l^Since this is an exploratory study, I am using tables 
mainly to suggest hypotheses for future testing, not to indi­
cate verification evidence. This point should be borne in 
mind whenever I discuss tables with results which are not 
"statistically significant."
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Communities traditionally have problems in excess of 
their financial ability to handle them. The people 
themselves have created their own burden of taxation 
as for the most part they have demanded an expanded 
level of services including . . .  social amenities 
over and above water, sewer, streets and refuse. In 
a sense, taxpayers contract with the city to provide 
social counseling, youth services and other things 
which were once the responsibility of free enter­
prise or civic groups. As the job specs increase in 
scope, so must the tab be expected to increase. 
(Official 303)
All three groups tend to downplay the arbitration role, 
Interestingly, the 1 per cent officials stand out again— this 
time in assigning a low priority to arbitrating conflict. 
Actually, as Dye observes, arbitration is not a policy role 
because it emphasizes the decision-making process instead of 
the substance of government action.Bearing this in mind, 
one might well interpret the officials’ responses in several 
ways. For example, interest group conflict might have rela­
tively low salience for officials in all three categories of 
cities, especially those from 1 per cent cities. This seems 
plausible in light of the relatively homogeneous character of 
most cities and towns in Oklahoma. Perhaps the officials do 
in fact perceive "substantial agreement on the proper policies 
for government to follow."^0 Or maybe the agreement is
IQThomas R. Dye, Politics in States and Communities 
(2d ed.; Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey; Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
1973), pp. 273-274.
20l b i d . .  p .  274.
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primarily among the leaders themselves, and the officials have 
something of a "public-be-damned" attitude, as Prewitt's "norm 
of volunteerism" s u gg e st s .T h e se  latter two possibilities 
receive more attention later in the chapter, incidentally. 
Finally, one might simply conclude that arbitration is not a 
good category within the overall classification scheme.
The overall figures show some interesting similarities 
and differences with earlier research based on the Williams 
and Adrian typology. For instance. Booth's survey of 136 
managers of small cities throughout the United States indi­
cates that 53 per cent identified economic growth as the main 
role of their municipal governments; 24 per cent, amenities;
15 per cent, small government; 1 per cent, arbitration; and 8 
per cent, a combination of roles ("transitional-composite" 
role). And Downes reports that 74 per cent of the St. Louis 
councilmen ranked economic growth first or second; 82 per cent, 
amenities; 37 per cent, "caretaker" government; and 19 per cent.
21Kenneth Prewitt, "Political Ambitions, Volunteerism, 
and Electoral Accountability," American Political Science 
Review. LXIV (March 1970), pp. 5-17; Kenneth Prewitt, The 
Recruitment of Political Leaders; A Study of Citizen-Politi- 
cians (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1970).
Z^David A. Booth, Counci1-Manager Government in Small 
Cities (Washington, D.C.: International City Managers' Asso­
ciation, 1968), p. 43. Percentages computed.
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arbitration.23 These figures generally suggest that in com­
parison with their counterparts in other parts of the country, 
Oklahoma municipal officials tend to place somewhat greater 
emphasis on economic growth and to assign a lesser degree of 
importance to amenities. The other two categories seem to 
receive roughly the same amount of stress.
In this and preceding chapters, I have suggested a 
number of ways in which one might find linkages between local 
sales tax rates, relative degrees of reliance on different 
categories of revenue, governmental policy roles, and offi­
cials' revenue-raising preferences. Accordingly, to "round 
out the picture" by relating community context to the immedi­
ate situation, I devised four revenue-raising methods and asked 
the respondents to rank them in order of their preferences for 
obtaining additional funds for their cities and towns. These 
methods— corresponding to the "direct impact taxes," "sales and 
services," "intergovernmental revenue," and "indirect revenue" 
source-categories discussed in Chapter II— involved passing a 
local sales tax, raising more money from utilities, obtaining 
a grant-in-aid, and increasing the cost of permits and licenses. 
Appendix A, item 2, gives the wording of the question and the 
possible responses. The reader should note that the sales tax
Downes, "Municipal Social Rank . . . ," p. 535.
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option stipulated no legal upper limit on the levy. I included
this proviso so that the 2 per cent officials could feel free
to rank the sales tax wherever they wished. Table 4-2 shows 
the rather surprising responses to the question.
Officials from all three groups of cities tend to
look on the sales tax with great favor. But contrary to
expectations, the 0 per cent officials opt for the levy in 
much greater proportions than do officials from the sales tax 
cities. Indeed, about 95 per cent of the former group rank 
the sales tax as their first or second choice. In contrast, 
"only" about three-fourths of the 1 and the 2 per cent offi­
cials give the sales tax comparable rankings.
In light of the patterns developed in this and previous 
chapters, I understate the case when I say that these respon­
ses puzzled me at first. Then I recalled the rapid spread of 
the sales tax in recent years, and immediately I suspected 
that the "rush of events" was influencing the answers. A 
quick check of data from the Oklahoma Tax Commission lent 
strong support to this suspicion; between June 30, 1972 (the 
cutoff date for collecting financial data), and May 1973 (the 
end of the survey of officials), seven of the 14 municipalities 
in the 0 per cent category approved local sales tax
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table 4-2
OFFICIALS' RANK-ORDER PREFERENCES FOR RAISING ADDITIONAL REVENUE, 
BY LOCAL SALES TAX RATE (in percentages)
Revenue-Ra i s ing 
Preference and 
Rank-Order Are:
Sales Tax Rate
0%
Cities
1%
Cities
2%
Cities Total
City sales tax
First 76.6 57.7 56.3 62.6
Second 18.8 19.2 17.5 18.5
Third 3.1 16.7 13.8 11.7
Fourth 1.6 6.4 12.5 7.2
Total 100.1 100.0 100.1 100.0
(N) (64) (78) (80) (222)
= 14.832 , p<.05 gamma = 0.285
Utilities
First 4.7 11.5 18.8 12.2
Second 48.4 39.7 33.8 40.1
Third 28.1 24.4 30.0 27.5
Fourth 18.8 24.4 17.5 20.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.1 100.1
(g) (64) (78) (80) (222)
x^ = 9.227, not significant at .05 level gamma = -0.074
Grant-in-aid
First 17.2 26.9 22.5 22.5
Second 12.5 17.9 23.8 18.5
Third 31.3 17.9 22.5 23.4
Fourth 39.1 37.2 31.3 35.6
Total 100.1 99.9 100.1 100.0
(N) (64) (78) (80) (222)
X  = 7.330, not significant at .05 level gamma = -0.115
Permits & licenses
First 1.6 3.8 2.5 2.7
Second 20.3 23.1 25.0 23.0
Third 37.5 41.0 33.8 37.4
Fourth 40.6 32.1 38.8 36.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.1 100.0
(N) (64) (78) (80) (222)
x ^  = 2.408, not significant at .05 level gamma = -0.041
NOTE: Percentages do not always total 100 because of rounding.
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referenda.This suggested that the 0 per cent officials in 
many places had finally found the way to "catch-up" with their 
counterparts in the sales tax cities. It was almost as if I 
had been asking a bunch of kids whether they liked their new 
Christmas toys.
The rankings for the other three revenue sources show 
no significant associations, but some are suggestively inter­
esting nonetheless. For example, the number one rankings on 
utilities perhaps indicate that officials everywhere perceive 
a great deal of public opposition to increased reliance on 
this traditional revenue source, and that they tend to share 
this sentiment to a considerable extent. This official's 
comment is typical:
I feel and most people . . . feel that our munici­
pal fees are too high. (Official 152)
But as the combined one and two rankings reveal, the opposi­
tion does not seem to be so intense that officials would tend 
to rule out public enterprises as politically feasible sources 
of additional money. After all, "sales and services" remain 
their primary money-makers. As one official puts it:
We are a very fortunate city to have money to work 
and build our city. Most of our revenue comes from
24oklahoma, Tax Commission, Information/Research 
Section, "City Sales Tax Collections: Fiscal Year 1965-1966
through Fiscal Year 1972-1973," Oklahoma City, n.d. (Mimeo­
graphed . )
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our electric which we buy from Public Service and 
sell to our people. Some complain that our rates 
are high, but we must finance our city government.
When you explain, most of them agree . . . .
(Official 165)
Regardless of their revenue-raising preferences, the 
comments of officials indicate that they perceive a close 
political interrelationship between the local sales tax and 
public enterprises. Some think that utilities are more 
equitable:
I think in a town our size (2500 . . .), city sales 
tax puts a burden on the working and fixed income 
people, but all the big shots shop out of town any­
way, and we tax the class of people we are trying to 
entice to shop with us. Increase in utilities taxes 
everyone more evenly. (Official 202)
Others believe that "sales and services" make the tax unneces­
sary:
The city . . . owns electric and water systems and 
because sufficient income has been derived from 
electric sales, no sales tax proposition has ever 
been presented to a vote of the people. (Official 
206)
But many see city sales tax as a means of escaping political
heat generated by the utility plants:
Lower fixed income people in this size community 
strongly oppose the utility raise. However, they 
will support a sales tax if you can, through the 
news media, service clubs, etc., prove a need. 
(Official 227)
The city . . . has passed two sales tax increases in 
the last six years . . . .  It seems that the people 
. . . are aware of our needs and were willing to see 
that we would be able to get the money through sales
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tax. However, if we tried to add another fifty cents 
to the sanitation charge, they would not be able to 
understand it. They seem to think that service should 
be free, and that it is already too high. But I 
would venture to say it is probably the cheapest in 
the state. (Official 294)
The rankings for grants-in-aid seem consonant with the 
overall reliance rankings shown in Table 2-4, Chapter II. All 
three groups of officials tend to downplay the importance of 
this category. But the 0 per cent officials appear to be 
appreciably less enthusiastic about it than do officials from 
the sales tax cities. This finding suggests a couple of points 
which receive attention later on. First, officials from the 
no-sales-tax cities may tend to have a more self-reliant 
orientation toward municipal finances than do their counter­
parts in the sales tax cities. And second, officials from 
sales tax cities may be viewing grants-in-aid more favorably 
because they perceive rising psychological barriers to fin­
ancing further "progress" through increased taxes.
Nobody appears to have much faith in permits and 
licenses. Like Williams and Adrian's arbitration category, it 
presents difficulties in both application and interpretation. 
One of the respondents ranking it fourth showed me the error 
of my ways: "These wouldn’t get you much money in a small
town."
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Partly in keeping with earlier expectations, the offi­
cials tend to associate an economic growth policy orientation 
with a preference for the sales tax as a means of obtaining 
additional revenue. But no sharp differences appear among the 
three groups of leaders. Some 48 per cent of the responding 
0 per cent officials assign number one rankings to both eco­
nomic growth and the sales tax. For both the 1 and the 2 per 
cent leaders, the comparable figure is 44 per cent. Interest­
ingly, some 20 per cent of both the 1 and the 2 per cent offi­
cials rank economic growth and grants-in-aid as number one.
Only about 7 per cent of the no-tax group hold the same view. 
All of the other top-rank pairings produced such low percen­
tages that they warrant no further discussion.
The analysis to this point seems to have led to some­
what mixed and inconclusive results. Chapter II shows that 
as the local sales tax rate goes up, relative reliance on that 
levy increases. Moreover, the cities with a sales tax tend to 
have a rather diversified "mix" of important revenue sources, 
whereas the 0 per cent cities tend to rely heavily only on 
public enterprises. Chapter III suggests that cities with 
higher tax rates tend to have officials who would, in compari­
son with their counterparts elsewhere, be more progressive and 
innovative in their approach to municipal problems and policies.
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In this chapter, the discussion of perceived policy roles of 
government seems to support the general thrust of the patterns 
appearing in the earlier chapters. As the sales tax rate 
rises, an orientation toward economic growth increases markedly. 
And the proportion of officials perceiving a small government 
role is much greater in the 0 per cent cities than it is in 
the sales tax cities. But when one looks at revenue-raising 
preferences, a reversed pattern appears. The proportion of 
0 per cent officials highly favorable toward the sales tax is 
appreciably greater than is the case with officials from muni­
cipalities with a sales tax. This finding becomes somewhat 
less puzzling when one considers that one-half of the 0 per 
cent cities passed a local sales tax during the data collec­
tion phase of this study.
In short, the analysis thus far provides a number of 
useful insights into why some cities rely on the local sales 
tax more than others do. And it lends support to the idea that 
tax leaders play a crucial part in accounting for differences 
in municipal tax and revenue policies. Moreover, it suggests 
that the basic research question needs to include a dimension 
focusing on why some cities have waited longer than others 
have to start using the sales tax. An exploration of perceived 
community tax climate seems like a good place to begin attack­
ing this problem.
122
Community Tax Climate 
Patterson describes "political culture" as a somewhat 
open-ended, multi-faceted, and sensitizing notion. It employs 
a variety of cognitions, values, and emotional commitments; it 
tends to interrelate a number of analytically distinct dimen­
sions of a political system; and it enhances one's sensitivity
25to subjective orientations in politics. Almond and Verba 
suggest that the
relationship between the attitudes and motivation 
of the discrete individuals who make up political 
systems and the character and performance of poli­
tical systems may be discovered systematically 
through the concepts of political culture . . . .
In other words, the connecting link between raicro- 
and macropolitics is political culture . . . .  
Qîence,3 we can relate political psychology to 
political system performance by locating attitu- 
dinal and behavioral propensities to the political 
structure of the system.
Thus, as Pye observes, the political culture approach involves 
a presumption that the political system operates "as if" cer­
tain values, sentiments, and orientations are critical in 
distinctively characterizing a collectivity. Moreover, these 
subjective factors need not necessarily be the ones most
^^Samuel C. Patterson, "The Political Cultures of the 
American States," Journal of Politics. XXX (February 1968), 
p. 188.
Z^Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Cul­
ture; Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations 
(Abridged ed.; Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1963, 1965),
p. 32.
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distinctive among all the attitudes within a given popula­
tion.^^ Accordingly, this part of the analysis limits the 
scope of both subjective factors and structure by focusing on 
perceived differences in community orientations toward local 
taxation (^ .e_., the perceived community tax climate) and 
relating them to variations in the municipal sales tax rate. 
This approach is somewhat reminiscent of Alford's effort to
use community economic base as the key independent variable
28related to differences in local community cultures.
One approach to the tax climate problem is to assume 
that differences in the sales tax rate are associated with 
variations in a sort of composite community orientation toward 
progressiveness, civic responsibility, and support of politi­
cal leaders. One can readily find justification for such an 
assumption in much of the literature dealing with communities. 
Swanson, for example, contends that Americans have an ethos of 
progress and community-expanding boosterism which encourages 
leaders and communities to strive to increase various local
27Lucian W. Pye, ."Culture and Political Science: Prob­
lems in the Evaluation of the Concept of Political Culture," 
in The Idea of Culture in the Social Sciences, ed. by Louis 
Schneider and Charles M. Bonjean (Cambridge, England:
Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 73.
^®Alford, Bureaucracv and Participation.
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attributes to the point that they are the very best.29 Boskoff 
and Zeigler and Banfield and Wilson call attention to the way 
in which a sense of civic responsibility among community mem­
bers is closely associated with a willingness to assume the 
financial burdens necessary to underwrite desired expansions 
of public goods and services. Persons with civic responsibil­
ity are frequently motivated by concerns over such things as 
"community need" and "local p r o g r e s s . A s  for support, 
Patterson calls for additional empirical research on beliefs 
supportive of regimes.Meltsner makes a similar appeal 
specifically with respect to local taxation. And Schmoel- 
ders interestingly ties together psychological differences in 
general culture and community tax climate with this comment:
The main task of fiscal psychology remains . . . 
to analyze the direct resistance to direct taxation 
of individuals and nations according to their general 
"tax mentality." Such tax mentality can be shown to
29Bert E. Swanson, The Concern for Community in Urban 
America (New York: Odyssey Press, 1970), pp. 123-124.
^^Alvin Boskoff and Harmon Zeigler, Voting Patterns in 
a Local Election (Philadelphia and New York: J. B. Lippincott
Company, 1964), pp. 101-102; James Q. Wilson and Edward C. 
Banfield, "Public-Regardingness as a Value Premise in Voting 
Behavior," American Political Science Review, LVIII (December 
1964), pp. 876-887.
31patterson, "The Political Cultures of the American 
States," pp. 189-190.
32Meltsner, The Politics of City Revenue, p. 284.
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differ widely between different peoples of Europe. 
Whereas, in the Latin world, the word tax means 
something felt as an "imposition" upon the citizens 
(impôt, imposto, impuesto), the German word, Steuer, 
means "support" and the Scandinavian, skat, the 
common treasure destined for common purposes. On 
the basis of such different national tax mentalities, 
which are closely connected with the citizens' com- 
munity-mindedness in general, individual tax-minded- 
ness develops by personal experiences.^3
Empirical research has produced widely varying results 
as to the degree of self-sacrificing orientations toward pro­
gress, civic responsibility, and support to be found in 
various p l a c e s . B u t  some evidence exists to support the 
notion that the climate for increased taxes might— surpris­
ingly enough— be highly favorable in communities with a 
pronounced "business culture." In his case study of "Mayburg,"
G. Schmoelders, "Fiscal Psychology: A New Branch of
Public Finance," National Tax Journal, XII (December 1959), 
pp. 341-342.
^^For optimistic views, see, for instance, Boskoff and 
Zeigler, Voting Patterns in a Local Election; Wilson and Ban­
field, "Public-Regardingness . . ."; Meltsner, The Politics of 
City Revenue. In contrast, see, for example, Angus Campbell 
et al.. The American Voter (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
1960), pp. 204-205; Lewis Bowman, Dennis S. Ippolito, and 
Martin L. Levin, "Self-Interest and Referendum Support: The
Case of a Rapid Transit Vote in Atlanta," in People and Poli­
tics in Urban Society, ed. by Harlan Hahn, Urban Affairs 
Annual Reviews, Vol. 6 (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Pub­
lications, 1972), pp. 119-136; Ronald G. Claunch, "Voter 
Reactions to Missouri Sales Tax Referenda: The Role of Self-
Interest, Public-Regardingness and Political Trust" (unpub­
lished Ph.D. dissertation. University of Missouri, Columbia, 
1972).
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Iowa, Smith shows that public officials, business leaders, and 
the general public all tended to rank business-oriented symbols 
considerably higher in prestige than they did political 
s y m b o l s . I n  addition, Prewitt, among others, indicates that 
local officials tend not to view themselves as politicians and 
also to see a convergence or interchangeability of governmen­
tal, civic, and business s p h e r e s . A n d  in this study, the 
earlier discussion of the tax leaders' social characteristics 
and orientations toward economic growth suggests positive 
associations between "progressive" businessmen and higher local 
sales tax rates. Hence, one might reasonably expect to find 
that a tendency for officials to perceive a favorable tax 
climate is positively associated with increased local sales 
tax rates.
To explore the officials' perceptions of their commun­
ity tax climate, I devised four statements designed to elicit 
a pattern of basic orientations on the progressiveness, civic 
responsibility, and supportiveness of their localities. The 
respondents were asked to rank each statement on a scale from 
one (strongly agree) to six (strongly disagree). There was no
^^Paul A. Smith, "The Games of Community Politics," 
Midwest Journal of Political Science. IX (February 1965), pp. 
42-43.
O C
Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders, pp.
164-165.
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middle or neutral category, but for mean scores, 3.5 would be 
the theoretical midpoint. Means above that point would indi­
cate extent of agreement; means below, extent of disagreement. 
Means for each of the three groups of officials were computed. 
In addition, the mean of the four means was calculated and used 
as an index of favorable tax climate. The lower the score, 
the more favorable a given aspect of community tax climate is 
perceived to be. Table 4-3 shows the results of this effort.
TABLE 4-3
OFFICIALS' MEAN RESPONSES TO COMMUNITY TAX CLIMATE STATEMENTS,
BY LOCAL SALES TAX RATE
Statement
0%
Cities
Sales Tax
1%
Cities
Rate
2%
Cities
1. People here have a progressive 
spirit and want to boost the 
community. 2.49 2.16 2.21
2. The people here have a good 
sense of civic responsibility 
when it comes to facing up to 
community problems. 2.21 2.16 2.12
3. In general, people here support 
the efforts of their city officials 
to cope with the problems facing 
the city. 2.14 2.05 1.96
4. In general, people here will 
support a tax increase if their 
city officials show them the need 
for one. 2.05 2.49 2.04
Index of perceived tax climate; 2.27 2.22 2.08
(N) (63) (80) (81)
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In general. Table 4-3 indicates very little difference 
among the three groups of officials. They all seem to per­
ceive a relatively high degree of progressiveness, civic 
responsibility, and supportiveness in their communities. If 
one makes finer distinctions, however, some of the trends are 
at least suggestively interesting. Statement 1, for example, 
indicates that the 0 per cent officials seem to perceive 
noticeably less progressivism in their cities and towns than 
is the case elsewhere. This seems to be in keeping with 
expectations raised by earlier analysis in this and preceding 
chapters. Statements 2 and 3 show tendencies— slight though 
they may be— for perceived civic responsibility and general 
public support to increase as the sales tax rate rises. With 
respect to statement 4, the relatively high score for the 
officials from 1 per cent cities suggests a perceived psycho­
logical barrier to taking full advantage of the municipal 
sales tax. In addition, one might at least surmise that the 
0 per cent officials' mean score for statement 4 would be 
appreciably higher if it were not for the fact that one-half 
of the cities in this group passed a local sales tax during 
the data collection period. Finally, bearing this latter 
point in mind, the trend of the tax climate index scores gives 
something of a clue as to why some cities have relied more on
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the local sales tax and have moved to use it sooner than others 
have. As the sales tax rate rises, one sees a slight but 
possibly significant tendency for local tax leaders to per­
ceive a community climate more generally favorable to tax 
increases.
The comments of some of the officials tend to corrob­
orate the patterns revealed in Table 4-3. These officials 
from sales tax cities consider their communities to be indeed 
progressive:
Qrhis comment follows a lengthy description of various 
ways that the city helps citizens and visitors.] We 
feel when you quit helping people, you quit being a 
"Goad Little Town" and become an Organization . . . .  
Lwej have the BEST TOWN IN THE UNITED STATES. If you 
don't live here, you ought to move here. We're both 
losing if you don't. (Official 160)
The city . . . has a great many dedicated citizens, I 
mean the kind you can call on when you need to get 
something done . . . .  I think we have one of the 
best small cities in the entire country. (Official 
241)
(jWe have the] most progressive type of people you will 
ever come across . . . .  rp]uring the last three 
years . . . .  [we have] won Chamber of Commerce City 
of Year award [and have passed several sales-tax and 
capita1-improvements bonds proposals] . . . simply 
because the people backed everything the City Council 
and the Chamber brought before them . . . .  We work 
better together. (Official 110)
And one can almost sense the improving tax climate in the fol­
lowing comments by 0, 1, and 2 per cent leaders respectively:
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Quite a number of our citizens are older and went 
through the depression and are on the so-called tight 
side. Our only industry being farming and ranching 
and the old timers holding on to their land leaves no 
place for the younger citizen; therefore they are 
moving on, causing the lack of community interest.
The older citizen is scared to let our community grow 
for fear of additional taxes. (Official 074)
Our people seem to be in a semi-satisfied position in 
regard to the community status-quo. However, we are 
going forward and growing very slowly in spite of it. 
Probably the main reason is a lack of leadership in 
the area. There is talk of big progress, but no one 
will lead out . . . .  [we must provide morej educa­
tion and leadership for . . . new expansion . . . and 
future development in our community. (Official 118)
My city has passed two separate one cent sales tax—  
by votes of over three to one. [People herej gener­
ally have a progressive attitude. (Official 286)
Community Self-Reliance Values 
Having examined the overall community tax climate per­
ceived by local tax leaders in Oklahoma, I then shifted the 
focus to the leaders' normative assessment of the sort of tax 
and revenue values which should be guiding their communities. 
Presumably, since they all tend to perceive a relatively 
favorable and supportive community tax climate, the leaders 
might well try to translate these values into specific tax 
policies. If this were the case, the local sales tax rate 
should provide something of a measure of the way in which 
municipal tax policies are a reflection of the leaders' values.
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I decided to explore this matter through the general 
theme of community self-reliance. The idea that "home folks" 
can best handle local problems furnishes an important— if not 
the major— rationale for establishing municipal governments.
A good deal of the controversy in urban politics revolves 
around questions of local independence and "self-determination" 
— as the current bussing-of-school-children issue amply illus­
trates. And since most local problems sooner or later acquire 
a critical financial dimension, fiscal self-reliance presents 
municipal leaders with a thorny issue in terms of political 
philosophy, practical politics, and day-to-day administration.
Relationships between the local sales tax and outside 
financial assistance seem like an interesting way of examining 
this problem, for one might well find leaders looking on the 
tax in at least one of two ways. On the one hand, they might 
view the city sales tax as a means of decreasing their reliance 
on and subservience to state and federal "meddlers." They 
might join Vidich and Bensman, for instance, in bemoaning what 
they consider to be abdications or compromises of local auton­
omy, decision-making authority, and jurisdictions in favor of 
higher levels of government— particularly in fiscal matters.
^^Arthur J. Vidich and Joseph Bensman, Small Town in 
Mass Societv; Class, Power and Religion in a Rural Community 
(Rev. ed.; Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1968). See p. 113, especially.
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On the other hand, they might perceive their intergovernmental 
relations more in terms of useful assistance which has little 
or no detrimental effect on local "say-so." A survey of Minne­
sota municipal officials reveals that the respondents tended 
to hold this view.38 Accordingly, the sales tax might be seen 
as a way of increasing outside financial assistance and meeting 
public demands for tax relief. For instance, the sales tax 
can provide matching funds for grants-in-aid, and it serves 
as a measure of local effort in determining federal revenue- 
sharing apportionments. And as Meltsner and associates report 
after a 1967 study in California, citizens strongly desire 
changes in the local school-financing system. Some 80 per 
cent of those polled thought that the schools should rely 
mainly on revenue sources other than those generated l o c a l l y . 3 9  
If one looks at these matters in terms of differences 
in the local sales tax rate, he might reasonably speculate 
that as the municipal sales tax rate increases, values favoring
38Edward W. Weidner, Intergovernmental Relations As 
Seen by Public Officials. Intergovernmental Relations in the 
United States As Observed in the State of Minnesota, Research 
Monograph No. 9 (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota
Press, 1960), pp. 79-89.
S^Arnold J. Meltsner e_t , Political Feasibility of 
Reform in School Financing; The Case of California (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1973), Chapter One. See p. 13, especi­
ally.
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community self-reliance decrease. This line of thinking would 
be in keeping with the governmental role orientations and 
revenue-raising preferences brought out earlier.
To test this notion, I devised four "six-point agree- 
disagree" statements designed to bring out basic orientations 
toward local self-reliance in fiscal a f f a i r s . A n d  to inject 
some intensity of feeling into the analysis, I wrote the state­
ments so that the subject matter ranged from an almost plati­
tudinous concern with community self-reliance through attitudes 
on the propriety of obtaining outside assistance to the highly 
controversial issue of the desirability of federal revenue- 
sharing. I analyzed the responses in the same manner as that 
described for the statements in Table 4-3 except that the 
frequencies for statement 1, regarding general self-reliance, 
were reversed for the sake of consistency. Accordingly, the 
higher the mean score, the more highly is local self-reliance 
prized. Table 4-4 shows the results of this analysis.
In general. Table 4-4 reveals that the lower the sales 
tax rate, the more likely it is that officials from cities with 
that rate will highly value local self-reliance. And differ­
ences among the three groups of leaders tend to become sharper
^®Two of the statements were adapted from Meltsner's 
interview schedule. See Meltsner, The Politics of Citv 
Revenue, p. 288.
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TABLE 4-4
OFFICIALS' MEAN RESPONSES TO COMMUNITY SELF-RELIANCE STATEMENTS,
BY LOCAL SALES TAX RATE
Sales Tax Ra te
Statement
0%
Cities
1%
Cities
2%
Cities
1. Basically, the city should 
i_notH be self-reliant and draw 
on its own resources when it 
comes to solving community 
problems. 5.13 5.13 4.79
2. The city can and should 
obtain financial support from 
county, state, and federal 
agencies. 2.40 2.29 2.00
3. The city should be more 
aggressive in going after 
financial assistance from 
county, state, and federal 
agencies. 2.89 2.32 2.42
4. Federal revenue-sharing is 
a good thing for this community. 2.89 1.96 1.84
Index of self-reliance: 3.33 2.93 2.76
(N) (63) (80) (81)
as the issue involved grows more controversial. In short, the 
expected patterns— though not too sharply drawn in most cases—  
do nevertheless appear. And they are consistent with the 
governmental policy role orientations and revenue-raising pre­
ferences discussed earlier. Taken together, these things 
suggest that differences in tax leaders' self-reliance values
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provide an important clue in accounting for differences in 
reliance on the local sales tax.
One of the most interesting things about the statements 
is the strong responses which they evoked. For example, about 
50 per cent of the 0 and the 1 per cent officials strongly 
agree that the community should be self-reliant; only about 30 
per cent of the 2 per cent officials hold similarly intense 
feelings. In contrast, roughly one-half of the 1 and the 2 
per cent leaders strongly agree that their cities can and 
should obtain outside financial assistance; the comparable 
fraction for the 0 per cent leaders drops to about two-fifths. 
However, more than 80 per cent of the leaders from each of the 
three groups agree with this statement. In comparison, some 
71 per cent of Oakland's "citizen-leaders" agreed with a 
similarly worded q u e s t i o n . T h e  Oklahoma leaders are, how­
ever, somewhat less enthusiastic than the Oakland citizens with 
respect to pursuing outside funds more aggressively. Whereas 
some 90 per cent of the Oakland respondents favored this course 
of action,42 the comparable figures drop to less than 70 per 
cent for the no-tax officials and about 80 per cent for the 
other two groups. Interestingly, the 1 per cent leaders are
4^Ibid.. p. 228. 
4^Ibid.. p. 231.
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much more emphatic on the matter of increased agressiveness. 
Only about 20 per cent of the no-tax officials and slightly 
more than 30 per cent of the 2 per cent officials strongly 
agree with this statement. In contrast, more than 40 per cent 
of the 1 per cent officials strongly agree. This seems to be 
consistent with earlier findings about the 1 per cent offi­
cials' economic growth-small government ambivalence and their 
perceptions of less support for a tax increase. The sharpest 
distinctions of all appear in the responses to the revenue- 
sharing statement. The percentages of "strongly agree" 
responses are as follows: 0 per cent officials— 36.5 per cent;
1 per cent officials— 57.5 per cent; 2 per cent officials—
53.1 per cent.
These four statements apparently hit a sensitive nerve 
among the tax leaders, for they produced not only high percen­
tages of "strongly agree" responses but also the largest number 
of added comments. As noted earlier, the local self-reliance 
issue involves both ideological and practical considerations. 
These factors seem influential in the comments of officials 
from all three groups of cities. In fact, if one considers 
these "commentators" as a single group, he can come up with an 
interesting typology relating the officials' orientation toward 
financial self-reliance to their more general philosophical 
outlook. The typology looks like this:
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Philosophical
Outlook  Self-Reliance Orientation__________
Independent Ambivalent Interdependent
Ideologue X X
Pragmatic-
Ideologue X
Pragmatist X X  X
The independent ideologue comes on with strongly ideo­
logical overtones. Here are some representative comments:
When local government is financed by the Federal 
government, you will have total Federal control. I 
am strongly against this. (Official 073)
Cities should arrange for their own finances and not 
depend on the state or LfederalJ government. (Offi­
cial 225)
I think the federal government is trying to help, but 
we are getting like spoiled children. Everytime we 
want something we ask them for it, and we are slowly 
losing control of our own local government and self- 
respect. (Official 202)
Independent pragmatists tend to favor self-reliance
because outside assistance means administrative hassles,
economic problems, and legal constraints.
We're slightly against Revenue Sharing, etc., because 
of the "red tape" involved. If a city can afford 
projects, it's much better off to get them done it­
self than to go through the Government . . . .  We 
usually solve our own problems. (Official 160)
This is a small town (1200 pop.) and state and federal 
governments place so many restrictions and regulations 
that do not fit small town problems that it makes it 
difficult for a town council to fit small town
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requirements into regulations that are enacted for 
governing larger towns. In other words, the cost of 
meeting government requirements places a heavy load 
on small town governments. (Official 181)
Federal Revenue Sharing is just like setting out one 
small bowl of ice cream with 20 spoons. (Official 063)
We are gearing the city to the amount received from 
revenue sharing. When it ends, we'll have to raise 
taxes so I feel it is going to be trouble in the end. 
(Official 038)
I do not feel that a law should have been passed which 
limited sales tax to a total of 4%. Cities and towns 
should have been permitted to handle their own affairs. 
(Official 111)
I believe financing of local government is a local 
problem . . . .  Financing from state and federal 
governments puts more restriction on the operation of 
your city and tends to take the operation and affairs 
out of the local level. (Official 193)
I can't believe that revenue sharing is the answer to 
most city problems as there are too many restrictions 
as to what a city can use it for. I am afraid many 
cities will start projects that will have no way of 
completing should revenue sharing fail or cease to 
exist. I hope I am wrong. (Official 172)
The ambivalent pragmatic ideologue wants to be indepen­
dent, but he sees everyone else getting outside money to solve 
local problems. Accordingly, "in principle" he opposes inter­
governmental fiscal assistance. However, he reluctantly con­
cludes that "in practice" he has no choice but to accept it.^3
I answer some of these questions reluctantly because 
there is doubt in my mind. I believe a city should
43lbid.. p. 228.
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stand on its own feet as far as possible. With such 
rising costs facing our cities today, it may become 
necessary to ask for help from all available sources 
in order to offer satisfactory services to its citi­
zens. My feeling is that Federal Revenue Sharing is 
not the solution to our city problems. I believe that 
if more Federal spending was limited, our cities, 
schools and counties would have more local money avail­
able for support. (Official 019)
I feel very strongly that the local government should 
do everything possible for itself, but as long as all 
the personal income tax goes to Washington we have to 
look there for aid . . . .  (Official 101)
Federal Revenue Sharing has been a good thing for our 
city . . . .  I believe our city should receive mil­
lage from the county, also those taxes from the state 
such as gasoline, mileage, vehicle, etc., that we are 
entitled to, but I do not believe we should look to 
the state or federal government for hand-outs. (Offi­
cial 222)
There are many here who feel that funds accepted from 
other government agencies surrender control commen­
surate with the amount of the funds accepted. While I 
don't agree entirely with this point of view, I still 
applaud the "do it yourself" concept. (Official 205)
I am of opinion all cities and towns have grown accus­
tomed to receiving grants and matching funds to help 
stretch their budgets. Being accustomed to these 
things during the last eight or ten years, it will be 
hard for municipalities to do business within their 
own budget. Government money is not free by any means. 
However, as long as our Government continues to pour 
money by the billions into foreign countries and keep 
spending over the Federal budget, then I feel cities 
and towns should continue getting all money possible 
from our Government . . . .  I believe there will come 
a day when Congress will look back and wonder why more 
was not spent in our cities and towns rather than so 
much for so long to foreign countries. (Official 237)
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Ambivalent pragmatists have no philosophical qualms 
about outside financial aid. They do, however, worry about 
inequities and uncertainties in the arrangements for handing 
out money.
Federal revenue sharing costs you to get it. Other 
towns may pay less and get more money. (Official 320)
My objection to revenue sharing for our town is because 
the formula upon which it is based is grossly unfair. 
The amount we received was only $1.45 per capita, 
while other cities received more than $12.00 per capita. 
(Official 183)
Revenue sharing would be good for the city if we knew 
how many years it could be depended upon. (Official 
138)
The interdependent ideologue thinks that it is "right" 
for his city to receive intergovernmental financial assistance. 
Going after more money constitutes a moral obligation of pub­
lic office.
We have purchased an $11,000 fire truck in order to 
keep insurance rates down. This was done with $11,000 
of a $22,000 revenue sharing. It sure helps to receive 
deserved money. (Official 296)
I would feel remiss and negligent if I didn't go after 
all federal funds available since Congress has appro­
priated them , and some other towns will get it if 
we don't . . . .  As long as [congress puts up money,] 
you owe it to your town to go after it. (Official 
052)
The interdependent pragmatists favor outside assis­
tance because it bestows political benefits. They just wish 
that the money would come in faster.
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I'm indeed thankful for revenue sharing. It has made 
our two years in office look good. The groundwork was 
laid by a mayor that people didn't like, nor did he 
have the money to spend that the present administra­
tion has. (Official 173)
I think the State and Federal agencies don't act soon 
enough on aids or grants that the smaller towns or 
cities have requested assistance on . . .  . (Official 
180)
The Tax Policy Environment in Brief 
In general, one can say that as the municipal sales tax 
rate rises, officials' perceptions of economic growth policy 
roles for their cities tend to increase. And a reverse sort 
of relationship appears with respect to the small government 
policy role. Contrary to expectations, however, officials 
from cities with no local sales tax tend to favor the sales 
tax much more than do their counterparts in the 1 and the 2 
per cent cities when it comes to preferences for sources of 
additional revenue. Perhaps one can partly account for this 
situation by noting that many of the 0 per cent cities played 
"catch-up" during the data collection period and by surmising 
that some leaders in the sales tax cities may be perceiving a 
psychological barrier to further tax increases. This line of 
thought may help explain the slight differences among the three 
groups of officials with respect to perceptions of the commun­
ity tax climate. And given these conditions, it does seem
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important that one can still discern something of a trend for 
higher sales tax rates to be positively associated with per­
ceptions of an increasingly favorable tax climate. Finally, 
as the sales tax rate decreases, values favoring local self- 
reliance tend to increase. The relationships noted for the 
community tax climate and local self-reliance values seem to 
be consistent with the findings concerning municipal policy 
roles.
Immediate Concerns in the Tax Policy Process 
The analysis of the tax policy environment stresses 
attitudinal differences among the three groups of officials.
But in many cases, their similarities in orientation are 
equally striking. Moreover, unexpected results appear in the 
attempt to establish a continuity and consistency between per­
ceptions of environmental policy roles of government and immed­
iate preferences for sources of additional revenue. These 
things suggest that in exploring variations in municipal sales 
tax policies, one must go beyond the general "strategic" con­
siderations of community culture and environment to an examina­
tion of elements of the immediate "tactical" situation in the 
political arena. Earlier research supports this notion. For 
instance, Prewitt and associates argue that immediate, pressing 
demands of office are more important than background
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experiences in explaining the political orientations and 
behavior of city councilman and state l e g i s l a t o r s . *4 And 
Downes concludes that interactions with fellow councilman and 
other community residents and exposure to institutional con­
siderations and situational pressures probably account for a 
great many attitudinal similarities and differences found among 
St. Louis area councilman. The political milieu of communi­
ties, he continues, is likely to condition these more 
immediate experiences. Nevertheless, one would probably be 
well advised to look beyond the general community context to 
other pressures and experiences if he wishes to explain local 
leaders' orientations and behavior s a t i s f a c t o r i l y . ^5
Leaders and Followers' Views on Local 
Taxes and Spending
Both Eyestone and Meltsner emphasize that public offi­
cials' own subjective orientations toward local tax and spend­
ing levels and their perceptions of public opinion on these 
matters constitute critical variables in determining the suc­
cess of policy leadership in coping with municipal financial
^^Kenneth Prewitt, Heinz Eulau, and Betty H. Zisk, 
"Political Socialization and Political Roles," Public Opinion 
Quarterly, XXX (Winter 1966-1967), pp. 569-582.
45Downes, "Municipal Social Rank . . . ," p. 537.
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problems.46 This suggests that an examination of leaders and 
constituents’ views on local levels of taxes and spending 
might well provide useful insights into possible relationships 
between immediate concerns and variations in reliance on the 
local sales tax.
Officials' views
As a first step in exploring these matters, I asked 
the municipal officials what they thought about the current 
level of local taxes in their communities. Appendix A, item 
7, gives the exact wording of the question and the possible 
r e s p o n s e s . 47 Table 4-5 shows how the officials replied.
All three groups of officials hold remarkably similar 
views on the local tax level in their communities. The re­
sults of Table 4-5 reveal that surprisingly high proportions 
of officials think that local taxes are adequate to meet 
current community needs. In comparison, Downes reports that 
68 per cent of the St. Louis area councilman favored increasing
46Eyestone, The Threads of Public Policy, pp. 59-60; 
Meltsner, The Politics of City Revenue.
47This question was adapted from an item found in 
Morgan's public opinion survey instrument. See David Reid 
Morgan, "Suburban Differentiation and Metropolitan Political 
Integration" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of 
Oklahoma, 1969), p. 350.
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TABLE 4-5
OFFICIALS' OPINIONS ON LOCAL TAX LEVEL, BY 
LOCAL SALES TAX RATE (in percentages)
Local Tax 
Level Is:
Sales Tax Rate
0%
Cities
1%
Cities
2%
Cities Total
High 9.9 9.2 5.9 8.2
About right 57.7 69.0 65.9 64.6
Low 32.4 21.8 28.2 27.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(N) (71) (87) (85) (243)
x^ = 3.350, not significant at .05 level; gamma = -0.000
local taxes to provide better city services.^® But Morgan 
offers figures closely paralleling those in this study. Of 
the Oklahoma City area councilman in his survey, 12.5 per cent 
thought that local taxes were too high; 54.2 per cent, about
A O
right; and 33.3 per cent, too low. In Oakland, however, 
public officials wanted lower taxes.
The 0 per cent tax leaders seem slightly less prone 
to a status-quo mentality than do their counterparts elsewhere.
^®Downes, "Municipal Social Rank . . . ," p. 531.
^^Morgan, "Suburban Differentiation and Metropolitan 
Political Integration," p. 265.
S^Meltsner, The Politics of Citv Revenue, pp. 51-68.
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This unexpected finding possibly reflects the peculiarities of 
events during the data collection stage of this study, plus 
something of a continuing desire to "catch-up." Roughly 70 
per cent of the 1 per cent officials consider local taxes to 
be about right. This relatively high proportion may provide 
a clue as to why their cities have not taken full advantage of 
the local sales tax as a revenue-raiser. An extremely low 
proportion of the 2 per cent officials thinks that local taxes 
are too high. This appears to be in keeping with earlier 
speculation about the progressiveness of tax leaders in this 
group.
In polities largely prohibited from indulging in 
deficit financing, spending levels roughly equate to tax and 
revenue levels. To see how local tax leaders view this part 
of the immediate situation, I asked them whether municipal 
services and spending should be decreased, held at present 
levels, or increased. Given the widespread satisfaction with 
current tax levels, one might reasonably expect to find simi­
lar views on expenditures and expansions of government. At 
the same time, however, some of the earlier analysis suggests 
that as the local sales tax rate rises, one might well find 
that officials tend to see more and more of a need to increase 
spending. Appendix A, item 9, gives the exact wording of the
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question and the possible responses. And Table 4-6 shows the 
officials' rather surprising answers.
TABLE 4-6
OFFICIALS' OPINIONS ON THE LEVEL OF MUNICIPAL SPENDING AND 
SERVICES, BY LOCAL SALES TAX RATE (in percentages)
Sales Tax Rate
Spending and 
Services Should Be
0%
: Cities
1%
Cities
2%
Cities Total
Decreased 5.6 18.4 10.6 11.9
Held at present 
level 18.3 35.6 22.4 25.9
Increased 76.1 46.0 67.1 62.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.1 99.9
(N) (71) (87) (85) (243)
x^ = 16.899, p <■ .05 gamma = -0.089
NOTE; Percentages do not always total 100 because of rounding.
The officials' complacency about the level of taxes 
does not carry over to their views on spending and services. 
More than 60 per cent of the entire group favor increased 
governmental activity. In contrast, only some 43 per cent of 
municipal officials in Minnesota wanted a similar expansion of 
the public economy.
S^Weidner, Intergovernmental Relations As Seen bv 
Public Officials, p. 27. Percentage computed.
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Particularly surprising is that some three-fourths of 
the supposedly "caretaker government"-oriented 0 per cent offi­
cials want to expand governmental activity. The figures for 
the 1 and the 2 per cent officials seem to be a bit more in 
keeping with what one might expect. A slight majority of the 
1 per cent officials want to hold spending and services at 
present levels or to retrench on governmental activity. This 
roughly 50/50 division may well reflect an ambivalence about 
governmental policy roles which was suggested earlier. Given 
the background characteristics and economic growth policy 
orientations of the 2 per cent officials, it comes as no par­
ticular surprise that about two-thirds of them feel that cur­
rent circumstances call for expansions of the public sphere.
The overall results of Tables 4-5 and 4-6 raise some 
interesting questions about local tax leaders' understanding 
of the tax-service nexus. Unfortunately, for fear of alien­
ating the respondents, I did not include any questions 
designed specifically to measure the officials' tax knowledge. 
However, their views on the citizenry's tax and revenue com­
prehension— a matter discussed later in this chapter— may 
provide at least a hint as to the leaders' degree of financial 
sophistication.
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Perceived constituency views
As for the basic research question guiding this study, 
the tax leaders' views on local tax and spending levels shed 
little new light on why some cities rely on the municipal sales 
tax more than others do. The officials' inconsistencies over 
these aspects of the current situation do suggest, however, 
that they may be experiencing rather strong cross-pressures 
from their constituents. If this is the case, one might 
assume that perceived public opinion on municipal tax and rev­
enue matters plays an important part in accounting for 
differences in local sales tax policies.
A great many public opinion polls have established the 
general "popularity" of the sales tax at all levels of govern­
ment. For example, in a nationwide poll in 1972, 34 per cent 
of the respondents chose a new value-added tax (a form of 
national sales tax) as the best way for the federal government 
to raise taxes. In contrast, only 10 per cent preferred 
increasing the less regressive income tax. And what is even 
more remarkable, the value-added tax fell only six percentage 
points below an option calling for elimination of tax "loop­
holes" I This same survey found that almost one-half of the 
respondents (46 per cent) preferred that their state governments 
use the sales tax as a means of obtaining additional revenue.
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The next most preferred method was the state income tax, which 
25 per cent f a v o r e d . I n  Wisconsin, 43 per cent of those 
polled during a 1963 survey preferred the sales tax over the 
income tax as a means of raising additional state revenue. 
Earlier surveys in Michigan and Wisconsin showed that 46 and 
34 per cent of the respondents favored the sales tax.^^ The 
sales tax stands in high esteem at the local level, too. 
Boskoff and Zeigler found this to he true in a Georgia
S^Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 
Public Opinion and Taxes (Washington, D.C.: The Commission,
1972), pp. 17 and 19. A sample of "tax professionals" attend­
ing the 1972 conference of the National Tax Association ans­
wered the same questions as those which AGIR asked the public. 
These experts had views fairly similar to those of the general 
public. For instance, 33 per cent liked the value-added tax 
and 38 per cent favored the state sales tax. See John O. 
Behrens, "The Public and the Publicans Talk Taxes," National 
Tax Journal, XXVI (June 1973), p. 224.
S^Leon D. Epstein, Votes and Taxes (Madison: Institute
of Governmental Affairs, University Extension Division, The 
University of Wisconsin, 1964), p. 57.
^^Elizabeth L. David, "A Comparative Study of Tax Pre­
ferences," National Tax Journal, XXI (March 1968), p. 98. The 
state sales tax is not always popular, however. For instance, 
in 1969 Oregon citizens voted down a general sales tax propo­
sal by a ratio of almost eight-to-one. See Clara Penniman,
"The Politics of Taxation," in Politics in the American States—  
a Comparative Analysis, ed. by Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. 
Vines (2d ed.; Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), p.
548. And in 1965, Oklahoma voters refused to increase the 
state sales tax rate to 3 per cent. See Oklahoma, State 
Election Board, Directory and Manual of the State of Oklahoma. 
1971 (Oklahoma City: The Board, 1971), p. 286.
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locality.55 According to Meltsner, 74 per cent of the "citi-
zen-leaders" would choose the sales tax if additional levies
were required.5® And a recent survey of citizens in ten major
cities across the nation reported that the sales tax
stood out in every single city as being the most 
popular way to raise additional local tax money. In 
every city, more people selected the sales tax as the 
first choice than any of the other alternatives. With 
five alternatives, it is not surprising that there is 
a lack of a majority for the sales tax as a first 
choice, but about 40 percent on the average chose the 
sales tax over the other four alternatives. However, 
even more impressive is the fact that in every city 
more than half of the people chose the sales tax as 
one of the two best ways to raise increased tax
revenue.57
As a preliminary to looking at perceived public opinion 
on local tax and spending levels, I wanted to get some idea of 
how the municipal sales tax stacks up as a revenue-raiser in 
the minds of Oklahoma citizens. Accordingly, I asked the 
officials for their perceptions of how their constituents 
would rank the four revenue sources discussed in connection 
with Table 4-2. Appendix A, item 3, gives the exact wording 
of the question and the possible responses. Given the results
^^Boskoff and Zeigler, Votincr Patterns in a Local 
Election, p. 66.
^^Meltsner, The Politics of City Revenue, p. 224.
57"City Taxes and Services; Citizens Speak Out," An 
Urban Observatory Report (Washington, D.C.: National League of
Cities, 1971), p. 9. This is an expanded reprint of an article 
by the same title in Nation's Cities, IX, No. 8 (August 1971), 
pp. 9-24.
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of other research and some of the patterns appearing in this 
study, I expected to find that the citizenry would be seen as 
generally preferring the sales tax, but that as the local 
sales tax rate increases, citizens would tend to favor it more.
1 also assumed that increased utility rates would find little 
favor anywhere (for Oklahomans, high utility rates have conno­
tations almost as bad as high property taxes), and that low- 
cost grants-in-aid and user charges would receive high rank­
ings. Table 4-7 shows the responses to this question.
Although officials everywhere tend to view their con­
stituents as favoring the local sales tax, perceived public 
opinion does, nevertheless, differ among the three groups. 
Moreover, the differences run in a direction quite the oppo­
site of what was expected. The 0 and the 1 per cent officials 
see their constituents as highly supportive of the sales tax. 
But less than a majority of the 2 per cent leaders view the 
citizenry as ranking the tax first or second. One can probably 
account for part of these results on the basis of the situation 
during the data collection phase of this study. But the strik­
ing percentage differences— particularly between the 0 and the
2 per cent groups— suggest that the tax lacks the almost 
limitless popularity sometimes attributed to it. As an offi­
cial from a 2 per cent city puts it:
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TABLE 4-7
PERCEIVED CITIZENS' RANK-ORDER PREFERENCES FOR RAISING ADDITIONAL 
REVENUE, BY LOCAL SALES TAX RATE (in percentages)
Revenue-Raising 
Preference and 
Rank-Order Are:
Sales 'rax Rate
0%
Cities
1%
Cities
2%
Cities Total
City Sales Tax
First 56.3 35.9 28.8 39.2
Second 26.6 23.1 20.0 23.0
Third 12.5 29.5 33.8 26.1
Fourth 4.7 11.5 17.5 11.7
Total 100.1 100.0 100.1 100.0
(N) (64) (78) (80) (222)
'A = 19.513, P < .05 gamma = 0.346
Utilities
First 4.7 5.1 3.8 4.5
Second 23.4 15.4 15.0 17.6
Third 20.3 25.6 32.5 26.6
Fourth 51.6 53.8 48.8 51.4
Total 100.0 99.9 100.1 100.1
(N) (64) (78) (80) (222)
X  = 4.168, not significant at .05 level gamma = 0.017
Grants-in-aid
First 37.5 56.4 63.8 53.6
Second 18.8 23.1 16.3 19.4
Third 23.4 9.0 12.5 14.4
Fourth 20.3 11.5 7.5 12.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.1 100.0
(N) (64) (78) (80) (222)
x2 = 15.873, p <  .05 gamma = -0.300
Permits & licenses
First 1.6 2.6 3.8 2.7
Second 31.3 38.5 48.8 40.1
Third 43.8 35.9 21.3 32.9
Fourth 23.4 23.1 26.3 24.3
Total 100.1 100.1 100.2 100.0
(N) (64) (78) (80) (222)
= 9.433, not significant at .05 level gamma = -0.133
NOTE: Percentages do not always total 100 because of rounding.
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Our sales tax was voted to 4% from 3% [[state and local 
combined]. There is nothing— no matter how drastic the 
situation— that would encourage the citizens to vote 
further taxation. (Official 013)
As expected, grants-in-aid are popular— but noticeably 
less so in the 0 per cent cities. This is, of course, in 
keeping with the self-reliance values brought out earlier in 
this chapter. And looking at the figures for both the sales 
tax and grants-in-aid, one sees that in comparison with 0 per 
cent citizens, people in the sales tax cities are perceived to 
be significantly more concerned about increasing taxes than 
about possible encroachments on local autonomy.
The ratings for public enterprises and "indirect 
revenue" sources, though not statistically significant, are 
nonetheless interesting. As noted earlier, citizens tend to 
be quite concerned about high utility rates. Accordingly, the 
figures for utilities indicate that municipal officials can 
and probably do use threatened increases in utility rates as 
a highly effective tool for generating public support for the 
local sales tax. It is also interesting that only the 2 per 
cent officials see a majority of the citizenry as ranking per­
mits and licenses as the first or second choice. And if one 
looks at the number one rankings for grants-in-aid and the 
first and second ratings for permits and licenses, he sees 
that perceived public desires for an "easy way out" tend to 
accompany a rising sales tax rate.
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One can compare the overall figures with some of
Meltsner's findings by assuming that combined first and second
ratings represent "positive" responses. Meltsner asked the
Oakland "citizen-leaders" whether they would either increase
or rely on a number of specific revenue sources— some of which
correspond to the four sources covered by this study. In
reply, 74 per cent of the Oakland leaders responded positively
to the sales tax; 71 per cent, to user charges (similar to the
"sales and services" category); 72 per cent, to federal or
58state assistance; and 31 per cent, to business licenses. In 
comparison, then, Oklahoma citizens are perceived to be much 
more opposed to utilities, somewhat less favorable toward the 
sales tax, about equally positive toward outside assistance, 
and appreciably more enthusiastic about "indirect" sources.
In general. Table 4-7 provides no direct information 
as to why some cities rely on the sales tax more than others
do. But it does suggest that local leaders tend to perceive
increasing opposition and psychological barriers to additional 
levies as the sales tax rate increases. If this is the case, 
then one might speculate that at least one reason for varia­
tions in reliance on the local sales tax is that until
recently, citizens in the sales tax cities have been less
58Meltsner, The Politics of City Revenue, p. 247.
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inclined than have citizens in the 0 per cent cities to con­
sider the overall local tax level as being too high. If this 
line of thought is valid, then one should find some relative 
tendency at present for citizen concern about high taxes to 
increase as the sales tax rate rises. If this expectation is 
borne out, it would help to explain some of the present and 
past differences in reliance on the sales tax.
To explore this matter, I asked the tax leaders how 
the average citizen feels about the local tax situation. 
Appendix A, item 8, gives the exact wording of the question 
and the possible responses. Table 4-8 shows the answers 
provided.
TABLE 4-8
PERCEIVED CITIZENS’ OPINIONS ON LOCAL TAX LEVEL, BY LOCAL 
SALES TAX RATE (in percentages)
Sales Tax Rate
Local Tax 0% 1% 2%
Level Is: Cities Cities Cities Total
High 52.1 55.8 60.0 56.2
About right 40.8 41.9 38.8 40.5
Low 7.0 2.3 1.2 3.3
Total 99.9 100.0 100.0 100.0
(N) (71) (86) (85) (242)
x^ = 4.946, not significant at .05 level gamma = -0.128
NOTE: Percentages do not always total 100 because of rounding.
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Although not statistically significant, the results of 
Table 4-8 do reveal a slight tendency for perceived public 
concern over high local taxes to rise as the sales tax rate 
increases. All three groups of officials tend to believe that 
a majority of their constituents consider their local taxes to 
be too high. But among 0 per cent officials, this particular 
psychological barrier to tax increases seems to be somewhat 
lower than it is for tax leaders in the 1 and the 2 per cent 
cities.
The overall figures afford some interesting comparisons 
with the results of various public opinion polls on tax burdens 
For instance, according to a Gallup Poll survey taken in late 
February 1973, 65 per cent of the respondents said that their 
federal income taxes were too high. This figure represented 
the third highest majority recorded in 14 surveys since 1949.59 
And in Wisconsin, 61 per cent of the citizens polled believed 
that the state should get along with the amount of money which 
it had at the time.^O Hence, perceived public opinion about 
local tax levels in Oklahoma appears to approach this high 
degree of dissatisfaction with federal and state taxes.
^^Gallup Opinion Index, Report No. 93 (March 1973), 
pp. 5 and 7.
G^Epstein, Votes and Taxes, p. 54.
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Other surveys dealing with local tax levels suggest, 
however, that public opposition may not be as great as that 
which the Oklahoma tax leaders perceive. For example, in 
nearly all of 12 Iowa communities surveyed, respondents gener­
ally clustered in the moderate category with respect to their 
satisfaction with local tax b u r d e n s . A  recent survey in ten 
major cities across the country produced somewhat similar 
results.G2 And Morgan found that about two-thirds of the
respondents in his survey of Oklahoma City area suburbanites
63considered their local taxes to be about right.
Previous research thus indicates that the general pub­
lic is not going to be knocking on the doors of city halls and 
demanding local tax increases. But at the same time, the 
average citizen appears not to be as adamantly opposed to more 
local taxes as he is oftentimes perceived to be. Transferring 
this conclusion to the municipal scene in Oklahoma, one might 
speculate that perceived community tax climate (^ .3,., percep­
tions of the degree of community progressiveness, civic 
responsibility, supportiveness) would serve tax leaders as a
Glçitizens and Local Governments in Iowa, pp. 35 and
37.
62
"City Taxes and Services; Citizens Speak Out," p. 5,
^^Morgan, "Suburban Differentiation and Metropolitan 
Political Integration," p. 245.
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better guide to the probable success of tax-increase proposals 
than would perceptions of "immediate" public opinion on local 
tax levels. If this is the case, one might think that differ­
ences in tax leaders' willingness to test the climate— which 
was found to be generally favorable in all three groups of 
cities— may account in part at least for differences in reli­
ance on the municipal sales tax. This matter receives further 
attention later on in this chapter.
In any case, if Oklahoma citizens presently seem to be 
opposed to local tax increases, how do they feel about the 
other side of the financial coin, viz., spending and services? 
Public opinion polls have produced mixed results on this matter. 
For example, a recent Gallup Poll shows that a majority (54 
per cent) of the respondents favored holding down spending on 
a variety of social p r o g r a m s . B u t  other surveys indicate 
that Americans generally favor more spending and services at 
both the federal and local levels.^5 in Oakland, "citizen- 
leaders" split about half-and-half on the desirability of 
increasing municipal s p e n d i n g . A s  Fisher and Fairbanks note.
^^Gallup Opinion Index, Report No. 93 (March 1973), p. 5.
^^Eva Mueller, "Public Attitudes Toward Fiscal Programs," 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXVII (May 1963), p. 214;
"City Taxes and Services; Citizens Speak Out," p. 5.
66Meltsner, The Politics of City Revenue, p. 208.
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these inconsistencies apparently grow out of widely varying 
public awareness and evaluation of governmental services. 
Accordingly, for any given public good or service, one citizen 
may wish to expand governmental activity; another, to hold it 
constant; and a third, to reduce it.^^
To see if perceived public opinion on municipal spend­
ing and services seems in any way related to differences in 
reliance on the local sales tax, I asked the tax leaders 
whether their constituents wanted expenditures and governmental 
activity decreased, held at present levels, or increased. 
Appendix A, item 10, gives the exact wording of the question 
and the possible responses. In keeping with the economic 
growth and small government policy orientations discussed 
earlier, I expected that as the sales tax rate rises, demands 
for higher spending and more services would increase. Table 
4-9 shows a slight— though statistically insignificant— ten­
dency for this pattern to appear.
Officials in all three groups perceive about the same 
degree of public support for decreased governmental activity.
In contrast— and as expected— perceived demand for increased 
spending and services tends to accompany a rising tax rate.
^^Glenn W. Fisher and Robert P. Fairbanks, "The Poli­
tics of Property Taxation," Administrative Science Quarterly, 
XII (June 1967), p. 56.
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TABLE 4-9
PERCEIVED CITIZENS' OPINIONS ON LOCAL SERVICES AND SPENDING 
LEVELS, BY LOCAL SALES TAX RATE (in percentages)
Spending and 
Services Should 
Be:
Sales Tax Rate
0%
Cities
1%
Cities
2%
Cities Total
Decreased 26.8 26.7 31.8 28.5
Held at present
level 50.7 46.5 34.1 43.4
Increased 22.5 26.7 34.1 28.1
Total 100.0 99.9 100.0 100.0
(N) (71) (86) (85) (242)
X  = 5.173, not significant at .05 level gamma = 0.047
NOTE: Percentages do not always total 100 because of rounding.
And these demands for more expenditures and expansions of the 
public sector come at the expense of preferences for "holding 
the line." Table 4-9, then, may well offer another clue as to 
why some cities rely on the local sales tax more than others do.
The results of Tables 4-8 and 4-9 point up a frequently 
noted inconsistency between public attitudes on taxes and those 
pertaining to services. That is, public support for increased 
spending and services tends greatly to exceed backing for a 
correlative tax policy.^® Nevertheless, relatively high
68See, for example, V. 0. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and 
American Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), pp. 165-
169; Glenn W. Fisher, Taxes and Politics: A Study of Illinois
Public Finance (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1969),
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proportions of officials from all three groups of cities per­
ceive a "middling" public attitude on both taxes and services.
This latter situation led me to wonder how citizens in 
the three groups of cities would react if forced to choose 
between increasing taxes or cutting services. A recent survey 
of citizens in ten major U.S. cities suggested that most people 
would prefer to pay higher local taxes than to have fewer pub­
lic services.69 But given the differences in reliance on the 
local sales tax in Oklahoma, I assumed that one would find 
more willingness to cut services among citizens from cities 
with lower sales tax rates. To explore this matter, I asked 
the public officials to agree or disagree with this statement: 
"People here would rather cut services than increase taxes." 
Table 4-10 shows the rather unexpected results.
In keeping with the results of the nationwide survey 
cited above, tax leaders in all three groups tend to perceive 
their constituents as preferring to sacrifice money rather 
than public goods and services. This tends to support the 
argument advanced earlier that one could perhaps largely dis­
count "immediate" public opinion on local tax levels— at least
p. 182; Mueller, "Public Attitudes Toward Fiscal Programs," 
pp. 222-224.
69i'city Taxes and Services: Citizens Speak Out," p. 5.
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TABLE 4-10
PERCEIVED PUBLIC PREFERENCES FOR CUTTING SERVICES AS OPPOSED TO 
INCREASING TAXES, BY LOCAL SALES TAX RATE (in percentages)
Sales Tax Rate
Statement
0%
Cities
1%
Cities
2%
1 Cities Total
People here would 
rather cut services 
than increase taxes
Strongly agree 6.3 13.6 1.2 7.1
Pretty much agree 11.1 16.0 14.8 14.2
Agree a little 15.9 16.0 30.9 21.3
Total agree 33.3 45.6 46.9 42.6
Disagree a little 17.5 23.5 22.2 21.3
Pretty much dis­
agree 22.2 16.0 14.8 17.3
Strongly disagree 27.0 14.8 16.0 18.7
Total disagree 66.7 54.3 53.0 57.3
Total 100.0 99.9 99.9 99.9
(N) (63) (81) (81) (225)
yr = 19.943, p <.05 gamma = -0.102
NOTE: Percentages do not always total 100 because of rounding.
when the "crunch" of hard choices faces the populace. Few 
urban residents would relish the idea of hauling their own 
garbage to the city dump, for instance.
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The most striking thing about Table 4-10, however, is 
that it fails to confirm expectations about differences in 
public preferences. Perceived differences do appear among the 
three groups of officials. But the pattern of these differ­
ences is the opposite of what was expected. About two-thirds 
of the 0 per cent officials see a public preference for 
raising taxes, whereas the comparable figure drops to roughly 
one-half for officials from sales tax cities. Even more 
impressive is that nearly 50 per cent of the no-tax officials 
rather much or strongly disagree with the statement. And com­
parable proportions of the 1 and the 2 per cent officials fall 
into the "maybe, maybe not" area (i.e., agree or disagree a 
little).
These results suggest that, as mentioned earlier, local 
leaders can and probably do use threatened increases in utility 
rates, coupled with warnings about fewer services, as an 
effective campaign tactic during sales tax referenda. And with 
respect to differences in reliance on the sales tax, the fig­
ures in Table 4-10 lend some support to speculation that the 
0 per cent officials are just now waking up to this possibility, 
and that officials from sales tax cities are encountering 
psychological barriers to using the "reduced services/higher 
utility rates" tactic as a means of raising additional taxes.
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Also, 0 per cent officials may perhaps believe that their ser­
vice levels are at the lowest possible point, and that further 
cutting would be virtually impossible.
Official-constituent agreement
Thus far, I have not specifically discussed the degree 
of attitudinal agreement between the tax leaders and their 
perceptions of the citizenry in their communities. But this 
would seem to be a critical question in trying to account for 
differences in local tax and revenue policies. Presumably, if 
leaders and followers tend to hold similar views on current 
financial issues, community policies will be likely to reflect 
this consensus.
Morgan cites several studies to make the point that 
most earlier research on leader-follower attitudinal similar­
ities and differences focused on national level politics, 
particularly distinctions between Congressmen and their con­
stituents.^® But more recently, scholars have shown a great 
deal of interest in manifestations of this problem at the local
^®Morgan, "Suburban Differentiation and Metropolitan 
Political Integration," p. 254. A more recent work argues for 
a fairly high degree of attitudinal congruence between U.S. 
Representatives and their constituents. See Robert S. Erikson 
and Norman R. Luttbeg, American Public Opinion; Its Origins, 
Content, and Impact (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1973),
pp. 253-259.
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level. And is often the case in the social sciences, various 
research efforts have produced mixed results. For example, 
Morgan says that in the Oklahoma City area, officials and 
citizens agreed rather closely on three-fourths of 20 possible 
paired items dealing with municipal p o l i c i e s . I n  contrast, 
Luttbeg's comparison of leaders and followers' attitudes in 
Eugene and Springfield, Oregon, shows that on nine policy 
issues (18 possibilities total), "all but two differences 
between leaders and followers are statistically significant 
. . . ."72 Interestingly— and perhaps understandably— local 
tax and revenue matters have proved to be a major area of dis­
agreement in terms of both actual policy preferences and 
accuracy of leaders' perceptions of followers' preferences.73
^^Morgan, "Political Linkage and Public Policy . . . ," 
pp. 221-223.
72Luttbeg, "Patterns of Leadership Policy Preference 
. . . ," p. 359.
•7 0
See, for example, Morgan, "Suburban Differentiation 
and Metropolitan Political Integration," pp. 265-266; Morgan, 
Political Linkage and Public Policy . . . ," pp. 217-223;
Sigel and Friesema, "Urban Community Leaders' Knowledge of 
Public Opinion," pp. 881-895; Basil G. Zimmer and Amos Hawley, 
"Opinions on School District Reorganization in Metropolitan 
Areas: A Comparative Analysis of the Views of Citizens and
Officials in Central City and Suburban Areas," Southwestern 
Social Science Quarterly, XLVIII (December 1967), pp. 319- 
320.
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To explore this problem from the standpoint of differ­
ences in reliance on the local sales tax in Oklahoma, I cross­
tabulated leaders and perceived constituents' attitudes on the 
four methods of raising additional revenue, the local tax level, 
and the level of spending and services. I then totaled the 
agreement responses and computed percentages. Thus, for 
example, I summed the responses where leaders and followers 
both ranked the sales tax first, second, third, or fourth in 
order of preference or where the local tax level was consid­
ered high, about right, or low. Table 4-11 shows the results 
of this effort.
In general, officials in all three groups tend to per­
ceive relatively high agreement with the citizenry on matters 
associated with local taxes and revenues. In one sense, then, 
the results seem to confirm the notion that local policies—  
whatever they may be— reflect considerable belief-sharing 
between leaders and followers. Equally interesting, however, 
are the variations in degree of agreement. Contrary to what 
one might expect, the amount of consensus on all of the issues 
except spending and services tends to decline as the sales tax 
rate increases. This raises questions, which will be explored 
later, concerning the nature of the leaders' "political 
muscle. "
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TABLE 4-11
OFFICIALS AND PERCEIVED CITIZENS' AGREEMENT ON MUNICIPAL FINANCIAL
ISSUES, BY LOCAL SALES TAX RATE (in percentages)
Sales Tax Rate
Issue and Percentage 0% 1% 2%
of Agreement: Cities Cities Cities
Sales tax
First 53.1 34.6 26.3
Second 14.1 9.0 10.0
Third 0.0 10.3 7.5
Fourth 1.6 6.4 7.5
Total 68.8 60.3 51.3
(N) (64) (78) (80)
Utilities
First 3.1 3.8 1.3
Second 21.9 14.1 10.0
Third 9.4 11.5 15.0
Fourth 18.8 21.8 13.8
Total 53.2 51.2 40.1
(N) (64) (78) (80)
Grant-in-aid
First 12.5 24.4 22.5
Second 4.7 11.5 5.0
Third 10.9 5.1 8.8
Fourth 20.3 11.5 7.5
Total 48.4 52.5 43.8
(N) (64) (78) (80)
Permits & licenses
First 0.0 1.3 2.5
Second 12.5 19.2 20.0
Third 20.3 23.1 8.8
Fourth 15.6 16.7 20.0
Total 48.4 60.3 51.3
(N) (64) (78) (80)
Local tax level
High 8.5 9.3 6.0
About right 29.6 36.0 26.2
Low 5.6 2.3 1.2
Total 43.7 47.6 33.4
(N) (71) (86) (84)
Spending & services
Decrease 2.8 9.3 6.0
Hold 14.1 19.8 11.9
Increase 22.5 18.6 29.8
Total 39.4 47.7 47.7
(N) (71) (86) (84)
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For the sake of simplicity, Table 4-11 does not show 
the magnitude of leader-follower disagreement. But the dir­
ection of agreement on the revenue-raising issues does suggest 
some useful insights into the way in which the immediate situ­
ation bears on variations in reliance on the sales tax and other 
revenue sources. With respect to raising additional revenue 
through the sales tax, for instance, the trend of consensus is 
favorable among all three groups. But this tendency is much 
more pronounced among the 0 per cent officials than it is 
among the other two groups. Events during the data collection 
phase probably account for part of this difference, but the 
variations are sharp enough to lend further support to the 
notion that as the sales tax rate increases, the levy does 
bump into a psychological barrier. Agreement on the undesira­
bility of increasing public enterprise rates and "indirect" 
charges seems fairly substantial. But with respect to utili­
ties, leaders and followers in the 0 per cent cities seem more 
inclined than do others to agree that traditional modes of 
local financing are not to be cast out forthwith. The oppo­
site trends of agreement on grants-in-aid further support this 
idea.
The pattern differences in the local tax level and the 
local spending level figures suggest that in comparison with 
the other two groups, the 1 per cent officials perceive
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relatively little pressure to increase either one. This could 
possibly help to explain why their cities have stayed at the
1 per cent rate. At the same time, there is rising agreement 
among 0 and 2 per cent officials and citizens on the need to 
expand governmental activity and expenditures. And whereas 
the 0 per cent officials perceive a strong consensus on using 
the sales tax to finance additional spending and services, the
2 per cent leaders and followers seem relatively more inclined 
to agree on the desirability of outside assistance. This in­
formation appears to be consistent with the differences in 
self-reliance values discussed earlier.
Leaders and Followers' Preferences in 
Tax-Policy Perspective
To summarize the main thrust of the argument thus far, 
the local sales tax apparently declines in popularity as the 
tax rate rises. But even at the 2 per cent rate, both offi­
cials and citizens still think highly of the tax— even though 
it may tend to bump into something of a psychological (as well 
as a constitutional/legal) barrier as it approaches or reaches 
the maximum allowable rate. This possibly helps to explain 
the 1 and 2 per cent officials and citizens' inconsistent 
attitudes with respect to local tax and spending levels. More­
over, to look at matters from the perspective of officials in
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the 0 per cent cities, the sales tax seems to be extremely 
popular with the citizens and thus offers a politically fea­
sible yet self-reliant means of "holding the line" in an in­
flationary economy. This line of thinking also helps to 
account for the 0 per cent officials' unexpectedly strong pre­
ferences for the sales tax as a revenue source and for 
increasing local taxes, spending, and services. It also seems 
to be in keeping with the 0 per cent citizens’ opinions about 
both taxes and spending.
At the same time, however, the fact remains that some 
cities have moved to the sales tax sooner than others have. 
Looking back, one can see that in general, the higher the tax 
rate, the greater the tendency for cities to have progressive 
leaders who perceive economic growth policy orientations, 
favorable tax climates, and rising constituent demands for 
public goods and services. In addition, the "habituation" idea 
may be working here. The sales tax has a long tradition at 
the state level in Oklahoma; many cities adopt it locally and 
appear to benefit from it; finally the 0 per cent communities 
come to view it as representing a not-too-sharp break with their 
"caretaker government" orientations.^^ With respect to the
^^This line of thought really amounts to a sort of 
"diffusion of tax innovation through habituation" argument. 
Social psychology offers evidence that familiarity developed
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desirability of the sales tax as a revenue-raiser, then, these 
trends help to account for such things as past variations in 
reliance on the sales tax and the relatively high degree of 
attitudinal congruence between 0 per cent leaders and followers, 
Although these factors, taken together, may well help 
to explain many of the past and present policy variations with 
respect to the local sales tax, they still leave unanswered a 
number of questions concerning differences in leaders' 
approaches to "selling" the tax to the public. After all, as 
the sales tax rate rises, perceived leader-follower congruence 
on tax and revenue matters seems to decline. And this situa­
tion leads one naturally to a consideration of problems
through repeated exposures to a strange stimulus (even one 
which may be disliked at first) tends to result in a more 
favorable attitude toward or an, increased preference for that 
stimulus. See, for example, A. H. Maslow, "The Influence of 
Familiarization on Preference," Journal of Experimental Psy- 
cholocrv. XXI (August 1937), pp. 162-180; Robert Zajonc, 
"Brainwash: Familiarity Breeds Comfort," Psychology Today.
Ill, No. 9 (February 1970), pp. 32-35 and 60-62. For theoret­
ical conceptualizations of the way in which such "favorable 
habituation" might help to diffuse a local political innova­
tion such as the sales tax, see Thomas M. Scott, "The Diffusion 
of Urban Government Forms as a Case of Social Learning,"
Journal of Politics, XXX (November 1968), pp. 1091-1108; or, 
more generally, Everett M. Rogers, with F. Floyd Shoemaker, 
Communication of Innovations— A Cross-Cultural Approach (2d 
ed.; New York: The Free Press, 1971), Chapters 3 and 9. In 
addition, given the long tradition of a state sales tax, the 
city sales tax is actually a "new" old tax which, as Fisher 
observes, would seem likely to meet with less public resis­
tance than would an unfamiliar form of tax levy. See Fisher, 
Taxes and Politics, pp. 183-184.
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revolving around the thorny issues of constituency relations 
and representational responsiveness.
Constituency Relations in the Tax 
and Revenue Process
Meltsner wonders whether cities lacking appreciable 
"political muscle" tend to rely less on direct than on indirect 
forms of financing. He apparently equates such muscle with a 
strong mayor governmental structure. But one might as easily 
associate the "political muscle" idea with the aggressive tax 
leadership which Meltsner seems to favor. "Aggressive leaders 
may prefer direct ways of coping with the public, while passive 
leaders may prefer indirect w a y s . " ? 5
In terms of municipal tax and revenue policy-making in 
Oklahoma, I originally assumed that such aggressive, politi­
cally muscular leadership would be most likely to appear among 
officials in the higher tax rate cities. And I supposed that 
it would be associated with relatively higher degrees of per­
ceived public support and leader-follower agreement. But the 
patterns which have appeared in this study fail to bear out 
this line of thought to any appreciable extent. Instead, as 
the sales tax rate rises, the officials' preferences for 
"direct impact taxes" decline. Moreover, officials from the
^^Meltsner, The Politics of City Revenue, p. 284.
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three groups of cities perceive only slight differences in the 
general support level (the community tax climate), and the 2 
per cent officials seem to perceive the least amount of agree­
ment with their constituents.
Despite the various possible explanations for these 
generally unexpected results, the fact remains that some cities 
have gone to the sales tax sooner and have relied on it more 
heavily than other cities have. In terms of tax leadership 
roles in the policy process, these various patterns— taken 
together— led me to think that "political muscle" in Oklahoma 
municipalities may involve less of an aggressiveness than a 
sort of independence and electoral indifference similar to the 
"volunteerism" norm of officials in the San Francisco Bay area. 
If this is the case, then one might reasonably wonder whether 
or how the three groups of officials differ with respect to 
constituency relationships. To explore this matter, the dis­
cussion now turns to an examination of selected aspects of 
leader-follower relations within the context of reported 
policy-making behavior.
Representational Roles 
According to Seligman, a central hypothesis found in 
the literature on leaders is that leadership depends on accep­
tance by followers. "A leader is not a leader unless he is
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accepted by followers; leadership is a representational role."^^ 
Thus the role of leaders is a critical element in a long­
standing question in political philosophy, viz., the mandate- 
independence controversy over the nature of political repre­
sentation. Pitkin concisely summarizes the question:
"Should (must) a representative do what his constituents want, 
and be bound by mandates or instructions from them; or should 
(must) he be free to act as seems best to him in pursuit of 
their welfare?" Accordingly, she continues, one's position 
on representational role correlates with his broadest concep­
tions of political life, e,.£., the nature of political issues,
the relative capacities of the rulers and the ruled, and the
77nature of society.
A few years ago, scholarly concern over the mandate- 
independence problem led Wahlke and associates to develop a 
famous classification scheme which has guided a great deal of 
subsequent research, especially in the area of state and local 
politics. More specifically, the authors identified three 
legislative role orientations with respect to representation
^^Lester G. Seligman, "The Study of Political Leader­
ship, " American Political Science Review, XLIV (December 
1950), p. 913.
^^Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 145-
146. Quote on p. 145.
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of constituents: (1) the trustee, who acts according to his
conscience and expertise rather than constituency opinion 
whenever a conflict arises; (2) the delegate, who perceives 
his behavior to be bound by constituency opinion; and (3) the 
politico, who defines his behavior situationally or in terms 
of a sort of blending or compromising of the two preceding 
roles.78
Some of the literature dealing with local political 
systems posits a delegate (or delegate-leaning politico) 
orientation. For example. Wood says that the small town 
leader can never be above majority opinion, and that his suc­
cess rests on his sensitivity to follower moods and aspira­
tions.79 In New Haven, Connecticut, says Dahl, real or 
perceived constituency preferences largely determine leaders '
decisions on issues such as redevelopment, and deviant leaders
ROrun the risk of being smitten down.° And speaking of the 
San Francisco Bay area, Eyestone finds it particularly inter­
esting "that citizen desires strongly influence council
78john C. Wahlke et ^ . , The Legislative System: 
Explorations in Legislative Behavior (New York: John Wiley
and Sons, Inc., 1962), pp. 267-280.
7 Q Robert C. Wood, Suburbia: Its People and Their
Politics (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1959), p. 269.
GORobert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in 
an American City (New Haven, Connecticut; Yale University 
Press, 1961), pp. 89-90, 138, 225-226.
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attitudes and perceptions, because this kind of linkage brings
together the councilman-as-leader with the councilman-as-
representative.
This line of thinking grows out of a sort of admixture
of theorizing about political ambitions, electoral accounta-
ft 2bility, and the so-called "rule of anticipated reactions."
And, given the sensitivity of pocketbook issues, it has under­
standably created a picture of state and local politicians 
fearful of supporting tax increases. Fisher, for example, 
finds it a most useful technique in analyzing tax politics to 
assume that most politicians act according to perceived self- 
interest, that they wish to win elections, and that they win 
elections by responding to immediate political forces instead 
of acting pursuant to the ultimate effects of their policy 
decisions.83 Pomper contends that if a governor fears elec­
toral punishment as a result of increasing taxes, he will not
Blsyestone, The Threads of Public Policy, p. 159.
8^See, for instance, Joseph A. Schlesinger, Ambition 
and Politics; Political Careers in the United States (Chicago: 
Rand McNally & Company, 1966), pp. 1-2; John W. Kingdon, 
"Politicians' Beliefs About Voters," American Political 
Science Review. LXI (March 1967), pp. 137-145; Carl J. Fried­
rich, Constitutional Government and Democracy (Boston: Ginn
and Co., 1950), p. 49.
83pisher, Taxes and Politics, p. 242.
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try to raise levies.®^ And Ecker-Racz ominously warns that 
"political graveyards are filled with one-time state and local 
leaders whose promising careers abruptly ended because they 
did not or could not avoid association with tax i n c r e a s e s . "85 
One can readily see that much of this delegate/poli­
tico-oriented analysis is closely related to individual self- 
interest assumptions found in abstract economic theory. 
Empirical political research has, however, tended to contra­
dict such assumptions. For instance, Wahlke and associates 
found that the proportions of trustees among California, Ohio, 
New Jersey, and Tennessee state legislators were 55, 55, 61, 
and 81 per cent respectively.®^ After a 1962 survey of con­
stitutional convention delegates and state legislators in 
Michigan, Friedman and Stokes reported that 72 per cent of 
the convention delegates and 66 per cent of the legislators 
had trustee orientations.®^ In the St. Louis area, 73 per
84Gerald M. Pomper, Elections in America; Control and 
Influence in Democratic Politics (New York: Dodd, Mead &
Coitçjany, 1968) , p. 147.
®®Ecker-Racz, The Politics and Economics of State- 
Local Finance, p. 26.
®®Wahlke et a^.. The Legislative System, p. 281.
®"^Robert S. Friedman and Sybil L. Stokes, "The Role of 
Constitution-Maker as Representative," Midwest Journal of 
Political Science. IX (May 1965), p. 160.
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cent of the councilman indicated that they decided things in 
accordance with their own conscience, principles, or judgment.®® 
According to Zisk, 60 per cent of the San Francisco Bay area 
councilman chose the trustee orientation.®® And Prewitt and 
Eulau noted that 44 per cent of the 82 city councils in the 
San Francisco Bay area had a representational response style 
based on a self-defined image of community needs (as opposed 
to 24 per cent and 32 per cent being responsive to attentive 
publics and to ^  hoc interest groups respectively)
Out of this and other research has come Prewitt's 
conception of a trustee-like local representational role based 
on the ethic of "volunteerism." The councilman, says Prewitt, 
has little electoral competition, is largely unambitious and 
indifferent about reelection, and— most important— tends to 
treat his public service as something of a citizen duty 
similar to that associated with service in community organi­
zations such as the chamber of commerce, the PTA, or the 
library board. Accordingly, Prewitt concludes, the volunteer
®®Downes, "Municipal Social Rank . . . ," p. 528.
Q Q
Zisk, Local Interest Politics, p. 100.
®®Kenneth Prewitt and Heinz Eulau, "Political Matrix 
and Political Representation; Prolegomenon to a New Departure 
from an Old Problem," American Political Science Review. LXIII 
(June 1969), p. 430.
180
may serve the community devotedly pursuant to the way in which 
he perceives the public interest, but he probably minimizes 
the importance of and remains insensitive to voter preferences 
and public opinion.
Other research efforts lend support to Prewitt's 
argument. For example, a 1962 survey of 165 Canadian MPs 
shows that of legislators from districts perceived to be 
highly competitive, 53 per cent considered themselves to be 
delegates; 36 per cent, politicos; and 11 per cent, trustees. 
In contrast, for districts perceived as non-competitive, the 
proportions were 27 per cent delegates, 32 per cent politicos,
Q O
and 41 per cent trustees. This seems to be in keeping with 
Prewitt's contention that public officials neither perceive 
nor worry about competitive and reelection pressures. And 
Westby notes a dichotomy between the political and civic 
spheres in American communities which induces local politi­
cians to "dissociate themselves from politics" and to "go 
political as civic men," thus placing themselves above base
91prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders, pp. 
210-212; Prewitt, "Political Ambitions, Volunteerism, and 
Electoral Accountability," p. 10.
^^Allen Kornberg, "Perception and Constituency Influ­
ence on Legislative Behavior," Western Political Quarterly, 
XIX (June 1966), p. 290.
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93motives and conveying the idea of public honor and trust. 
Prewitt would probably argue with the idea of a dichotomy 
between the political and civic spheres, but doubtless would 
find little fault with Westby's conclusions.
Against this background of research on representa­
tional roles, I found the following statement by Ecker-Racz 
particularly intriguing:
Democracies and sound tax policies make uncom­
fortable bedfellows. The public's aversion to paying 
taxes obliges legislators and others in leadership 
positions dependent on elector approval to avoid overt 
association with tax increases even at the cost of 
imprudent fiscal policies.
Accordingly, I decided to pose a role orientation problem for
the Oklahoma municipal officials. More specifically, I set up
a hypothetical conflict situation which basically involved
publicly supporting or publicly disavowing an unpopular tax-
increase proposal. Appendix A, item 6, gives the exact wording
of the question and the possible responses. The first two
answers correspond to the trustee and delegate roles. Anyone
choosing the "other" alternative was arbitrarily coded as a
politico, regardless of the written answer which he supplied.
S^David L. Westby, "The Civic Sphere in the American 
City," Social Forces, XLV (December 1966), pp. 162-164. Quotes 
on p. 164.
94Ecker-Racz, The Politics and Economics of State- 
Local Finance, p. 22.
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I did this because I assumed that anyone making this choice 
would be at least subconsciously feeling the need for compro­
mise inherent in the politico position. In keeping with the 
preceding discussion, I was unsure about the results which 
might appear. Most earlier research indicated that trustee 
orientations would predominate. But my speculations about the 
nature of "political muscle" suggested that as the sales tax 
rate rises, the proportions of trustees would increase. Table 
4-12 shows the officials' responses.
TABLE 4-12
OFFICIALS' REPRESENTATIONAL ROLE ORIENTATIONS,
BY LOCAL SALES TAX RATE (in percentages)
Sales Tax Rate
Representational 
Role of Officials
0%
Cities
1%
Cities
2%
Cities Total
Trustee 87.3 85.5 81.2 84.5
Delegate 4.2 8.4 5.9 6.3
Politico 8.5 6.0 12.9 9.2
Total 100.0 99.9 100.0 100.0
(N) (71) (83) (85) (239)
x^ = 3.546, not significant at .05 level
NOTE: Percentages do not always total 100 because of rounding.
183
The sales tax rate seems to make little difference 
with respect to the officials' perceptions of their represen­
tational role in a policy process situation. In tax and 
revenue matters, at least, an overwhelming majority of the 
officials consider it important to follow one's own judgment 
and convictions about the best interests of the community.
And contrary to earlier speculation, as the sales tax rate 
rises, the proportions of trustees decrease slightly. In 
short, all three groups of Oklahoma municipal officials appar­
ently feel politically potent enough to see little need to 
take a delegate or politico stance on a local tax issue or to 
avoid overt association with a tax-increase proposal.
These results are in keeping with most research find­
ings about general representational role orientations. They 
also tend to support other research efforts suggesting that 
conflict situations intensify trustee orientations. For 
example, Buechner shows that Colorado councilman considered 
it quite important to support municipal improvements despite 
community opposition. And he indicates that Colorado city 
managers and councilman substantially agreed on the necessity 
of taking open, other-than-neutral policy stands on community-
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wide issues such as sales tax p r o p o s a l s . Prewitt and Eulau 
report a strong correlation between a high trusteeship orien­
tation and a tendency for San Francisco Bay area councils to 
take policy stands running counter to majority preferences.96 
Sigel and Pindur's study of urban legislators in six communities 
in the Detroit area reveals that perceived conflict situations 
dramatically increased trustee orientations, and that such 
orientations remained high even in the face of clearcut 
instructions received through a public opinion poll.^^
96John C. Buechner, Differences in Role Perceptions in 
Colorado Council-Manaaer Cities (Boulder: Bureau of Govern­
mental Research and Service, University of Colorado, 1965), 
pp. 37 and 41-62.
^^Heinz Eulau and Kenneth Prewitt, Labyrinths of 
Democracy: Adaptations, Linkages, Representation, and
Policies in Urban Politics (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill 
Company, Inc., 1973), p. 414.
9^Roberta S. Sigel and Wolfgang Pindur, "Role Congru­
ence and Role Strain among Urban Legislators," Social Science 
Quarterly. LIV (June 1973), pp. 56-61. These findings are 
particularly interesting in light of a public opinion survey 
in Florida which revealed that more than three-fourths of the 
respondents favored a delegate role for city councilmen. See 
McMurray and Parsons, "Public Attitudes . . . ," p. 169. 
Nevertheless, the high proportions of trustees in all three 
groups may actually indicate less conflict with constituents 
than one might suppose. This would be in keeping with some of 
the results of the 1967 Iowa Legislative Project which show 
that trustees were much more accurate in predicting constitu­
ency opinion than were delegates, especially in perceived 
conflict situations. See Ronald D. Hedlund and H. Paul Frie­
sema, "Representatives' Perceptions of Constituency Opinion," 
Journal of Politics. XXXIV (August 1972), pp. 738-743.
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Constituency Information Levels 
A generally low level of citizen knowledge about tax 
and revenue matters may partly account for the high propor­
tions of trustees among Oklahoma municipal officials. As 
Wahlke and associates point out, modern government at all lev­
els is exceedingly complex, and its many and interrelated areas 
of concern, including taxation and finance, tend to lie beyond 
the comprehension of the average citizen. This being the case, 
the trustee reasons that the people cannot or will not adequat­
ely instruct their representatives. And his role orientation 
thus increasingly becomes a "functional necessity" as govern­
mental business takes on a more and more intricate and 
technical character.^® Moreover, as Sigel and Pindur suggest, 
although trustees, delegates, and politicos have different 
philosophical outlooks, their pragmatic experiences show them 
a public which fails to "cooperate" by being interested, in­
formed, and communicative. Hence, all three groups tend to 
hold similar or perhaps identical images of the public. Given 
this unity of views, it is little wonder that they all even­
tually tend to arrive at a trustee-like approach to policy­
making.99
^®Wahlke et a^.. The Legislative System, p. 281.
99Sigel and Pindur, "Role Congruence and Role Strain 
. ," pp. 64-65.
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Some public opinion polls show that the citizenry 
claims to have a high interest in and understanding of local 
issues and affairs. For instance, Dahl— drawing on unpub­
lished data gathered by Almond and Verba in the 1950s— reports 
that 65 per cent of the respondents indicated that they under­
stood local issues very well or moderately well. In contrast, 
only 45 per cent said that they were equally well-informed on 
national and international i s s u e s . Using 1966 Survey 
Research Center data, Jennings and Zeigler indicate that 30 
per cent of the respondents ranked local affairs number one in 
order of salience— a proportion only two percentage points 
below national affairs and ten or more percentage points above 
international and state a f f a i r s .
Other surveys, however, raise serious questions about 
these sanguine findings. Almond and Verba, for example, 
report that only 21 per cent of their U.S. sample indicated a 
sense of duty to try to participate in or to understand and 
keep informed about local government activities; a mere 3 per
lOORobert A. Dahl, Democracy in the United Statesr 
Promise and Performance (2d ed.; Chicago: Rand McNally &
Company, 1972), p. 237,
Kent Jennings and Harmon Zeigler, "The Salience 
of American State Politics," American Political Science Review, 
LXIV (June 1970), p. 525.
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102cent mentioned taking an interest in what is going on. And 
in "Mayburg," Iowa, Smith says, just a week before a municipal 
election, a survey of adult citizens revealed that 72 per cent 
of the respondents ranked relatively low on identification of 
local political leaders; only 8 per cent exhibited any mean­
ingful knowledge of specific election issues; and 48 per cent 
were either ignorant of or vague about community p r o b l e m s . ^03 
Hence, it is not too surprising to find that politicians tend 
to discount claims about high levels of voter interest and 
information.
This situation seems to be particularly true with 
respect to local tax and revenue matters. Commenting on the 
results of a public opinion survey taken in four suburban 
school districts in upstate New York, Burkhead observes that 
only hard-core tax-"aginners" appear able to agree on a pri­
ority of public needs. "For the remainder of the population, 
the structure of values seems to lack coherency and articula­
tion. Buchanan devotes a chapter to summarizing a number
^^^Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, p. 129.
^^^Smith, "The Games of Community Politics," p. 47.
^®^See, for example, Kingdon, "Politicians' Beliefs 
About Voters," pp. 138-141; Zisk, Local Interest Politics, p. 102,
lOSjeggg Burkhead, Public School Finance; Economics and 
Politics (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1964),
p. 168.
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of empirical studies on the average individual's degree pf 
information on various fiscal institutions, especially taxa­
tion. Taken together, the studies amply demonstrate a high 
level of public ignorance about tax and revenue m a t t e r s . -^6 
Pomper argues that the electorate neither can nor does separ­
ate the varying impacts of national, state, and local 
f i n a n c e s . 107 And even among Oakland's "citizen-leaders," only 
about one-half had any inkling of the financial problems of
the c i t y . 108
To explore this matter within the context of Oklahoma 
municipal tax politics, I gave the tax leaders a couple of 
six-point agree-disagree" statements concerning some of their 
perceptions of the citizenry's information level. I thought 
that such data might provide insights into whether trustee- 
oriented leadership differs among the three groups of offi­
cials. For example, I speculated that the 0 per cent officials 
would tend to perceive a more knowledgeable public and less 
difference in their own information level relative to
^8®james M. Buchanan, Public Finance in Democratic 
Process; Fiscal Institutions and Individual Choice (Chapel 
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1967), Chapter
13.
^87pomper, Elections in America, p. 144.
^88Meltsner, The Politics of City Revenue, p. 220.
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constituents than would be the case with officials in the 
other two groups. In other words, using a "knowledge is power" 
argument, one might suppose that relatively lower information 
levels permit trustees to flex their political muscles more 
freely. And such a finding would add yet another clue as to 
reasons for differences in reliance on the local sales tax.
Table 4-13 shows the mean scores for each group of officials.
The higher the score, the greater the degree of disagreement 
with the statement.
TABLE 4-13
OFFICIALS' MEAN RESPONSES TO STATEMENTS ABOUT PUBLIC INFORMATION 
ON MUNICIPAL FINANCIAL MATTERS, BY LOCAL SALES TAX RATE
Sales Tax Rate
Statement
G%
Cities
1%
Cities
2%
Cities
1. People here understand that 
the taxes and charges they pay 
are related to the city ser­
vices they receive. 2.63 2.39 2.79
2. The average citizen in 
your city is as well informed 
on local government tax and 
revenue matters as you are. 3.97 4.04 4.30
(N) (63) (80) (81)
In general, Oklahoma municipal tax leaders seem to hold 
slightly more favorable views about constituency information 
levels than most empirical research would bear out. All three
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groups of officials tend to agree mildly that the public at 
least understands the tax-service nexus. And they all appear 
to believe themselves better informed than the citizenry, 
although the relative weakness of this belief comes as some­
thing of a surprise.
Statement 1 does not confirm the expected differences 
in perceptions of citizen knowledge. But the second statement 
does lend at least some support to the notion that politically 
muscular knowledge levels tend to increase as the sales tax 
rate rises.
Some of the proportions along the agree-disagree con­
tinuum are even more interesting than the mean scores. For 
example, the proportions of those strongly agreeing that the 
people understand the tax-service nexus drop from about 30 
per cent for the 0 per cent officials to 20 and 16 per cent 
for the 1 and- the 2 per cent officials respectively. A similar 
trend appears for those agreeing that the citizenry is as well- 
informed as the officials are: 0 per cent officials— 41-2 per
cent; 1 per cent officials— 34.9 per cent; 2 per cent offi­
cials— 29.6 per cent. These figures at least hint at the 
possibility that tax leaders' fiscal sophistication tends to 
increase as the sales tax rate rises. This would be in keep­
ing with the finding in Chapter III that as the sales tax rate
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rises, the proportion of leaders in high SES occupational 
categories, particularly businessmen, tends to increase. 
Meltsner also supports this line of thought with his finding 
that businessmen have greater tax comprehension than other 
categories of leaders have.^^S
Communication with Constituents
Closely related to the problems of representational
responsiveness and citizen ignorance is the matter of poor
communication between public officials and constituents. When
public opinion inputs are vague or conflicting, local leaders
may find it much simpler and easier to follow their own judg-
Tinment as a guide in the policy-making process.
In his case study of "Eastown," Seism suggests that 
general public opinion probably outweighs other variables such 
as expert opinion with respect to local decisions on highly 
salient issues.Accordingly, with respect to financial 
matters, Mueller urges political leaders to obtain "a clear 
picture of prevailing opinions" through "an active two-way
lO^Ibid., p. 192.
^^*^Robert L. Lineberry and Ira Sharkansky, Urban Poli­
tics and Public Policy {New York: Harper & Row, Publishers,
1971), p. 166.
lllThomas E. Seism, "Public Opinion and Public Policy 
Decisions in Small Cities: A Case Study," Social Science
Quarterly, LII (June 1971), pp. 209-210.
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flow of information" which would presumably "stimulate dis­
cussion of the underlying issues and could reduce any large 
gaps between the views of the citizenry and the views of their 
elected representatives. Meltsner and Claunch offer similar 
advice to local tax-proposing leaders.
In contrast to such findings and advice, Prewitt and 
Eulau say that local public officials rely on their own judg­
ment precisely because they do not hear from the public.
Public opinion surveys tend to confirm this low level of 
communication with local leaders. For instance, in answer to 
a question about individual measures to influence local gov­
ernment, only 20 per cent of Almond and Verba's U.S. respon­
dents indicated that they would directly contact elected 
political leaders or the press, and just 1 per cent mentioned 
direct contact with non-elected administrative officials. 
Moreover, a mere 14 per cent would vote against "offending" 
officials at the next e l e c t i o n . I n  New Haven, Dahl's
ll^Mueller, "Public Attitudes Toward Fiscal Programs,"
p. 235.
^^^Meltsner, The Politics of City Revenue, pp. 254-260; 
Ronald Claunch, "How Voters Decide in a Sales Tax Election," 
Missouri Municipal Review. XXXVI, No. 7 (July 1971), p. 7.
(In the article. Dr. Claunch's name was spelled "Glaunch.")
H^prewitt and Eulau, "Political Matrix and Political 
Representation . . . ," p. 434.
^Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, p. 148.
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public opinion poll revealed that only 27 per cent of the 
citizenry had ever contacted local public officials or poli­
ticians concerning an issue of interest. And the proportion 
dropped to 16 per cent with respect to contact during the past 
year or so.^^^ One can find comparable evidence of low-level
citizen communication, involvement, and participation in stud-
1 17ies by Cans, Presthus, Wildavsky, and Alford.
Given this lack of communication, I was hardly sur­
prised to find Meltsner arguing that with respect to municipal
taxation, "local officials generally talk to one another," 
not to the citizens who provide political support for tax
i n c r e a s e s . in light of such things as the Oklahoma offi­
cials' trustee orientations and the differences among the 
three groups on perceived degree of agreement with constituents, 
Meltsner's argument suggested to me that I might profitably
ll^Dahl, Who Governs?, p. 279.
ll^Herbert J. Gans, The Levittowners; Ways of Life 
and Politics in a New Suburban Community (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1967), pp. 305-311; Robert Presthus, with a chapter by 
L. Vaughn Blankenship, Men at the Top: A Study in Community
Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 258-264;
Aaron Wildavsky, Leadership in a Small Town (Totowa, New 
Jersey: The Bedminster Press, 1964), p. 16; Alford, Bureau­
cracy and Participation, p. 232.
ll^Meltsner, The Politics of Citv Revenue, pp. 255-256. 
Quote on p. 256.
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look at the officials’ preferred information source in a situa­
tion requiring that a large amount of additional revenue be 
raised. In general, I expected to find that the officials 
"turned inward" in their quest for information. In addition,
I speculated, one might discover some slight tendency for con­
sultation with the public to decrease as the sales tax rate 
rises. Appendix A, item 5, shows the exact wording of the 
question and the possible responses. Table 4-14 gives the 
results of this query.
Table 4-14 confirms the expected relationships. Local 
tax leaders do indeed tend to rely mainly on one another for 
essential information related to municipal financing. Over­
all, the ratio of governmental to public sources is about two- 
to-one, with well over one-half of the officials preferring 
to consult with other officials in their immediate governmental 
circle. Only among 0 per cent officials does the proportion 
favoring governmental sources drop below 50 per cent. The 
combined figures for governmental and personal sources simply 
underscore the officials' "inward-looking" tendencies. Read­
ing horizontally, one sees that as the sales tax rate increases, 
consultation with the public does tend to decline slightly.
This seems to be in keeping with the trends discerned with
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TABLE 4-14
OFFICIALS' PREFERRED REVENUE INFORMATION SOURCE, BY LOCAL 
SALES TAX RATE (in percentages)
Sales Tax Rate
Preferred 
Source Is:
0%
Cities
1%
Cities
2%
Cities Total
Municipal govt.: 
Council (board) 
members 29.0 38.3 35.7 34.6
City mgr. or 
other adminis­
trators 17.4 22.2 20.2 20.1
Total 46.4 60.5 55.9 54.7
Personal:
Personal know­
ledge 15.9 11.1 19.0 15.4
Other personal 
sources 5,8 1.2 1.2 2.6
Total 21.7 12.3 20.2 18,0
Public:
Citizens-at-
large 10.0 16.0 8.3 11.5
Community
interest
groups 21.7 11.1 15.5 15.8
Total 31.7 27.1 23.8 27.3
TOTAL 99.8 99.9 99.9 100.0
(N) (69) (81) (84) (234)
NOTE: Percentages do not always total 100 because of rounding.
respect to perceived differences in the officials' tax know­
ledge relative to the citizenry.
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These results are similar to those of certain other
research efforts. Buechner, for instance, reports that
Colorado councilman considered it rather important to clear
with other leaders before they agreed to start projects which
called for fund-raising.According to Zisk, about 80 per
cent of the San Francisco Bay area councilman ranked the city
manager or other city officials as their first or second
choice as a source of advice about council issues. About 60
per cent gave other councilman similar ratings as a source of
consultation. In addition, about two-thirds indicated that
they did not actively seek the support or advice of community
120interest groups before a council decision was made. In 
Oakland, the city manager is the "fiscal conscience of the 
council," which reflects many of his beliefs in tax and 
revenue matters.
Constituency Relations in Tax Policy Perspective 
Differences in reliance on the local sales tax seem 
unrelated to variations in Oklahoma municipal tax leaders' 
perceptions of their representational role. In all three groups
p. 36.
1 1 Q
Buechner, Differences in Role Perceptions . . . ,
^^®Zisk, Local Interest Politics, pp. 32-34 and 57.
Percentages computed.
121
Meltsner, The Politics of City Revenue, p. 7.
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of officials, the trustee role predominates overwhelmingly; 
officials everywhere tend to be quite willing to associate 
themselves openly with an unpopular tax-increase proposal 
which they deem to be in the best interests of the community. 
This suggests that all three groups tend to feel politically 
muscular in the sense of being relatively unconcerned about 
the consequences of going against popular opinion.
At the same time, however, an examination of tax know­
ledge levels and preferred information sources indicates that 
such trusteeship or volunteerism similarities do not lead to 
comparable likenesses in certain key aspects of the tax and 
revenue policy process. For example, relative to the citi­
zenry, 0 per cent officials seem to consider themselves some­
what less knowledgeable than do their counterparts in the sales 
tax cities. Since the 0 per cent officials' cities have lag­
ged in going to the sales tax, one might speculate that in 
local tax and revenue matters, political prowess is positively 
associated with relatively high knowledge and information 
levels. And as the sales tax rate rises, such knowledge seems 
to increase. Moreover, in keeping with this "knowledge is 
power" hypothesis, as the tax rate increases, consultation 
with the public tends to decrease. As the sales tax rate goes
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up, "inward-looking" expertise, not public opinion, tends to 
become an increasingly important power base.
Overall, then, the general thrust of this section is 
that differences in knowledge levels and patterns of informa­
tion flow may be important factors in accounting for varia­
tions in reliance on the local sales tax. This immediately 
raises questions about how such information is acquired and 
transmitted within the context of the tax and revenue policy 
process.
Table 4-14 suggests that city managers may play a 
critical part here. Since only about one-half of the cities 
in the sample have a city manager form of government, it seems 
highly significant that some 20 per cent of the officials 
would turn to the city manager as a prime source of informa­
tion. Loveridge, Meltsner, and Zisk— among others— point up
122the importance of city managers as information sources.^
This would be in keeping with Wright's argument that the city 
manager actively initiates politically relevant communications 
to the community and seems to perform an outwardly oriented 
"linking pin" role between the city and its larger
122Loveridge, Citv Managers in Legislative Politics, 
p. 85; Meltsner, The Politics of City Revenue, pp. 51-60; 
Zisk, Local Interest Politics, p. 57.
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e n v i r o n m e n t . 123 i n  other words, the presence or absence of a 
city manager may be a key factor in accounting for differences 
in local sales tax policies. The next chapter explores cer­
tain aspects of this problem in some depth.
Summary
The attitudes and beliefs of political leaders are 
crucial factors in the municipal policy process. This suggests 
that differences in the psychological orientations of formal 
tax leaders may provide valuable insights into why some Okla­
homa cities rely on the local sales tax more than others do.
To pursue this line of thought, the chapter opens with 
an exploration of the perceived tax policy environment. In 
general, as the local sales tax rate rises, officials become 
increasingly more likely to perceive economic growth policy 
roles for their cities. With respect to the small government 
role, a reverse sort of relationship appears. These results 
are in keeping with previous expectations. However, attempts 
to relate officials' role orientations to their revenue- 
raising preferences produce unexpected results. For example.
^23j3eii S. Wright, "The City Manager as a Development 
Administrator," in Comparative Urban Research; The Adminis­
tration and Politics of Cities, ed. by Robert T. Daland 
(Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1969), p. 230.
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officials from cities with no local sales tax tend to be much 
more favorable toward the levy as a revenue-raiser than are 
their counterparts in cities with a municipal sales tax. 
Nevertheless, one finds a slight positive association between 
increasing sales tax rates and perceptions of a favorable com­
munity tax climate. And at the same time, as the sales tax 
rate decreases, officials seem to become more inclined to 
place a high value on local self-reliance. These latter two 
relationships appear to be consistent with the findings con­
cerning municipal policy roles.
Turning to more immediate concerns in the tax policy 
process, one finds that surprisingly high proportions of offi­
cials in all three groups think that local taxes are adequate 
to meet current community needs. Interestingly, however, tax 
leaders from the 0 per cent cities seem slightly less inclined 
toward a status-quo mentality on local taxes than do their 
counterparts in the sales tax cities. At the same time, all 
three groups of officials tend to favor increases in municipal 
spending and services. Surprisingly, however, the proportion 
of 0 per cent officials taking this position is noticeably 
greater than is the case with officials from the other two 
groups of cities.
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With respect to perceived constituency attitudes toward 
local tax and revenue matters, all three groups of officials 
see the citizenry as favorable toward the city sales tax as a 
revenue-raising source. However, the 2 per cent officials 
tend to view their constituents as less supportive of this 
source than the 0 and the 1 per cent officials do. As expec­
ted, public concern over high local tax levels tends to 
accompany rising local sales tax rates. Officials everywhere 
think that the citizenry considers local taxes to be too high. 
But among 0 per cent officials, this particular psychological 
barrier to additional tax increases appears to be somewhat 
lower than it is for officials in the other two groups. As 
for local levels of spending and services, perceived public 
demands for increased governmental activity apparently accom­
pany rises in the city sales tax rate. All three groups of 
officials tend to believe that citizens would rather increase 
taxes than cut services. But contrary to expectations, as the 
sales tax rate increases, the public is perceived to be more 
and more inclined to cut services instead of raising taxes.
In general, officials from all three groups of cities 
tend to perceive substantial agreement with constituents on 
revenue-raising preferences, local tax levels, and levels of 
municipal expenditures and activities. But contrary to what
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one might expect, the amount of consensus on most issues tends 
to decline as the city sales tax rate rises.
The factors discussed thus far raise questions about 
constituency relations and representational responsiveness in 
the tax policy process. An examination of such matters sug­
gests that differences in reliance on the local sales tax do 
not appear to be related to variations in the officials' per­
ceptions of their representational role. All three groups of 
officials tend overwhelmingly to take a trustee role in going 
against public opinion concerning an unpopular tax-increase 
proposal. Despite this general pattern of trusteeship or 
"volunteerism, " however, differences among the three groups do 
appear with respect to tax knowledge levels and preferred 
information sources. Relatively high tax knowledge seems to 
be positively associated with higher sales tax rates. And as 
the sales tax rate increases, officials seem somewhat more 
inclined to "look inward" for expert advice and to discount 
public opinion when it comes to consultations on means of 
raising additional revenue. This suggests that knowledge 
forms an important power base for the politically muscular 
sort of trusteeship which one might reasonably expect to find 
in tax leaders from cities with relatively high reliance on 
the local sales tax.
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This notion that "knowledge is power" raises questions 
about the acquisition and transmission of such information 
within the context of differing tax and revenue policy proces­
ses. Data on preferred information sources suggest that city 
managers may play a critical part in this aspect of the 
process. Accordingly, the next chapter examines these matters 
in some depth.
CHAPTER V
CITY MANAGERS IN MUNICIPAL TAX POLITICS 
Introduction
The preceding chapter explored various aspects of tax- 
leadership psychology to see how attitudes and perceptions 
related to differing tax and revenue policy processes. Several 
authors contend, however, that political structure or form may 
also constitute a critical variable in urban decision-making 
processes. For example, Crain and Rosenthal find that much of 
the literature on local political systems emphasizes common 
community values in explaining variations in the decision­
making process. And, they add, this literature supports the 
idea that such values are reflected in different forms of 
government.! Hahn argues that "efforts to identify the forms 
of political behavior that emerge in cities with diverse 
structural characteristics" seem to be especially appropriate
^Robert L. Crain and Donald B. Rosenthal, "Structure 
and Values in Local Political Systems: The Case of Fluorida­
tion Decisions," Journal of Politics, XXVIII (February 1966), 
pp. 169-171.
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2
for exploring local political affairs. And Meltsner says that 
political scientists need to understand how the structure of 
political systems influences the kinds of taxes imposed on the
citizenry.3
The last part of Chapter IV develops a "knowledge is 
power" argument to help explain differences in reliance on the 
local sales tax. And it suggests that a city manager/non-city 
manager framework might prove useful for examining how innova­
tive fiscal information diffuses and becomes translated into 
tax and revenue policy. As Loveridge and Meltsner point out, 
the city manager's expertise, extensive informational resour­
ces, and grasp of detailed technical knowledge enable him—  
potentially, at least— to be a major policy innovator and 
leader.4 Thus, Table 4-14 in Chapter IV offers few surprises 
when it shows that a fairly large proportion of the municipal 
tax leaders turns to the city manager for information on com­
plex financial issues.
^Harlan Hahn, "Reassessing and Revitalizing Urban Poli­
tics: Some Goals and Proposals," in People and Politics in
Urban Society, ed. by Harlan Hahn, Urban Affairs Annual Reviews, 
Vol. 6 (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1972),
pp. 27-28.
^Arnold J. Meltsner, The Politics of City Revenue 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. 284.
^Ronald 0. Loveridge, Citv Managers in Legislative 
Politics (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1971),
pp. 6-7; Meltsner, The Politics of Citv Revenue, pp. 51-60.
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Several recent research efforts afford theoretical 
justification for studying tax policy innovations in terms of 
the city manager governmental structure and the impact of the 
professional manager's orientations and behavior in the infor­
mation transmission process. Gray and Walker, for instance—  
though disagreeing sharply over analytical technicalities—  
nevertheless use structural units of analysis (states and 
regions) for exploring the diffusion of policy innovations. 
And they seem to agree that policy diffusion research should 
carefully consider how decision-makers acquire and transmit 
issue-related information.^ Rogers and Shoemaker point out 
that innovation involves closely interrelated changes in 
social structures and individual attitudes. Moreover, they 
continue, diffusion of innovation is essentially a communica­
tion process. And this process frequently begins with a pro­
fessional change agent who seeks to influence innovation 
decisions in a direction which he deems desirable.^ Mohr
^See Jack L. Walker, "The Diffusion of Innovations 
among the American States," American Political Science Review, 
LXIII (September 1969). pp. 880-899; Virginia Gray, "Innova­
tion in the States: A Diffusion Study," Jack L. Walker, "Com­
ment: Problems in Research on the Diffusion of Policy Innova­
tions," and Virginia Gray, "Rejoinder to 'Comment' by Jack L. 
Walker," American Political Science Review, LXVII (December 
1973), pp. 1174-1193.
^Everett M. Rogers, with F. Floyd Shoemaker, Communi­
cation of Innovations— A Cross-Cultural Approach (2d ed.; New 
York: The Free Press, 1971), Chapter 1.
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suggests that innovation is "the function of an interaction 
among the motivation to innovate, the strength of obstacles 
against innovation, and the availability of resources for over­
coming such obstacles." And he lists a number of major corre­
lates of innovation commonly associated with city managers and 
the counci 1-manager form of government, ^.3.., organizational 
availability of resources; environmental norms favoring change; 
and individual change-favoring norms, cosmopoliteness, positive 
professional orientation, and opinion leadership.^
In short, the discussion thus far suggests that one 
may well acquire valuable insights into differences in reli­
ance on the local sales tax by examining certain key financial, 
social, and attitudinal factors in terms of city manager/non­
city manager governmental structure. And if these factors 
bring out a notable pattern of differences based on structure, 
then one might reasonably shift back to the sales tax rate 
framework used in earlier chapters and focus on differences 
among city managers themselves— paying special attention to 
their reported orientations and behavior as they acquire and 
communicate innovative fiscal information and possibly attempt
Lawrence B. Mohr, "Determinants of Innovations in 
Organizations," American Political Science Review, LXIII 
(March 1969), pp. 111-114. Quote on p. 111.
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to translate it into tax and revenue policy. The remainder of 
this chapter examines these matters in some detail.
Selected Indicators of Structural Differences 
Preceding chapters bring out several factors which 
seem to be particularly important in accounting for differences 
in reliance on the local sales tax. More specifically. Chapter 
II (Table 2-4) confirms that as the sales tax rate rises, 
relative reliance on the sales tax as a source of revenue 
increases. Chapter IV suggests that increasingly favorable 
perceptions of the community tax climate and relatively high 
levels of tax knowledge are positively associated with higher 
tax rates (see Tables 4-3 and 4-13, statement 2). And as noted 
earlier in this chapter. Chapter IV also presents evidence 
that tax leaders frequently consult city managers on financial 
matters. Accordingly, in light of the preceding discussion, 
if governmental structure also seems to be related to differ­
ences in reliance on the local sales tax, then one might 
reasonably expect to find positive associations between these 
various indicators and the city manager form of government.
Reliance on the Sales Tax 
Obviously, one would need to pursue this line of 
thought no further if the financial data indicate that non-city
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manager cities rely on the local sales tax more heavily than 
city manager cities do. Table 5-1 shows, however, that this 
is not the case. City manager cities tend to rely more heavily 
on "direct impact taxes" than do non-city manager cities.
TABLE 5-1
RELIANCE ON "DIRECT IMPACT TAXES" FOR REVENUE, BY CITY MANAGER/ 
NON-CITY MANAGER FORM OF GOVERNMENT, 44 OKLAHOMA 
MUNICIPALITIES, FISCAL YEAR 1972
Reliance
Ranking
Is:
Form of Government
City Manager Non-City Manager
N % N %
High 8 35 4 19
Medium 9 39 a 38
Low _6 26 _9 43
Total 23 100 21 100
NOTE: See Chapter II, p. 55-56 for derivation of the reliance
ranking scale.
SOURCE: Computed from statements of financial condition, city
audit reports, and municipal public trust audit 
reports of the 44 cities.
Community Tax Climate 
Both the results of this study and a number of other 
research efforts suggest that a favorable or progressive com­
munity tax climate would indicate differing innovation norms 
between tax leaders in city manager cities and those in non­
city manager cities. Crain and associates, for example.
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report that cities with the council-manager plan are best able
p
to adopt a progressive innovation such as fluoridation.
Wolfinger and Field find that the city manager form of govern­
ment is strongly associated with a "public-regarding" ethos 
favoring "good government."^ Cistone and Hennessy indicate 
that school board members from council-manager cities hold 
stronger "good government" or "public-regarding" attitudes than 
do those from mayor-council cities with respect to the pro­
efficiency, pro-expertise dimension of their study.
To explore this matter in terms of Oklahoma municipal 
tax politics, I cross-tabulated the officials' responses to 
the four community tax climate statements (see Chapter IV,
Table 4-3) according to whether the leaders came from city 
manager or non-city manager cities. Then I computed mean 
scores and an index of favorable tax climate (see Chapter IV, pp. 
126-127, for the computational methods) . The lower the score.
8
Robert L. Crain, Elihu Katz, and Donald B. Rosenthal, 
The Politics of Community Conflict; The Fluoridation Decision 
(Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1969) p. 158.
g
Raymond E. Wolfinger and John Osgood Field, "Politi­
cal Ethos and the Structure of City Government," American 
Political Science Review. LX (June 1966), pp. 312-315.
^^Peter J. Cistone and Bernard Hennessy, "School Board 
Members' Attitudes and Administrative Forms: An Exploration of
Public-Regardingness," Midwest Journal of Political Science.
XV (August 1971), pp. 587-594.
211
the more favorable a given aspect of the community tax climate 
is perceived to be. Table 5-2 shows a slight but nevertheless 
distinct tendency for tax leaders from city manager cities to 
perceive a more generally favorable tax climate.
TABLE 5-2
OFFICIALS' MEAN RESPONSES TO COMMUNITY TAX CLIMATE STATEMENTS, 
BY CITY MANAGER/NON-CITY MANAGER FORM OF 
GOVERNMENT
Statement
Form of
City
Manager
Government
Non-City 
Manager
1. People here have a progressive 
spirit and want to boost the 
community. 2.14 2.51
2. The people here have a good 
sense of civic responsibility 
when it comes to facing up to 
community problems. 1.99 2.47
3. In general, people here support 
the efforts of their city officials 
to cope with the problems facing 
the city. 1.99 2.14
4. In general, people here will 
support a tax increase if their 
city officials show them the need 
for one. 2.16 2.28
Index of perceived tax climate: 2.07 2.35
(N) (145) (79)
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Tax Knowledge
To look for tax knowledge differences between the two 
groups of officials, I computed mean scores for the following 
"six-point agree-disagree" statement (see Table 4-13 and dis­
cussion on pp. 185-191 in Chapter IV): "The average citizen
in your city is as well informed on local government tax and 
revenue matters as you are." In this case, the higher the 
score, the more knowledgeable the officials feel in relation 
to their constituents. The mean score for officials from city 
manager cities is 4.26; the score for the other group, 3.85. 
And some of the proportions along the agree-disagree continuum 
are even more interesting than are the mean scores. For 
instance, only 12.4 per cent of the city-manager officials 
strongly or pretty much agree with the statement. In con­
trast, 29.1 per cent of the officials from non-city manager 
cities hold similar views.
These figures would appear to lend some support to 
the notion that tax leaders' financial sophistication tends to 
be higher in city manager cities. The following comments by 
non-city manager officials illustrate this point rather well:
We have a need for advice as to what we should be 
charged by consulting engineers for their services.
We need ideas as to cleaning up junkyards and other 
eyesores. (Official 098)
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Sometimes I wish there were an agency or private 
enterprise where a person could turn to get factual 
information on different city functions. For instance, 
we have a hospital board and a hospital trust who run 
the hospital. We have a utility board who runs the 
city utilities. A fire board— low rent housing board, 
etc. Oftentimes if we want to change a procedure, we 
are told that we cannot for some reason or another.
We recently wanted to make some changes in our volun­
teer fire department, but couldn't for jeopardizing 
pensions— or at least we were so told. The hospital 
wants us to convert half of our sales tax to them, or 
the hospital will be closed because of failure to meet 
Medicare standards. We're told we cannot change the 
sales tax as our revenue sharing is partially based on 
our sales tax revenue. In other words, the council 
receives biased information, depending on which depart­
ment head is talking. We need a computer to sort it 
all out. (Official 084)
Revenue Information Source 
Where do officials turn for information on innovative 
tax and revenue matters? Walker urges innovation researchers 
to concentrate on questions such as the information sources 
used by decision-makers.^^ In Chapter IV, Table 4-14 and some 
of the literature cited on page 196 suggest that the city 
manager is an exceedingly important source of information.
To explore this matter in terms of political behavior 
differences between tax leaders from city manager cities and 
those from non-city manager cities, I first excluded the 21 
city managers from the sample of officials, grouped the
l^Walker, "Comment . . . ," p. 1191.
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remaining officials according to their form of government, and 
cross-tabulated their preferred information sources in a situ­
ation requiring that a large amount of additional revenue be 
raised (see Chapter IV, Table 4-14 and discussion on pages 
191-196). Table 5-3 shows how the officials responded.
TABLE 5-3
OFFICIALS' (EXCLUDING CITY MANAGERS) PREFERRED REVENUE INFORMATION 
SOURCES, BY CITY MANAGER/NON-CITY MANAGER FORM OF 
GOVERNMENT (in percentages)
Form of Government
Preferred 
Source Is:
City
Manager
Non-City
Manager
Municipal govt.:
Council (board) members 28.0 42.0
City mgr. or other 
administrators 32.0 4.5
Total 60.0 46.5
Personal:
Personal knowledge 14.4 12.5
Other personal 
sources 1.6 3.4
Total 16.0 15.9
Public:
Citizens-at-large 10.4 15.9
Community interest 
groups 13.*^ 2L.A
Total 24.0 37.5
TOTAL 100.0 99.9
(N) (125) (88)
NOTE: Percentages do not always total 100 because of rounding.
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If one assumes that practically all of the city mana­
ger officials would be more likely to consult with the manager 
than with other municipal administrators, he can see that the 
city manager is indeed an important source of information. 
About one-third of the leaders from city manager cities would 
turn to him for counsel. In contrast, only about 5 per cent 
of the other group of officials would look to administrative 
personnel for guidance.
Some of the officials' comments revealingly illustrate 
this point about the importance of the city manager as an 
information source. For example, one official recites a long 
list of municipal financial woes and then concludes:
It is important that the council and city manager meet 
probably once a month besides the regular council 
meeting for a skull session so needed problems can be 
discussed openly. You just can't cover all the prob­
lems in the regular meetings where a regular agenda 
is followed. (Official 308)
This official's comment also illustrates another point 
brought out by Table 5-3. That is, the city manager form of 
government seems to intensify the "inward-looking" tendencies 
of officials— a factor which Chapter IV shows to be somewhat 
related to higher tax rates. Whereas only about one-fourth of 
the city manager officials would consult with the public, the 
proportion rises to almost 40 per cent for officials from non­
city manager cities. This finding appears to be in keeping
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with the results of certain other research. For example,
Cistone and Hennessy report that school board members from
council-manager cities are more willing than are those from
mayor-council cities to let administrative experts handle tasks
12generally deemed suitable for citizen participation.
To summarize this section, then, the city manager form 
of government does appear to be an important factor in account­
ing for variations in reliance on the municipal sales tax. As 
compared with their counterparts in the non-city manager cities, 
officials from city manager cities tend to perceive a more 
favorable tax climate, to consider themselves more knowledge­
able about tax and revenue matters, and to acquire such infor­
mation from bureaucratic rather than constituent sources. And 
these differences seem to be translated into variations in 
policy innovation. As Table 5-1 reveals, city manager cities 
tend to rely more heavily on the local sales tax.
City Manager Similarities and Differences 
The preceding section suggests that city managers are 
indeed a potent force in municipal tax and revenue politics. 
Moreover, a good deal of their power appears to grow out of 
their knowledge-and information transmission activities. At
l^cistone and Hennessy, "School Board Members' Atti­
tudes and Administrative Forms . , . pp. 587-594.
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the same time, however, one cannot simply conclude on that note, 
At all three tax rates, the subsamples of cities divide about 
evenly between the council-manager and the mayor-council forms 
of government. This fact suggests that in trying to account 
for differences in reliance on the local sales tax, one might 
fruitfully focus on similarities and differences among city 
managers in the three groups of cities. This approach admit­
tedly provides an incomplete picture since it omits any effort 
to isolate comparably critical leaders in the non-city manager 
cities. But limitations of time and resources precluded the 
development and implementation of a research design broad 
enough to attack this part of the problem.
Time in Community and Position 
Rogers and Shoemaker say that with respect to collec­
tive innovation decisions, longevity within a given social
13system tends to inhibit activity by stimulators. At the 
municipal level, adopting the local sales tax would provide an 
example of this sort of collective innovation decision. Chap­
ter III presents evidence that higher sales tax rates are 
positively associated with relatively high proportions of 
"progressive" newcomers. And in this chapter, the discussion
^^Rogers and Shoemaker, Communication of Innovations,
p. 278.
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thus far suggests that the city manager form of government and 
city managers are related to key fiscal, attitudinal, and in­
formational indicators of tendencies toward higher reliance on 
the sales tax. Accordingly, if city managers do indeed play 
a critical part in municipal tax and revenue policy decisions 
concerning the sales tax, one might reasonably expect to find 
that as the sales tax rate rises, the proportion of "short- 
timer" city managers increases. Table 5-4 examines this 
proposition.
TABLE 5-4
CITY MANAGERS’ DURATION OF RESIDENCE IN COMMUNITY AND 
TENURE IN OFFICE, BY LOCAL SALES TAX RATE
Sales Tax Rate
Residence and
0%
Cities
1%
Cities
2%
Cities Total
Tenure (years) N % N % N % N %
Residence:
0-4 1 16.7 2 28.6 6 75.0 9 42.9
5-more 5 83.3 5. 71.4 2 25.0 12 57.1
Total 6 100.0 7 100.0 8 100.0 21 100.0
Tenure
0-4 2 33.3 4 57.1 7 87.5 13 61.9
5-more 4 66.7 3 42.9 1 12.5 _8 38.1
Total 6 100.0 7 100.0 8 100.0 21 100.0
Table 5-4 confirms that the expected relationship does 
indeed appear. With respect to both residence and tenure, the
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managers' background characteristics tend to become more 
favorable to innovativeness as the sales tax rate rises. The 
contrast between the 0 per cent and the 2 per cent managers is 
particularly striking.
The overall tenure figures are generally consistent with 
the findings of other researchers. For example, Buechner 
reports that 72.2 per cent of the Colorado city managers had 
been in their present positions for no more than four years.
And Booth indicates that of 140 small cities with the manager 
plan, 65 per cent had an average managerial tenure in office 
of 4.4 years or less.^^
Taxes and Spending
Williams and Adrian observe that the city manager's
professional code will not allow him to sit idly by and watch
16municipal facilities deteriorate in order to have low taxes.
In addition, Fisher and Fairbanks imply that professional
14John C. Buechner, Differences in Role Perceptions in 
Colorado Council-Manaqer Cities (Boulder: Bureau of Govern­
mental Research and Service, University of Colorado, 1965), p. 
22.
^^David A. Booth, Council-Manaqer Government in Small 
Cities (Washington, D.C.: International City Managers' Associ­
ation, 1968), p. 84. Percentage computed.
^^Oliver P. Williams and Charles R. Adrian, Four Cities; 
A Study in Comparative Policy Making (Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press, 1963), p. 283.
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standards encourage managers to take a more expansive view of 
adequate services and spending levels than city councils 
generally do.^^
With one notable exception, all three groups of city 
managers tend to conform to this picture. Two-thirds of the 0 
per cent, five-sevenths of the 1 per cent, and three-fourths 
of the 2 per cent managers say that municipal spending and 
services should be increased. Moreover, two-thirds of the 0 
per cent and one-half of the 2 per cent managers believe that 
local taxes are too low. Interestingly, however, five of the 
seven managers from 1 per cent cities feel that the present 
level of taxes is about right. This proportion (71.4 per cent) 
is almost exactly the same as that for the entire group of 1 
per cent officials (69.0 per cent) and lends further support 
to speculation that this particular opinion on taxes may fur­
nish a clue as to why the 1 per cent cities have not gone to 
the maximum sales tax rate.
In general, however, the city managers' similarities 
in viewpoint stand out much more sharply than do their differ­
ences. Overall, they want to expand governmental getting and
^^Glenn W. Fisher and Robert P. Fairbanks, Illinois 
Municipal Finance— A Political and Economic Analysis (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1968), p. 195.
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spending. As Wells concludes after a survey of 26 city mana­
gers in Missouri, their public service ideology implies
a tendency to justify a central role for government in 
the life of society. Men do not ordinarily become 
career public executives . . .  in order to preside over 
the liquidation or curtailment of governmental func­
tions for which they have been made responsible . . . .  
"Progress," a word much on the lips of professional 
managers, is not likely to be defined in terms of the 
withering away of the state.
Governmental Policy Roles 
Williams and Adrian argue that city managers like eco­
nomic growth and amenities orientations since these governmen­
tal roles provide a policy basis for innovative managerial 
leadership. In contrast, small government and arbitration roles 
tend to create an environment hostile to the managers' commit­
ments to expansion of governmental activity and increased admin­
istrative e f f i c i e n c y . I n  light of this theoretical guidance 
and earlier findings in this study, one might reasonably expect 
to find that as the sales tax rate rises, city managers tend 
more and more to see growth and amenities roles for their com­
munities. But Table 5-5 reveals a somewhat different pattern 
of perceptions.
^®Lloyd M. Wells, "Social Values and Political Orien­
tations of City Managers: A Survey Report," Southwestern
Social Science Quarterly, XLVIII (December 1967), p. 449.
^^Williams and Adrian, Four Cities, pp. 278-284.
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TABLE 5-5
RANK-ORDER OF POLICY ROLES OF GOVERNMENT AS PERCEIVED BY 
CITY MANAGERS, BY LOCAL SALES TAX RATE
Sales Tax Ra te
Policy Role and 
Rank-Order Are:
0%
Cities
1%
Cities
2%
Cities Total
N % N % N % N %
Economic growth 
First or 
second 5 83.3 6 85.7 6 75.0 17 81.0
Third, fourth 
or other 1 15.7 1 14.3 2 25.0 4 19.0
Total 6 100.0 7 100.0 8 100.0 21 100.0
Amenities 
First or 
second 4 66.7 5 71.4 4 50.0 13 61.9
Third, fourth, 
or other 2 33.3 1 28.6 4 50.0 8 38.1
Total 6 100.0 7 100.0 8 100.0 21 100.0
Small government 
First or 
second 2 33.3 2 28.6 2 25.0 6 28.6
Third, fourth 
or other 4 66.7 5 71.4 6 75.0 15 71.4
Total 6 100.0 7 100.0 8 100.0 21 100.0
Arbitration 
First or 
second 1 16.7 1 14.3 3 37.5 5 23.8
Third, fourth, 
or other 5. 83.3 6 85.7 5 62.5 16 76.2
Total 6 100.0 7 100.0 8 100.0 21 100.0
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Overall, in keeping with the Williams and Adrian argu­
ment, the city managers as a group tend to rank economic 
growth and amenities high and to deemphasize small government 
and arbitration. The number one rankings are distributed as 
follows: economic growth— 67 per cent, amenities— 19 per cent,
small government— 9 per cent, and arbitration— 5 per cent. 
These findings are generally consistent with the results of 
previous research, although the proportion of those managers 
stressing economic growth tends to be somewhat greater than is 
the case elsewhere. For example. Booth's survey of city mana­
gers across the nation shows that 53 per cent identified 
economic growth as the main governmental role; 24 per cent, 
amenities; 15 per cent, "caretaker" government; 1 per cent, 
arbitration; and 8 per cent, a combined "transitional-compos­
ite" role.^^ And Loveridge indicates that of 57 San Francisco 
Bay area managers, about 47 per cent ranked economic growth as 
the number one orientation; 26 per cent, amenities; 13 per
p  *1
cent, small government; and 14 per cent, arbitration.
Contrary to expectations, however, the proportion of 
Oklahoma managers assigning a high priority to growth and
20Booth, Council-Manaqer Government in Small Cities,
p. 43.
21Loveridge, City Managers in Legislative Politics, 
p. 71. Percentages computed.
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amenities generally tends to decrease as the tax rate rises.
As might be expected, the proportion of those managers per­
ceiving a strong "caretaker" government orientation decreases 
somewhat as the tax rate goes up. But the ratios for the 
arbitration role come as a distinct surprise. More than one- 
third of the 2 per cent managers see arbitration as an impor­
tant role, whereas less than one-fifth of the 0 and the 1 per 
cent managers give this orientation a comparable ranking.
Loveridge's analysis of San Francisco Bay area mana­
gers may offer some insights into this rather puzzling pattern 
of responses. Having divided the managers according to gen­
erally political or administrative personal policy orientations, 
he finds that perceptions of economic growth and amenities 
roles for their cities apparently have little influence on the 
managers’ personal policy role orientations. Large proportions 
of managers with both political and administrative orientations 
give growth and amenities high rankings. In contrast, Lover­
idge continues, 86 per cent of the "caretaker" cities have 
managers with administrative orientations; in 75 per cent of 
the arbiter cities, the managers are politically oriented. 
Accordingly, he concludes, as the Williams and Adrian typology 
suggests, small government cities impose or at least encourage 
a narrowly defined policy role for the manager. However, with
225
respect to the arbiter cities, a lack of consensus on politi­
cal values seems to necessitate highly politicized managers 
instead of ones who feel constrained in their policy role. 
"Perhaps the arbiter city gives a manager authority to more 
directly articulate and work toward executive policy objec­
tives for city government.
In addition to rescuing the arbitration category from 
the oblivion to which it was consigned in earlier chapters of 
this study, Loveridge's line of thought not only helps to 
account for the unexpected differences among the three groups 
of Oklahoma managers, but also offers valuable guidance in 
looking for further clues as to ways in which attitudinal and 
behavioral differences among the managers may be related to 
variations in reliance on the local sales tax. More specifi­
cally, Loveridge's analysis suggests that one should look for 
evidence indicating that the three groups of managers tend to 
differ with respect to their personal policy role orientations 
and behavior. Presumably, as the sales tax rises, one might 
reasonably expect to find city managers becoming more and more 
politicized.
To summarize the discussion thus far, then, city mana­
ger cities tend to rely more heavily on the local sales tax
^^Ibid., pp. 70-71. Quote on p. 71.
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than do mayor-council cities. And as compared with officials 
from cities without the manager plan, tax leaders in council- 
managers cities are more likely to consider the community tax 
climate to be favorable, to feel themselves fiscally sophisti­
cated, and to rely on administrators rather than the citizenry 
for innovative tax and revenue information. Turning to the 
managers themselves, one sees that their views on local tax 
and spending levels differ very little according to the sales 
tax rate of their cities. However, as the sales tax rate rises, 
increasing proportions of managers tend to have residency and 
tenure characteristics often associated with innovativeness. 
Finally, all three groups of managers tend to assign high 
rankings to economic growth and amenities policy roles for 
their governments and correspondingly low priorities to small 
government and arbitration orientations. Contrary to expecta­
tions, however, the importance of the former two roles tends 
to decrease as the tax rate goes up. Perceptions of the "care­
taker" role tend to follow the expected pattern of decreasing 
as the tax rate rises. But surprisingly, the arbitration role 
receives increasing stress as the tax rate goes up. This 
latter finding becomes less puzzling and provides valuable 
research guidance if one relates it to possible differences in 
the personal policy orientations and behavior of the city 
managers.
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City Manager Orientations and Behavior
According to Loveridge, the successful city manager
23must literally become the town's premier politician. This 
seems to be particularly true with respect to municipal tax 
and revenue matters. For example, in his case study of 
Oberlin, Ohio, Wildavsky says that the limited resources of the 
city place the most significant restrictions on the city mana­
ger, and that perhaps the most critical problem facing the 
manager is finding a politically palatable method of raising 
revenue to meet the ever-increasing responsibilities of the 
c i t y . A n d  although Meltsner contends that the Oakland city 
manager believes in separating politics from administration,
he nevertheless realizes that in financial affairs, "he is a
2 5policy maker and that politics are a part of his job."
Earlier discussion in this chapter suggests that Oklahoma 
managers may tend to differ in their political policy-making 
attitudes and behavior, and that these differences may be 
related to variations in reliance on the local sales tax. 
Accordingly, this section probes for evidence of attitudinal
23lbid.. p. 108.
^^Aaron Wildavsky, Leadership in a Small Town (Totowa,
New Jersey: The Bedminster Press, 1964), p. 222.
2^Melts 
Quote on p. 58.
25 ner, The Politics of City Revenue, pp. 57-58.
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and behavioral policy-making differences among the three 
groups of managers.
Professionalism and Diffusion of Innovations 
In a famous article written some years ago, Gouldner 
hypothesizes that organizational members will tend to take on 
either a "cosmopolitan" or a "local" role or identity. Cosmo­
politans presumably have such characteristics as a low degree 
of attachment to their employing organization, a high level of 
commitment to specialized role skills, and a tendency to 
orient themselves toward outer reference groups. Locals, in 
contrast, are high on organizational loyalty, low on commitment 
to specialization, and oriented toward inner reference groups. 
Rogers and Shoemaker say that innovators are more likely to 
have reference groups external to rather than within their 
social systems. That is, stimulators of collective innovation 
decisions tend to be more cosmopolite than are other members 
of a given collectivity. "The cosmopoliteness of stimulators 
may be expressed by wide travel, readership of nonlocal pub­
lications, affiliation with national or international
26Alvin W. Gouldner, "Cosmopolitans and Locals: Toward
an Analysis of Latent Social Roles— I," Administrative Science 
Quarterly. II (December 1957), p. 290. For the second part 
of this article, see ibid. (March 1958), pp. 444-480.
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organizations, or by membership in professional occupations
associated with occasional migration . . . And Walker
argues that state officials tend to become more cosmopolitan
and innovative as a result of their taking cues diffused
through specialized communications systems, the most important
28of which are professional associations.
These views fit in well with the usual portrayal of the 
city manager. In contrast to the "local" tendencies commonly 
attributed to most municipal officials, writers such as 
Williams and Adrian and Kammerer contend, the professionally 
oriented city manager looks outward to his peers in the Inter­
national City Managers’ Association (ICMA) for guidance on the
29way in which he should perceive his job. Loveridge and 
Crain and associates echo these sentiments and add that the 
manager's composite key reference group, i.e., his professional 
colleagues, organizations, and publications, urges him to
27 Rogers and Shoemaker, Communication of Innovations, 
pp. 189 and 277. Quote on p. 277.
28Walker, "The Diffusion of Innovations . . . pp.
888-895.
^^Williams and Adrian, Four Cities, p. 283; Gladys M. 
Kammerer, "Role Diversity of City Managers," Administrative 
Science Quarterly, VIII (March 1964), p. 427,
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become an active and innovative policy leader and indeed 
advises him on how to go about doing so.^®
Empirical research tends to bear out these generaliza­
tions. For example, having examined 1952-1962 issues of 
Public Management, professional journal of the ICMA, for 
articles revealing professional role expectations, Kammerer 
reports that the role of policy leader or innovator led the 
list, with— incidentally— fiscal expert tied for second with 
two other roles.Buechner indicates that practically all of 
the Colorado city managers not only felt obliged to but also 
actually did read professional journals regularly and work on 
committees sponsored by state and national professional organ­
izations.^2 Loveridge finds a strong sense of professional 
identification, as measured by attendance at League of Cali­
fornia Cities conferences, among San Francisco Bay area mana­
gers— although politically oriented managers were noticeably
more likely to engage in this sort of professional activity
33than were their administratively oriented colleagues. And
^^Crain, Katz, and Rosenthal, The Politics of Coromunitv 
Conflict, pp. 197-198; Loveridge, City Managers in Legislative 
Politics, pp. 44-47.
^^Kammerer, "Role Diversity of City Managers," p. 428.
32Buechner, Differences in Role Perceptions . . . ,
p. 33.
33
Loveridge, City Managers in Legislative Politics.
pp. 63 -64 .
231
Wright's survey suggests that city managers devote a good deal 
of time to maintaining contacts with administrative officials 
at all levels of government and to gathering information 
through various administrative and professional channels.
In view of such theoretical guidance and empirical 
findings, I decided to look at the Oklahoma managers' profes­
sional identification and sources of tax and revenue cues as 
an initial step in trying to establish differences in policy 
orientations and behavior. Accordingly, I first asked the 
managers how they felt about being a member of the city mana­
ger profession (see Appendix A, item 30, for the exact wording 
of the question and the possible responses). Although the 
data on the managers' length of residence and tenure suggest 
that stronger professional identification would tend to accom­
pany a rising tax rate, the managers' responses do not support 
such a hypothesis. Instead, 18 of the 21 managers (85.7 per 
cent) consider membership in the profession to be "very 
important" to them. One manager from a 2 per cent city and 
another from a 1 per cent city believe that membership is 
"somewhat important," and a single 0 per cent manager thinks
^^Deil S. Wright, "The City Manager as a Development 
Administrator," in Comparative Urban Research; The Adminis­
tration and Politics of Cities, ed. by Robert T. Da land (Bev­
erly Hills, California; Sage Publications, 1969), p. 230.
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that the profession is "a little important" to him. One can, 
of course, question these responses on the grounds that many 
small-city managers are not really professionals in the com­
monly accepted sense of the word, but instead are just local 
citizens or municipal officials (e.g.., city engineers) who 
more or less "stumbled" into their jobs. But for the purposes 
of this study, the important thing here is their perceptions, 
not their actual backgrounds. And the responses indicate 
little variation in the professional orientation of the three 
groups of managers.
All three groups of managers apparently have a strong 
sense of "outward-looking" professional identification. But 
as Buechner and Wright point out, the city manager occupies an 
intermediary position linking his professional reference 
groups to his municipal organization and his c o m m u n i t y . ^ 5 
Moreover, says Booth, although the professional city manager 
is a member of two worlds, he must operate within a local 
environment which will frequently reject behavior based on 
values drawn from outside sources. Accordingly, he must mini­
mize professional considerations and values in both his 
thinking and his work. Instead, he must seek community advice
^^Buechner, Differences in Role Perceptions . . . , 
p. 6; Wright, "The City Manager as a Development Administrator," 
p. 230.
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and do things the "local" way. To back up these generaliza­
tions, Booth notes that just three of the managers surveyed 
said that they even occasionally called on outside managers 
or the ICMA for assistance with a local problem. "The typi­
cal pattern was to seek consultations with local people, local 
leaders and organizations." In short. Booth would agree 
with Kessel that any "city manager who accepted his cues about 
correct behavior from outside professional sources would be
much more likely to act so as to upset the social equilibrium
37or violate certain local norms."
To explore this aspect of the problem in terms of 
differences in innovative tax and revenue policy-making pro­
cesses, I asked the city managers about their chief source of 
new fiscal information and checked their preferred source of 
advice on the most feasible means of raising additional 
revenue (see Appendix A, items 29 and 5 respectively, for the 
questions and the possible responses). Tables 5-6 and 5-7, 
showing the replies, bring out some interesting points about 
the "localism" argument discussed in the preceding paragraph.
36Booth, Council-Manaqer Government in Small Cities, 
pp. 120-124. Quote on p. 121.
37john H. Kessel, "Governmental Structure and Politi­
cal Environment; A Statistical Note about American Cities," 
American Political Science Review, LVI (September 1962),
p. 616.
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TABLE 5-5
CITY MANAGERS' MAIN SOURCE OF NEW INFORMATION ON LOCAL TAX AND 
REVENUE MATTERS, BY LOCAL SALES TAX RATE
Sales Tax Rate
0%
Cities
1%
Cities
2%
Cities Total
Main Source Is: N % N % N % N %
External
Other city mgrs. 1 16.7 2 28.6 2 25.0 5 23.8
Professional
education 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 25.0 2 9.5
Professional
reading 4 66.7 2 28.6 2 25.0 8 38.1
Other outside
sources 0 0.0 2 28.6 1 12.5 3 14.3
Total 5 83.4 6 85.8 7 87.5 18 85.7
Internal
Other city admini­
strators 1 16.7 1 14.3 0 0.0 2 9.5
Council members 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Citizens-at-large 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Community inter­
est groups 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 12.5 1 4.8
Total 1 16.7 1 14.3 1 12.5 3 14.3
TOTAL 6 100.1 7 100.1 8 100.0 21 100.0
NOTE: Percentages do not always total 100 because of rounding.
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TABLE 5-7
CITY MANAGERS' PREFERRED SOURCE OF REVENUE-RAISING INFORMATION,
BY LOCAL SALES TAX RATE
Sales Tax Rate
0%
Cities
1%
Cities
2%
Cities Total
Preferred 
Source Is : N % N % N % N %
Municipal govt.: 
Council members 2 33.3 4 57.1 3 37.5 9 42.9
Other city 
administrators 2 33.3 1 14.3 0 0.0 3 14.3
Total 4 66.6 5 71.4 3 37.5 12 57.2
Public:
Citizens-at-
large 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Community
interest
groups 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 12.5 1 4.8
Total 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 12.5 1 4.8
Personal:
Personal know­
ledge 2 33.3 2 28.6 3 37.5 7 33.3
Other personal 
sources 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 12.5 1 4.8
Total 2 33.3 2 28.6 4 50.0 8 38.1
TOTAL 6 99.9 7 100.0 8 100.0 21 100.1
NOTE: Percentages do not: always total 100 because of rounding.
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In keeping with their strong sense of professional 
identification, all three groups of managers, Table 5-6 reveals, 
tend to rely heavily on outside sources for innovative tax and 
revenue information and ideas. In this case of cue-taking, at 
least, the "localism" argument does not seem to stand up. 
Instead, all three groups of managers apparently tend to fit 
into the commonly accepted pattern of innovations communicated 
through cosmopolitan reference groups.
One must, however, view the data in Table 5-7 from a 
different perspective. The innovation diffusion process can 
be looked upon as essentially an administrative matter. Accord­
ingly, one might reasonably expect to find little difference 
among the three groups in this part of the process. But asking 
about the best way to raise additional public monies takes one 
into the realm of political feasibility. Here, the "localism" 
idea has a different meaning and more importance. And, signi­
ficantly, differences among the three groups do appear at this 
point. All three groups of managers largely ignore the public, 
although— as subsequent analysis will show— it does seem worth 
noting that one of the 2 per cent managers looks to the 
community for advice and support. But much more importantly. 
Table 5-7 presents evidence that as the tax rate approaches 
the maximum allowable rate, city managers are less likely to
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seek political guidance from decision-makers within the local 
"official family" and are more prone to consult personal 
sources of knowledge. And in light of the data on the innova­
tion diffusion process, one might reasonably conclude that this 
knowledge originates with external reference groups.
In short, the data suggest that with respect to vari­
ations in reliance on the local sales tax among city manager 
cities, a critical "moment of truth" arrives when managers 
must take their professionally oriented innovative knowledge 
into the political arena. Chapter IV advances a "knowledge 
is power" argument to help account for differences in reli­
ance on the local sales tax. The question here seems to 
involve differences in the managers' willingness to assume 
the policy leadership role necessary to translate profession­
ally acquired knowledge into financial policy power. Table 
5-7 suggests that such willingness may well tend to increase 
as the sales tax rate rises. Accordingly, the next task is 
to see whether the managers do in fact report differences in 
their leadership roles and behavior.
Leadership Roles and Implementation of 
Tax and Revenue Innovations
Representational role
An earlier part of this chapter revealed that an
unexpectedly high proportion of 2 per cent city managers
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perceives strong arbitration roles for their municipal govern­
ments. And this fact led to speculation that such governmental 
policy orientations may be associated with relatively more 
politicized city managers. The question used to examine 
representational role orientations in Chapter IV (see Appendix 
A, item 6) seems particularly appropriate for looking at one 
aspect of differences in the managers' personal policy orien­
tations, for it raises a conflict situation dealing with an 
unpopular tax-increase proposal. In keeping with the line of 
thought being developed here, relatively more political mana­
gers should be more willing to try to work out political 
policy accommodations which would permit passage of a sales tax 
proposal. And, accordingly, if this is the case, one might 
reasonably speculate that as the sales tax rate rises, the 
proportion of "politico" managers increases. Table 5-8 lends 
some support to this proposition.
TABLE 5-8
CITY MANAGERS' REPRESENTATIONAL ROLE ORIENTATIONS,
BY LOCAL SALES TAX RATE
Sales Tax Rate
0% 1% 2%
Cities Cities Cities Total
Role of Managers N % N % N % N %
Trustee 5 83.3 6 85.7 5 62.5 16 76.2
Delegate 0 0.0 1 14.3 0 0.0 1 4.8
Politico 1 16.7 0. 0.0 3 37.5 _4 19.0
Total 6 100.0 7 100.0 8 100.0 21 100.0
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As might be expected from the results of previous 
research, all three groups of managers tend to take the trus­
tee role. But the important thing here is the relative pro­
portions of politicos. The ratio of politicos from the 2 per 
cent cities contrasts strikingly with those of the other two 
groups of managers. Whereas only one of the 0 per cent mana­
gers and none of the 1 per cent managers would assume the 
politico role, three of the eight 2 per cent managers indicate 
such an orientation. The other two roles are, of course, 
indicative of political stances, too. But given the nature of 
the question used to gauge these role orientations, the "simon 
purity" of both the trustee and the delegate stands seems to 
be more in keeping with a "good government" administrative 
policy orientation than with a predisposition toward the 
political maneuvering needed to introduce tax and revenue 
innovations successfully. In any case. Table 5-8 does seem 
to provide some evidence that as the sales tax rate rises, 
managers tend to become more inclined to engage in innovative 
politicking and policy leadership on non-routine activities. 
And this conclusion appears to be generally consistent with 
Loveridge's finding that politically oriented managers in the 
San Francisco Bay area translate their orientations into 
direct styles of policy leadership and innovation, whereas
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their administratively oriented counterparts remain more 
aloof from political give-and-take and more reluctant to push
op
for changes in the status-quo.
Policy role
The city manager literature abounds with analyses of
whether managers are or should be policy leaders. The general
thrust of the findings is that councilman claim to oppose a
strong leadership role for their managers, but that managers
themselves contend that they should and do lead.
On the council side of the controversy. Eyestone, for
instance, says that most councils in the San Francisco Bay
area insist that they, not the managers, are the policy lea- 
39ders. In general, Loveridge finds that the Bay area coun­
cilman strongly oppose a policy leadership role for the city 
manager, favoring instead an administrative orientation. They 
expect him to administer efficiently, avoid direct involvement 
in municipal policy and political processes, and furnish good 
advice and information. Only 14 per cent of the councilman 
think that the manager should be a policy leader. And less
38Loveridge, City Managers in Legislative Politics, 
pp. 114-122.
39Robert Eyestone, The Threads of Public Policy: A
Study in Policy Leadership (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill
Company, Inc., 1971), pp. 122-123.
241
than 20 per cent believe that the city manager should act as 
a politically oriented executive or leader.^® Buechner reports 
that in Colorado, nearly one-half of the responding councilmen 
feel that the manager should not play a leading role in policy­
making.
From the perspective of city managers, Boynton indi­
cates that of more than 1,000 managers nationwide, 86 per cent 
agree that managers must usually lead their councils, and 58 
per cent concur with the idea that successful managers are 
major policy formulatorsBooth's survey of small-city 
managers throughout the country shows better than 80 per cent 
of the respondents agreeing with a statement prescribing a 
leading, activist policy-making role for managers.According 
to Buechner, two-thirds of the Colorado city managers hold that 
the manager should play a leading policy-making role.^^
^^Loveridge, City Managers in Legislative Politics, 
pp. 80-90.
41Buechner, Differences in Role Perceptions . . . , p.
16.
42Robert Paul Boynton, Code; The City Manager and His 
Profession (Iowa City: Institute of Public Affairs, University
of Iowa, n.d.), pp. 48 and 50, cited by Wright, "The City 
Manager as a Development Administrator, " p. 225.
^^David A. Booth, "Are Elected Mayors a Threat to 
Managers?" Administrative Science Quarterly. XII (March 1968), 
p. 584. Percentage computed.
44Buechner, Differences in Role Perceptions . .
p. 16.
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Loveridge says that 88 per cent of the San Francisco Bay area 
managers agree that the city manager should be a policy inno­
vator; 53 per cent, a political leader.
As for the actual policy behavior of managers. Booth 
indicates that city managers emerge as general policy initia­
tors and activists in nearly 60 per cent of the cities in his 
s a m p l e . W r i g h t  observes that 65 per cent of the managers in 
his survey indicate that more than two-thirds of the policy 
questions on council agenda get there solely at the managers’ 
initiative. And, he continues, such agenda-fixing or gate­
keeper powers "clearly establish the manager as the dominant 
policy initiator in most manager c i t i e s . M e l t s n e r  finds 
that in the tax and revenue politics of Oakland, "councilmen 
[merely] legitimize the finance policy of the city manager."^®
In terms of the "real world" of day-to-day municipal 
politics, one can probably boil down all of this attitudinal 
and behavioral controversy to the unremarkable statement that
p. 48.
p. 102.
^^Loveridge, City Managers in Legislative Politics,
^^Booth, Council-Manaqer Government in Small Cities,
^^Wright, "The City Manager as a Development Adminis­
trator, " pp. 224-225. Quote on p. 225.
'^®Meltsner, The Politics of City Revenue, p. 60.
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most managers innovatively lead policy-making, whereas others 
do not. Loveridge suggests that a key variable in accounting 
for this difference is whether a manager has a political or an 
administrative » controversy—avoiding) policy orientation.
Earlier analysis in this chapter suggests that as the 
sales tax rate rises, the proportion of politically oriented 
managers may well increase. To explore this hypothesis, I 
asked the city managers to characterize their behavior in the 
tax and revenue policy-making process. The four possible 
responses— adviser, participant, developer, leader— were 
intended to establish a spectrum of policy orientations ranging 
from strongly administrative to strongly political. Appendix 
A, item 32, shows the exact wording of the question and the 
possible responses.Table 5-9 gives the managers' replies.
Although the pattern or responses is not quite the 
same as the one predicted, it does appear to be similar enough 
to expectations to support the idea that differences in reliance 
on the local sales tax are associated with variations in the 
policy role orientations of city managers. Whereas two-thirds 
of the 0 per cent managers perceive their role administratively.
^^Loveridge, Citv Managers in Legislative Politics,
p. 52.
^^This question was adapted from an item in Loveridge's 
questionnaire. See ibid., p. 191.
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TABLE 5-9
CITY MANAGERS' POLICY ROLE ORIENTATION, BY LOCAL
SALES TAX RATE
Sales Tax Rate
0%
Cities
1%
Cities
2%
Cities
Gamma = 0.218
Total
Policy Role Is: N % N % N % N %
Adviser 2 33.3 1 14.3 1 12.5 4 19.0
Participant 2 33.3 1 14.3 3 37.5 6 28.6
Developer 1 16.7 2 28.6 1 12.5 4 19.0
Leader 1 16.7 3 42.9 3 37.5 z 33.3
Total 6 100.0 7 100.1 8 100.0 21 99.9
NOTE: Percentages do not always total 100 because of rounding.
one-half of the 2 per cent managers and five-sevenths of the 
1 per cent managers view their role in political terms. About 
40 per cent of the managers from the 1 per cent and the 2 per 
cent cities hold the strongest possible political orientation. 
In contrast, only one manager from the 0 per cent cities con­
ceives of his policy role in like terms.
Policy implementation
As Loveridge aptly puts it, the real payoff from clas­
sifying role perspectives lies in what such policy conceptions 
can explain about actual behavior in the policy-making process.
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And the most critical policy activities involve controversial 
innovations and leadership c h o i c e s . A l l  three groups of 
managers tend overwhelmingly to be professionally oriented and 
receptive to innovative tax and revenue information from outside 
reference groups. But the three groups of managers do appear 
to differ with respect to their policy role orientations.
Hence, one gets down to the politics of the matter. Do the 
managers also differ when it comes to translating orientations 
into real policy-making behavior?
In an effort to answer this question, I asked the mana­
gers how frequently they tried to use innovative tax and 
revenue ideas acquired through professional channels. Appendix 
A, item 31, gives the exact wording of the question and the 
possible responses. I expected to find that as the sales tax 
rate rises, the frequency of attempted implementation increases. 
Table 5-10 shows how the managers replied to this query.
The expected pattern does indeed appear. One-half of 
the 2 per cent managers report using all or many of the new 
ideas. About 85 per cent of the 1 per cent managers fall into 
the many-to-some range. And all of the 0 per cent managers 
try to use some or a few of the innovative ideas which they 
receive through professional communications channels. And it
^^Ibid.. pp. 115 and 119,
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TABLE 5-10
CITY MANAGERS' USE OF INNOVATIVE TAX AND REVENUE INFORMATION, BY
LOCAL SALES TAX RATE
Sales Tax Rate
Manager Reports 
Using:
0%
Cities
1%
Cities
2%
Cities Total
N % N % N % N %
All 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 12.5 1 4.8
Many 0 0.0 3 42.9 3 37.5 6 28.6
Some 4 66.7 3 42.9 3 37.5 10 47.6
A few 2 33.3 1 14.3 1 12.5 _4 19.0
Total
Gamma = -0.535
6 100.0 7 100.1 8 100.0 21 100.0
NOTE: Percentages do not always total 100 because of rounding.
does seem to be at least suggestively significant that only a 
2 per cent manager seeks to use all of the new ideas and infor­
mation communicated to him.
To summarize this section, then, one might begin by 
noting Wood's contention that the city manager, concerned with 
the total character and welfare of his community, quite 
naturally attempts to formulate and "sell" policy and, indeed, 
even to force politically distasteful decisions upon the city 
c o u n c i l . 52 But at least with respect to the situation in
52Robert C. Wood, Suburbia: Its People and Their
Politics (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1959), p. 185.
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Oklahoma, when the unpalatable decision concerns raising taxes, 
one must apparently modify such sweeping generalizations to 
account for the distinctions in policy role orientations which 
Loveridge brings out. Oklahoma cities do differ in their 
reliance on the local sales tax to meet financial problems.
And as Meltsner suggests, at the heart of such differences lie 
variations in the strength of political leadership. 3^ Politi­
cally oriented city managers seem to be crucial actors in the 
politics of municipalities which have come to rely relatively 
more heavily on the local sales tax. With their administra­
tively oriented counterparts in cities with relatively lower 
reliance on the tax, they tend to share a high degree of 
"outward-looking" professional identification and receptivity 
to innovative ideas received through professional channels.
But they tend to differ when it comes to translating innova­
tive knowledge into policy power. These differences become 
apparent when one sees that as the sales tax rate rises, city 
managers tend to become more "politico" in their perceptions 
of their representational role, more oriented toward an 
activist policy leadership role, and more willing to use inno­
vative tax and revenue information acquired from outside 
professional reference groups.
^^Meltsner, The Politics of City Revenue, Chapter 7.
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Summary
Political structure seems to be an important variable 
to consider in attempting to account for differences in poli­
tical behavior. The first part of this chapter uses a city 
manager/non-city manager government framework to look at 
certain variables identified earlier as apparently important 
in explaining differences in reliance on the local sales tax. 
The analysis within this framework shows that city manager 
cities tend to rely more heavily on the local sales tax than do 
cities without the council-manager plan. And as compared with 
officials from non-city manager cities, formal tax leaders 
from city manager cities tend to think that the community 
climate for tax increases is more favorable, to feel more 
informed about tax and revenue matters, and to depend more on 
administrative than on constituency sources for developing 
revenue-raising preferences.
Since cities with each of the sales tax rates divide 
about equally with respect to form of government, the rela­
tionships noted above suggest that one should examine similar­
ities and differences among city managers themselves. Subse­
quent analysis reveals that the managers differ very little in 
their views about local tax and spending levels. They gener­
ally feel that both taxes and spending should be increased.
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However, as the sales tax rate rises, managers become more 
likely to have residency and tenure characteristics which have 
been associated with innovativeness. All three groups of mana­
gers tend to stress economic growth and amenities policy roles 
for their governments and to downplay "caretaker" government 
and arbitration orientations. As expected, the proportion of 
managers emphasizing the small government role decreases as 
the sales tax rate rises. But unexpectedly, arbitration role 
orientations become more important as the tax rate goes up.
This latter finding leads one to speculate about pos­
sible differences in the managers' personal policy orientations 
and behavior, especially with respect to the interrelationship 
of professionalism, diffusion of innovative tax and revenue 
information, and the translation of orientations and informa­
tion into actual policy-making. An examination of these 
matters reveals that all three groups of managers tend to have 
a strong sense of professional identification which apparently 
makes them receptive to professionally transmitted information 
on tax and revenue innovations. But when one shifts from this 
more administrative aspect of the policy process to the more 
political requirements for translating knowledge into policy, 
he finds that the three groups of officials appear to differ 
in several critical respects. More specifically, as the sales
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tax rate rises, especially to the maximum allowable rate, 
managers tend to become more likely to assume a "politico" 
representational role, to see themselves as policy activists 
and politically oriented leaders, and to attempt to convert 
professionally communicated cues into actual tax and revenue 
policy. These findings suggest that the presence or absence 
of a politically oriented manager is a key variable in 
accounting for differences in reliance on the local sales tax. 
And they seem to underscore the importance of strong political 
leadership in municipal tax and revenue matters.
CHAPTER VI
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND TAX POLICY DIFFERENCES
Introduction
This study focuses on the importance of leadership in 
accounting for differences in reliance on the local sales tax 
among Oklahoma cities and towns. Chapter I raises one basic 
and numerous subordinate research questions. The basic ques­
tion asks what factors in the municipal tax and revenue policy 
process in Oklahoma encourage and enable leaders in some cities 
to rely more heavily on the local sales tax than is the case 
elsewhere within the state. The subordinate queries explore 
this matter from a number of perspectives: historical tra­
ditions and precedents, constitutional/legal constraints, 
municipal revenue sources, tax leaders' social background 
characteristics and psychological orientations, and govern­
mental structure.
As to be expected, an exploratory study such as this 
can offer no conclusive answers to the basic question, although 
the results suggest that strong political leadership is one of 
the most critical factors. In any case, the efforts to answer
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the subordinate sets of questions do seem to provide valuable 
insights into key variables in the policy process and to 
afford useful guidance for both future research and policy 
recommendations. Accordingly, the next section of this chap­
ter reviews the highlights of the study in order to point up 
the variables which appear to be particularly important. The 
subsequent section looks at possible areas for future research- 
drawing on observations made during visits to two cities 
(Geary and Clinton) conducting sales tax election campaigns 
to illustrate many of the problems which seem to merit addi­
tional study. The concluding section attempts to translate 
the findings of this research effort into some useful policy 
prescriptions for municipal tax leaders.
Revenue-Raising in Oklahoma Municipalities 
The Political Economy 
The first set of questions deals with the interrelated 
impact of tax traditions, precedents, and constitutional/legal 
constraints on the municipal tax and revenue process. How do 
these factors relate to differences in the political economies 
of cities with varying sales tax rates?
To secure adequate financial resources to meet demands 
for public goods and services, Oklahoma municipalities have 
traditionally relied more on public enterprises (especially
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utilities) than on municipal taxes. This situation has re­
sulted from two main causes. First, constitutional/legal 
constraints have strongly discouraged use of the property tax 
and deficit financing and have just as strongly encouraged 
public enterprise financing. Second, although Oklahoma pion­
eered in adopting a state sales tax, the state did not permit 
cities and towns to levy a local sales tax until the mid-1950s.
At present, Oklahoma municipalities may impose a voter- 
approved local sales tax up to a rate of 2 per cent. To date, 
over 300 communities have opted for this new source of 
revenue. At the same time, however, many cities have either 
foregone this revenue option entirely or taken less than 
maximum advantage of it.
As an initial step in trying to account for such dif­
ferences in reliance on the local sales tax, I drew samples of 
cities with each of the three possible sales tax rates (0, 1, 
and 2 per cent). Then I developed a politically oriented 
classification scheme for municipal revenues: "direct impact
taxes," "sales and services," "intergovernmental revenue," and 
"indirect revenue." Finally, I used this classification scheme 
to analyze the FY 1972 gross receipts of the 44 cities and towns 
in the total sample.
The analysis reveals that relative reliance on the sales 
tax (which makes up practically all of the revenue in the •
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"direct impact taxes" category) rises dramatically as the sales 
tax rate rises. At the same time, although very sizable pro­
portions of all three groups of cities continue to rely heavily 
on traditional "sales and services" sources of revenue (mainly 
utilities), reliance on this source tends to decline notice­
ably as the sales tax rate rises. In addition, whereas more 
than one-half of the 1 per cent and the 2 per cent cities rank 
high or medium on all four revenue categories, the 0 per cent 
cities rank low on all categories except "sales and services." 
This finding suggests that the local sales tax may provide 
new avenues for expanding revenues from the various categories 
and may be associated with tendencies to develop a more expan­
sive and diversified "mix" of revenue sources.
Analysis of the political economies of Oklahoma muni­
cipalities provides no direct information on why the cities 
vary in their reliance on the local sales tax. But it does 
offer a good foundation for exploring such differences in 
terms of the social background characteristics, political 
psychology, and form of government of formal tax leaders from 
the three groups of cities. Mail questionnaire responses of 
244 public officials form the basis for these three parts of 
the research effort.
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Background Characteristics of Tax Leaders 
The second group of questions focuses on selected 
social background characteristics of municipal tax leaders.
Can one find differences in these factors which appear to be 
associated with variations in reliance on the local sales tax?
Formal tax leaders in cities with relatively high sales 
tax rates tend to have certain social background and recruit­
ment characteristics which the results of other research have 
associated with innovativeness and a general lack of concern 
over constraints presumably imposed by the political environ­
ment. More specifically, as compared with 0 per cent officials, 
leaders from sales tax cities tend to have resided in their 
communities for appreciably shorter lengths of time and to 
hold higher SES occupations (proprietary businessmen making 
up a dominant category). Concerning motivations for recruit­
ment to public office, as the sales tax rate rises, the influ­
ence of friends and neighbors tends to decline. This suggests 
that acquaintances holding a low-tax ideology become less 
influential in the recruitment process as the sales tax rate 
goes up. And finally, a rising proportion of "short-termers" 
in office accompanies an increase in the local sales tax rate. 
These relationships suggest that in comparison with no-tax 
cities, municipalities with a sales tax tend to receive more
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frequent infusions of the kind of progressive "fresh blood" 
which would make for innovative tax leadership.
Political Psychology of Tax Leaders 
The third set of questions asks what makes tax leaders 
"tick" psychologically. Can one relate differences in psycho­
logical orientations to differences in reliance on the sales 
tax?
In an attempt to find possible relationships between 
political economies, social background characteristics, and 
attitudinal sets of local tax leaders, the analysis turns 
first to the officials' perceptions of the municipal tax 
environment, _i.e., governmental policy roles (especially as 
they relate to revenue-raising preferences), local tax climate, 
and community self-reliance values. In general, one can say 
that as the city sales tax rate goes up, officials' perceptions 
of economic growth policy roles for their communities tend to 
increase. And a reverse sort of relationship appears with 
respect to the small government policy role. But contrary to 
expectations, one finds no association between economic growth 
orientations and a progressive and innovative attitude toward 
the sales tax as a revenue-raiser. Officials from cities with 
no local sales tax tend to favor the sales tax much more than 
do their counterparts in the 1 per cent and the 2 per cent
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cities when it comes to preferences for sources of additional 
revenue. Perhaps one can partly account for this situation by 
noting that many of the 0 per cent cities played "catch-up" 
during the data collection phase of this study and by sur­
mising that some leaders in the sales tax cities may be per­
ceiving a psychological barrier to further tax increases.
Given these conditions, it does seem significant that one can 
nevertheless see a slight trend associating perceptions of an 
increasingly favorable community tax-increase climate with 
rising sales tax rates. In contrast to this relationship, as 
the sales tax rate declines, officials tend more and more to 
place a high value on local self-reliance. The relationships 
noted for community tax climate and local self-reliance values 
appear to be in keeping with earlier speculation and findings 
concerning progressive economic growth and traditionalist 
"caretaker government" policy roles.
The analysis of the tax environment emphasizes attitu­
dinal differences among the three groups of tax leaders. But 
in many cases, they exhibit strong similarities in orientation, 
In addition, unexpected results appear when one tries to 
establish a continuity and consistency between policy role 
perceptions and immediate revenue-raising preferences. These 
things suggest that in exploring variations in municipal sales
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tax policies, one must go beyond the general "strategic" con­
siderations of community culture and environment and examine 
aspects of the immediate "tactical" situation.
This "immediate situation" analysis focuses on per­
ceived similarities and differences between officials and 
constituents with respect to local tax and spending levels.
One finds that surprisingly high proportions of all three 
groups of officials think that local tax levels are about right, 
and that spending and services should be increased. But even 
more surprising is that the 0 per cent officials tend to be 
somewhat more likely to favor tax and spending increases than 
are their counterparts in the presumably more progressive 
sales tax cities.
With respect to perceptions of constituency attitudes 
on tax and revenue matters, all three groups of officials 
tend to view their constituents as favoring the sales tax as 
a revenue-raiser, believing local taxes to be too high, and 
wanting to hold the line on services and spending. Interesting­
ly, however, as the tax rate rises, the citizenry tends to be 
perceived as less supportive of the sales tax as a revenue 
source and more concerned about high tax levels. On the other 
hand, perceived public demands for increased spending and 
services apparently accompany a rising tax rate. Yet as the
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sales tax rate increases, the public is perceived to be more 
and more inclined to cut services rather than to raise taxes.
All three groups of officials tend to perceive sub­
stantial agreement with constituents on revenue-raising pre­
ferences, local tax levels, and levels of municipal spending 
and services. But in contrast to what one might expect, the 
degree of consensus on most issues tends to decrease as the 
sales tax rate goes up.
One can suggest a number of explanations for many of 
these surprising and inconsistent "immediate situation" find­
ings. For example, the sales tax may well bump into a psycho­
logical barrier as the rate approaches the maximum allowable. 
At the same time, the public fear of higher utility rates and 
officials' "desperation" over inadequate service and spending 
levels may combine with the well-known "tax habituation" prin­
ciple to promote a more favorable attitude toward the sales 
tax among 0 per cent officials and citizens. But from the 
standpoint of accounting for differences in reliance on the 
local sales tax by relating such variations to differences in 
leadership psychology, it would appear that differing percep­
tions of the general tax environment furnish a more reliable 
guide than do "immediate situation" variables.
One of the most difficult things to explain is the
unexpected finding that as the sales tax rate rises, perceived
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congruence between tax leaders and their constituents seems to 
decline. After all, the analysis of perceived community tax 
climate indicates that the citizenry is likely to become more 
and more progressive, responsible, and supportive as the tax 
rate goes up. Yet the officials in the higher tax rate cities 
tend to perceive more conflict with their public support base 
than is the case elsewhere. This situation leads one naturally 
to consider some of the thorny issues involved in constituency 
relations and representational responsiveness.
Using the familiar "trustee, delegate, politico" 
typology, one finds that differences in reliance on the local 
sales tax seem to be unrelated to variations in Oklahoma muni­
cipal tax leaders' perceptions of their representational role. 
Among all three groups of officials, trustee-like motivations 
and role perceptions predominate when the situation calls for 
the official to go against popular opinion on a tax-increase 
proposal. This suggests that all three groups tend to feel 
like "politically muscular volunteers" in the sense of being 
relatively unconcerned about the consequences of going against 
public opinion. Such similarities do not, however, carry over 
to the related matters of tax knowledge and preferred informa­
tion sources. For example, relative to the citizenry, 0 per 
cent officials seem to consider themselves somewhat less
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knowledgeable than do their counterparts elsewhere. Since the 
0 per cent cities have obviously lagged in adopting the sales 
tax, this finding suggests that political clout is positively 
related to relatively high information and knowledge levels. 
Moreover, in connection with such a "knowledge is power" hypo­
thesis, as the tax rate goes up, consultation with the public 
on preferred revenue-raising methods tends to go down. In 
other words, as the sales tax rate rises, "inward-looking" 
expertise, not public opinion, tends to become an increasingly 
important power base.
Differences in officials’ knowledge levels and infor­
mation flow patterns appear to be important in accounting for 
variations in reliance on the local sales tax. This finding 
raises questions about the acquisition and transmission of 
innovative tax and revenue information. And data on the offi­
cials' preferred information sources suggest that city mana­
gers play a critical part in this aspect of the policy process. 
Hence, one turns naturally to an examination of whether differ­
ences in form of government and managers' attitudes and behav­
ior seem to be related to variations in local sales tax policy.
Political Structure and the Role of Managers 
The fourth set of research questions inquires into 
whether city manager/non-city manager form of government makes
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any difference in reliance on the local sales tax. Earlier 
analysis suggests that it may well. And if this is the case, 
then one would do well to focus on the city managers them­
selves— looking for differences in background, attitudes, and 
reported policy behavior. It seems especially important to 
probe for differences among the managers with respect to com- _. 
municating innovative tax and revenue information and trans­
lating such knowledge into actual policy.
Analysis of selected indicators reveals that the city 
manager form of government seems to be an important variable 
in accounting for differences in reliance on the municipal 
sales tax. As compared with tax leaders from non-city manager 
communities, officials from municipalities with the council- 
manager plan tend to perceive a more favorable tax climate, to 
consider themselves more informed about tax and revenue matters, 
and to acquire such information from bureaucratic rather than 
constituency sources. In short, they appear to feel more 
politically "muscular" than do their non-city manager counter­
parts. And these differences are apparently translated into 
policy variations, for city manager municipalities tend to 
rely more heavily on the local sales tax than do mayor-council 
cities.
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At the same time, the three subsamples of cities split 
about evenly with respect to form of government. This sug­
gests that one must look for differences in the managers 
themselves if he is to pursue this line of thought to its 
logical conclusion.
Returning to the sales tax rate framework for this 
part of the analysis, one finds that the three groups of mana­
gers differ little with respect to their views on local tax 
and spending levels. They all tend to favor higher taxes and 
more governmental activity. However, as the sales tax rate 
rises, increasing proportions of managers tend to be relative 
"short-timers" in their communities and their office. These 
characteristics would presumably be associated with more 
progressive and innovative attitudes toward tax and revenue 
matters. Finally, all three groups of managers tend to stress 
economic growth and amenities policy roles for their govern­
ments and to downplay small government and arbiter roles. As 
expected, the proportion of managers emphasizing the "care­
taker government" orientation decreases as the tax rate goes 
up. But unexpectedly, arbitration role orientations tend to 
become more important as the tax rate rises.
This latter finding becomes less puzzling and provides 
valuable research guidance when one relates it to personal 
policy orientations and behavior. That is, differences in
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perceptions of the arbiter role permit one to speculate that 
as the sales tax rate rises, city managers tend to be more and 
more politically oriented in their attitudes and behavior. 
Moreover, using the "knowledge is power" argument, one might 
further speculate that a crucial "moment of truth" in the tax 
and revenue policy process arrives when city managers must 
translate administratively acquired innovative information 
into politically oriented financial "policy power."
Analysis along these lines indicates that politically 
oriented city managers are indeed important actors in the 
politics of municipalities which rely relatively more heavily 
on the local sales tax. With their more administratively 
oriented counterparts in cities with lower tax rates, they 
tend to share a high degree of "outward-looking" professional 
identification and receptivity to innovative ideas diffused 
through professional channels. But when one shifts from this 
more administrative aspect of policy-making to the more poli­
tical exigencies of translating information into policy, he 
discovers that the three groups of managers apparently differ 
markedly in several respects. More specifically, as the sales 
tax rate goes up, city managers tend to become more "politico" 
in their representational role perceptions, more oriented 
toward a policy leadership role, and more likely to try to 
convert professionally communicated cues into actual tax and
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revenue policy. These findings suggest that differences in 
reliance on the local sales tax are related to variations in 
the role orientations and behavior of city managers. And they 
seem to underscore the importance of strong, aggressive, inno­
vative political leadership in the municipal tax and revenue 
policy process.
Suggestions for Future Research 
The results of this study apparently offer some use­
ful insights into why some Oklahoma municipalities have been 
able to rely more on the local sales tax than others have.
But analysis of financial data and "closed-end" questionnaires 
oftentimes raises as many or more questions than it answers. 
Such is certainly the case with this study. Accordingly, I 
should like to suggest some areas which I consider to be 
worthy of future research effort.
In the area of financial data, once one learns his 
way around the state capitol, he has a centralized gold mine 
of raw material at his disposal. Since I am much more inter­
ested in leadership psychology than aggregate financial 
statistics, my treatment of the data in the various municipal 
documents is unsophisticated to say the least. But it does 
nevertheless attempt to examine the data from a political 
perspective. Political scientists should try to do more of
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this sort of thing; they need not remain chained to analytical 
formats imposed by economists and accountants. In any case,
I would plead especially for more research on the policy con­
sequences of the sales tax. For example, I suggest elsewhere 
that the sales tax may tend to expand and diversify other 
politically oriented categories of revenue. Is this really 
the case? If so, what is the nature of the political pro­
cesses involved? Are some categories more "favored" in the 
authoritative allocation process? If so, how and why?
With respect to social background characteristics, 
the "knowledge is power" idea suggests that one might well 
study tax leaders' educational backgrounds much more inten­
sively. By this, I mean their total educational experience, 
not just years of formal schooling. As one official told me, 
"You have to remember that half of the councilmen in this 
state can't spell 'government.'" But city officials are none­
theless governing, and their store of usable knowledge and 
experience seems to make a critical difference in local tax 
and revenue policy processes.
This notion gets support from my observations of sales 
tax election campaigns in Geary and Clinton in the spring of 
1973. In Geary (finally trying for the first penny), the 
council members had been in office for a full two years. But
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they still seemed unsure of themselves on many aspects of the 
sales tax, somewhat simplistic in their planning for the refer­
endum, and as highly reliant on the city attorney as Vidich 
and Bensman’s portrayal of the village board in Springdale.^
In Clinton (going for a 2 per cent rate), in contrast, the 
council members not only benefited from the presence of an 
administratively astute and a politically oriented city mana­
ger, but also appeared to be more generally knowledgeable and 
experienced in their own right. Accordingly, although the 
manager obviously furnished policy leadership in the campaign, 
he was certainly not the only strong leader in the affair.
And the council members and informal tax leaders were able to 
use the expertise of the manager and other technical experts 
to develop an administratively sophisticated financial approach 
to the tax issue. And by working together during a well- 
planned political campaign, they were able to translate their 
innovative information and knowledge into local tax policy.
In the survey questions concerning initial recruitment 
into office and representational role, I give some attention 
to certain aspects of tax leaders' psychological motivation.
^Arthur J. Vidich and Joseph Bensman, Small Town in 
Mass Society; Class. Power and Religion in a Rural Community 
(Rev. ed.; Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1968), p. 124.
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And although Prewitt’s concept of the "duty-bound volunteer" 
is highly useful in studying motivations of local tax leaders, 
it seems to lack something that I cannot really pin down.
When I asked tax-proposing leaders in Geary and Clinton why 
they were publicly associating themselves with a politically 
unpopular issue like a tax increase, some responded in terms 
of civic duty and community need. But many others just 
looked at me blankly for a while and then answered vaguely or 
simply changed the subject. And contrary to the "publie-be- 
damned and I-don’t-care-about-reelection" aspects of "volun- 
teerism," many of the Geary tax leaders who were running for 
council seats in a concurrent election indicated that they 
would have felt much more comfortable if they had not been 
publicly associated with the tax proposal. Moreover, in their 
personal campaigns, they tended to downplay or to try to hide 
their role in the issue.^ In other words, the Geary election 
suggests that Meltsner is right when he argues that motivations
^Kenneth Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders: 
A Study of Citizen-Politicians (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-
Merrill Company, Inc., 1970); Kenneth Prewitt, "Political 
Ambitions, Volunteerism, and Electoral Accountability," Ameri­
can Political Science Review, LXIV (March 1970), pp. 5-17.
^An interesting sidelight: whereas the sales tax
question received a resounding "yes" vote, the only two candi­
dates for municipal office who openly campaigned for the tax 
went down to crushing defeat at the hands of an individual so 
closed-mouth that he even refused to talk to me.
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present serious problems for political analysis because they 
are a highly idiosyncratic function of the individual, the 
time, and the place.^ This seems to be particularly true 
when one is dealing with local leaders who do not wish to view 
themselves as politicians in the first place.^ As Eldersveld 
points out, political leaders have difficulty with questions 
about their motivations because they either will not express 
their motives candidly or are confused about their actual 
personal interests in political affairs.^ In any case, moti­
vational differences among tax leaders appear to represent a 
topic worthy of considerable additional study.
Closely related to the problem of motivation is the 
matter of behavior resulting from such motivation. Here, one 
could profitably do a series of case studies of tax-proposing 
leaders' psychologically motivated campaign behavior. By 
this, I do not mean the mechanics of campaigns, e,.g,., usage 
of various mass media, different kinds of canvassing efforts.
Arnold J. Meltsner, "Political Feasibility and 
Policy Analysis," Public Administration Review. XXXII (November/ 
December 1972), p. 861.
^See Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders, 
pp. 100-103; Gordon S. Black, "A Theory of Professionalization 
in Politics," American Political Science Review, LXIV (Septem­
ber 1970), pp. 868-869.
^Samuel J. Eldersveld, Political Parties; A Behavioral 
Analvsis (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1964), p. 276.
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alliance-forming. These surely are all interesting matters, 
but it seems to me that a much more important problem involves 
the psychological orientations of tax-proposing leaders as 
they go about trying to "sell" the tax to the public.
If, as Meltsner contends, a city revenue crisis is 
essentially a political leadership crisis,? local tax referenda 
seem to be especially well-suited for studying this problem. 
According to Cobb and Elder, a political issue is most commonly 
created whenever members of the political system perceive an 
unfavorable distribution of positions or resources. And 
redistribution issues such as taxation tend to get on the 
agenda quickest of all since they involve the immediate
O
interests of.a great many persons. Accordingly, tax-proposing 
leadership— like all leadership— becomes a highly complex 
matter involving the interactions of leaders, followers, and 
the situation.9 This being the case, one might ask, for
^Arnold J. Meltsner, The Politics of City Revenue 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. 11.
®Roger W. Cobb and Charles D. Elder, Participation in 
American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda-Building (Boston:
Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1972), Chapter 5.
^Cecil A. Gibb, "Leadership," in The Handbook of Social 
Psychology, ed. by Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, Vol. 4 
(2d ed.; Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing
Company, 1969), pp. 205-282.
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example, if tax-proposing leaders perceive attitudinal differ­
ences with the public, do they modify their tax-proposing 
behavior to account for the differences? In the election 
campaign, in other words, do they try to talk to the citizens 
on their own terms, or do they in reality only talk to them­
selves and to others of like mind?
If one associates higher tax rates with relatively 
more successful tax-proposing leadership, then the results of 
the survey suggest that successful tax-proposing leaders are 
more likely to follow the latter course of action. And in 
its own peculiar way, the situation in Geary's campaign seems 
to bear out this line of thought. That is, the leaders half­
heartedly talked themselves into bringing the tax to a vote. 
Then they pretty much left the issue to fend for itself since 
they generally seemed to reinforce one another's perceptions 
of great public opposition to higher taxes. Yet the proposal 
passed by a healthy margin. The Clinton campaign appears to 
offer another variation of this theme. There, the leaders 
first "sold" themselves on the merits of the issue. Then, 
when they looked at the public, they perceived no great oppo­
sition to the tax. But they nevertheless enthusiastically 
sought out the citizenry and tried to promote the proposal in 
terms meaningful to the general public. And the issue passed 
by a margin much greater than that achieved in Geary.
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With respect to form of government, the survey results 
indicate that a politically oriented city manager is a crucial 
element of leadership when it comes to translating innovative 
tax and revenue information into substantive policy. Yet many 
mayor-council cities have been equally successful in intro­
ducing sales tax innovations. Accordingly, fruitful research 
might well look into the way in which tax and revenue inno­
vations are communicated to leaders in cities without the man­
ager plan and are subsequently converted (or not converted) 
into policy. To put it another way, do the non-city manager 
cities have counterparts to administratively or politically 
oriented city managers? If so, who are they, and how do they 
operate in tax and revenue matters?
Concerning referendum results, the rapid spread of the 
sales tax among Oklahoma municipalities suggests that this 
type of local levy enjoys considerable acceptance in the public 
mind. But is this really the case? No one keeps any records 
about the number of tax referenda which have failed over the 
years. One could, however, develop a fairly reliable set of 
data on rejections by screening the local newspapers on file 
at the Oklahoma Historical Society in Oklahoma City. This 
would admittedly constitute a sizable undertaking, but at least 
the materials would all ùe located in one place.
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Also related to referenda results is the problem of how 
predecisional tax-proposing leadership factors relate to citi­
zen attitudes as expressed behaviorally in level of turnout 
and election results. As Meltsner says, one may be able to 
define tax support only in terms of specific referenda and 
issues.
As for turnout, Boskoff and Zeigler observe that 
American state and local politics has few well-documented 
generalizations, but among them are these; (1) referenda and 
other forms of direct legislation tend to attract less citizen 
attention and electoral involvement than any other type of 
election; and (2) relatively high turnout in such affairs is 
associated with defeat of the proposition(s). The usual 
explanation for these generalizations is that a hard-core of 
high status, well-informed "good citizens" regularly turns 
out to advance the community interest as defined by the socio­
political elite. Accordingly, increased turnout indicates 
that something has moved usually uninformed and uninterested 
lower-strata citizens actively to oppose the democratic elites' 
vision of the public i n t e r e s t . A n d  as for election results.
^^Meltsner, The Politics of City Revenue, p. 223.
^^Alvin Boskoff and Harmon Zeigler, Voting Patterns 
in a Local Election (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company,
1964), pp. 15-29.
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Meltsner says that voting in tax elections and paying taxes 
provide important indicators of support for the political 
s y s t e m . Y e t  other authors imply that leadership activities 
are more likely to arouse dissatisfaction, negativism, or 
outright opposition among citizens than they are to win 
additional support.
In contrast to this general picture of the "alienated 
voter" model advanced by Coleman and numerous other sociolo­
gi s t s , o t h e r  researchers, notably political scientists, have 
taken issue with this view of local referenda. That is, they 
contend that the model is too simple mainly because it tends 
to ignore the crucial matter of specific issues involved.
^^Meltsner, The Politics of City Revenue, p. 3.
^^Boskoff and Zeigler, Votincr Patterns in a Local 
Election, Chapter 4; Robert Jackson Goettel, "The Relation­
ship Between Selected Economic and Fiscal Factors and Voting 
Behavior in School Budget Elections in New York State" 
(unpublished Ed.D. dissertation. Teachers College, Columbia 
University, 1970); George Katona, The Mass Consumption Society 
(New York; McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), pp. 150-152.
^^James S. Coleman, Community Conflict (Glencoe, Ill­
inois: The Free Press, 1957), p. 19. See Clarence N. Stone,
"Local Référendums: An Alternative to the Alienated-Voter
Model," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXIX (Summer 1965), pp. 213- 
215, for a good summary statement of the "alienation" theory 
and footnotes guiding one to much of the sociological litera­
ture on the topic.
^^See, for example, Charles L. Willis, "Analysis of 
Voter Response to School Financial Proposals," Public Opinion 
Quarterly. XXXI (Winter 1967-1968), pp. 648-651; Robert L.
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This emphasis on issues seems to be especially germane 
to the study of local sales tax referenda, for tax-proposing 
leaders tend to take one of two main approaches to selling 
the tax to the public. They can use the "shotgun blast" phil­
osophy, i-e.., a "general community welfare and improvement" 
sales pitch. Or they can relate the tax to one or a few 
specific issues. Claunch generally indicates that in five 
Missouri sales tax elections, the "specific issue" approach 
was much more successful than was the other technique.
This was certainly the case in Clinton, where the sales tax 
was specifically related to a new hospital. And in comparison 
with the median 29 per cent turnout for municipal elections 
held independently of other elections, the 44 per cent
Crain, Elihu Katz, and Donald B. Rosenthal, The Politics of 
Community Conflict: The Fluoridation Decision (Indianapolis:
The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1969), James Q. Wilson's pre­
fatory comments on pp. x-xi and the authors' arguments on pp. 
7-12 and 123-235; Stone, "Local Référendums . . . ," pp. 213- 
222; Harlan Hahn, "Voting in Canadian Communities: A Taxonomy
of Referendum Issues," Canadian Journal of Political^Science/ 
Revue canadienne de Science politique, I (December/décembre
1968), pp. 462-469.
l^Ronald G. Claunch, "Voter Reactions to Missouri 
Sales Tax Referenda: The Role of Self-Interest, Public-Regard-
ingness and Political Trust" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. 
University of Missouri, Columbia, 1972), pp. 76-139.
l^Northern Illinois University, Staff of the Center for 
Governmental Studies, "Citizen Participation and Local Govern­
ment in the United States— An Analysis of Recent Research," 
Studies in Comparative Local Government, V, No. 2 (Winter 1971),
p. 80.
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turnout of registered Clinton voters (91 per cent of the 
voters approving the issue) was relatively high and indeed 
compared quite favorably with the 52 per cent turnout for the 
most recent contested city-wide race for public office (the 
1970 contest for m a y o r ) I n  contrast, the Geary tax leaders 
used the "shotgun blast" approach. And the election was held 
in conjunction with municipal elections for mayor and council 
seats. Given the heightened public interest thus induced, it 
is not surprising that the sales tax proposal had a rela­
tively high 44 per cent turnout. But even so, it received a 
69 per cent approval rate.^^
In short, these findings appear to be somewhat contra­
dictory. And, accordingly, they suggest that a series of 
well-conceived case studies could usefully inquire into how 
tax-proposing leadership approaches and activities relate to 
public turnout and support levels in local sales tax referenda.
1ftPercentages computed from records on file at the 
city hall and the Custer County Election Board branch office, 
Clinton, Oklahoma. The turnout and results of the Clinton 
sales tax referendum seem to be consistent with other research 
indicating that hospitals and similar issues tend to be asso­
ciated with both high turnout and overwhelming voter approval. 
See Stone, "Local Référendums . . . ," pp. 215-222; Hahn, 
"Voting in Canadian Communities . . . ," pp. 466 and 468-469.
^^Percentages computed from records on file at the 
Blaine County Election Board, Watonga, Oklahoma, and the 
Canadian County Election Board, El Reno, Oklahoma. Geary has 
one precinct which lies within Canadian County.
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Policy Implications and Conclusions 
As Wood observes, the local budget-maker occupies an 
unenviable spot— analogous to that of "a cat on a hot tin 
roof"— between restricted revenues and ever-rising demands for 
public goods and s e r v i c e s .^0 To escape this two-way squeeze, 
he faces the problem of creating "fiscal illusions," to use 
Buchanan's term, which lower taxpayers’ resistance by making 
them feel that their tax levies are less burdensome than they 
really are.^^ For the Oklahoma municipal tax leader, at least, 
the local sales tax seems to offer a ready and highly useful 
vehicle for doing just that. The rapid spread of the city 
sales tax suggests, on the surface at any rate, that this 
particular type of levy meets with relatively light public 
resistance. My conversations with tax leaders reveal that 
the sales tax is relatively popular largely because both 
officials and citizens firmly believe that it equitably 
spreads out the burden of taxation— even to welfare recipients 
and visitors from out-of-town! And the analysis of financial
20
Robert C. Wood, with Vladimir V. Almendinger, 1400 
Governments; The Political Economy of the New York Metropol­
itan Region (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, 1961), p. 92.
Zljames M. Buchanan, Public Finance in Democratic 
Process: Fiscal Institutions and Individual Choice (Chapel
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1967), p. 131.
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data indicates that the sales tax not only increases total 
revenues appreciably, but also enables local leaders to lessen 
their reliance on unpopular "extractive" policies such as 
higher utility and property tax rates. In short, the local 
sales tax appears to afford the beleaguered city official a 
politically viable alternative to the specter of untenable 
financial pressures, although it admittedly represents only a 
partial solution to the basic problem.
In any case, the main thrust of this study is that 
local leaders must emphasize the political leadership aspects 
of the tax and revenue policy process if they wish to take 
advantage of this particular answer to some of their problems. 
And the analysis presented strongly suggests that differences 
in reliance on the sales tax are closely related to variations 
in the degree of the strength of political leadership among 
Oklahoma cities and towns.
It is, of course, all well and good to prescribe 
strong tax and revenue policy leadership. But from the prac­
titioner's standpoint, the big question is how to achieve it. 
The results of this study, though by no means conclusive, do 
suggest a number of positive steps which can be taken.
First, municipalities should select leaders with back­
ground characteristics which tend to make them receptive to
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innovative tax and revenue ideas. Such leaders should have a 
progressive and expansive attitude toward governmental activity.
Second, leaders with such characteristics apparently 
tend to perceive a more favorable tax environment than do 
their counterparts with more conservative and traditionalist 
backgrounds. And they also seem to be more willing to base 
their policy behavior on their perceptions of the general tax 
climate rather than on their conceptions of their constituents' 
"immediate" views and preferences. In terms of practical 
leadership, these factors indicate that local officials should 
be optimistic about the basic civic responsibility of the 
citizenry when it comes to coping with the financial problems 
of their communities. Moreover, they should not be afraid to 
go against perceived public opposition to tax-increase pro­
posals. The results of this study show that perceived leader- 
follower disagreement tends to rise as the sales tax rate 
goes up. Apparently, public opposition is not always as great 
as one might think. Also, given the relatively low level of 
public interest and participation in local politics, it seems 
likely that in many cases, perceived opposition comes from a 
small hard-core of vocal "aginners," not the general public.
Third, the study indicates that political prowess grows 
out of relatively high levels of knowledge and information.
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In other words, the "knowledge is power" hypothesis points up 
the crucial importance of effective communication of innova­
tive tax and revenue ideas. Although local leaders should not 
subordinate themselves to the cosmopolitan expertise which 
frequently generates such innovative information, they should 
certainly ensure that they do not shut off the communications 
channels running to sophisticated financial experts.
Finally, the study suggests that an excellent approach 
to translating tax and revenue innovations into actual policy 
is to hire a politically astute city manager. Indeed, many of 
the key indicators of differences in reliance on the sales tax 
show that the city manager form of government itself tends to 
be associated with higher sales tax rates. Hence, one might 
simply argue for hiring a city manager— period. But if the 
city is going to fork out good money for a manager, local 
officials might as well take the time and effort to find one 
with a political orientation to his job. His professional 
identification and connections are likely to make him highly 
efficient in handling the administrative aspects of acquiring 
innovative tax and revenue information. And his political 
orientations will probably make him an effective policy ally 
and leader when the sales tax issue must face its "moment of 
truth" in the political arena.
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Vidich and Bensman point out that the local political
process is no simplistic affair, but instead represents "a
complex integration of economic, social . . . , psychological,
legal and administrative facts." The thing that links these
various factors into a coherent and dynamic process is an
2 2intricate structure of political leadership. This study 
attempts to show how all of these factors bear on the tax 
and revenue process. The results indicate that the relative 
strength of political leadership is perhaps the critical 
element in accounting for varying tax policy responses to the 
financial problems facing Oklahoma municipalities.
2 2Vidich and Bensman, Small Town in Mass Society,
pp. 210-211.
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O K L A H O M A  M U N I C I P A L  L E A G U E
4040 LINCOLN BOULEVARD •  OKLAHOMA CITY. OKLAHOMA 73105 *  AC/405 427-6646
Dear City Official :
Attached is a questionnaire prepared by Mr. Charles B. Williams, who is 
a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Oklahoma. Mr. Williams is writing his 
doctoral dissertation on the problems of municipal taxation and revenue in 
Oklahoma.
Mr. Williams hopes that his research effort will eventually produce some 
useful and practical policy assistance for city officials in Oklahoma. This 
questionnaire will greatly influence the final conclusions which he reaches.
It is extremely important to get a good response from the scientifically 
selected sample of city officials to whom he is sending the questionnaire.
Mr. Williams is undertaking this research at his own expense and initia­
tive. With respect to this project, he is affiliated with no governmental 
agency or private association (other than his academic department at the 
University of Oklahoma, o f  course). In particular, the Oklahoma Municipal 
League neither officially sponsors nor financially supports Mr. Williams' 
research effort.
Although Mr. Williams has no official connection with the League, he is 
attempting some scholarly research which could potentially help city officials 
throughout Oklahoma. Accordingly, we would appreciate your participation in 
this project. You will need only a few minutes to complete and mail the 
questionnaire. The results of this study could benefit us all in the long run.
Thank you.
Very sincerely.
Donald C. Rider 
Executive Director
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QUESTIONNAIRE ON TAX AND REVENUE OPINIONS 
OF MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS
March 1973
Introduction
The following questions are designed to provide certain 
information about the opinions and the background of city offi­
cials in selected municipalities throughout Oklahoma. The 
final study will preserve the anonymity of each participant in
this survey, and the information contained in this question­
naire will be kept strictly confidential. This means that your 
completed questionnaire will be seen only by those few persons 
who are working with me on this study, and that the results of 
this study will appear as statistical summaries which will pre­
vent anyone from knowing how you answered the questions. I 
greatly appreciate your assistance and cooperation in helping 
me with this research project.
Overall Instructions
1. Please take care to answer all questions.
2. Some questions may not seem to apply to your city
or town. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this study, please 
give the answer which seems to be the most satisfactory or 
appropriate.
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3. You will probably need about 20 minutes to complete 
the questionnaire.
I
1. Please check the office you now hold (if you are no longer 
serving in your city's government, indicate the office that 
you have most recently held):
la.______  Mayor (or president of board of trustees).
lb.______  Councilman (or member of board of trustees).
Ic.______  City manager.
Id.______  City clerk or finance officer (specify: ) .
le.______  Other (specify: ) .
II
Here are three questions which ask you to rank-order your 
opinions on certain characteristics of your community. For 
these three questions only, you should enter a different number 
in front of each of the four possible answers. Please read 
each question carefully!
2. Most cities nowadays need additional revenue. Let's pre­
tend that your city needs to raise more money, and that you 
could get the extra funds only in the following ways. Please 
rank these methods in the order of your own preference (1 = 
your first choice, 2 = your second choice, 3 = your third 
choice, and 4 = your fourth choice);
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2a.______  Hold an election and pass a city sales tax
(assume that there is no legal upper limit 
on the rate).
2b.______  Raise additional revenue from city-owned
utilities.
2c.______  Obtain a state or federal grant-in-aid.
2d.______  Pass a city ordinance raising the cost of
permits and licenses.
3. Now, would you please rank-order these four methods of 
raising additional money as you think the average citizen 
would prefer them (1 = citizen's first choice, 2 = citizen's 
second choice, and so on):
3a.______  Pass a city sales tax.
3b.______  Raise more money from city-owned utilities.
3c.______  Get a state or federal grant.
3d.______  Raise the cost of permits and licenses.
4. Communities incorporate for various reasons, and they seem 
to have differing basic emphases or outlooks. Here is a list 
of four general kinds of city government. Would you please 
rank them in the order which seems to describe most closely 
the general situation in your community (1 = most like your
city, 2 = next most like your city, and so on):
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4a.______ Our city government promotes community
growth. We facilitate and encourage com­
mercial and industrial growth.
4b.______ Our city government promotes "gracious liv­
ing." We provide a wide variety and high 
level of community services.
4c.______ Our city government promotes small govern­
ment, low taxation, etc. We limit community 
growth and maintain only traditional services
4d.______ Our city government is unable to promote any
one interest. We work out policies with a 
number of conflicting community interests.
Ill
Thank you. Now, for each of the following questions, please 
check the one answer which best describes your opinion.
5. Let's suppose that your city has to raise a large amount of 
additional revenue. Please indicate which one of the follow­
ing sources you would most likely consult to get the "straight 
poop" on the best way to raise this extra money: (Check only
one ! )
5a.______ Members of the council or board of trustees.
5b.______ City manager or other city administrators.
5c.______ Citizens-at-large.
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5d.______ Community interest groups.
5e.______ Personal knowledge (gained through personal
contacts or acquaintances, reading, educa­
tion, training, experience, and so on).
5f.______ Other (specify;__________________________ ).
6. Traditionally, governmental officials have considered it 
politically unpopular to propose a tax increase. Now, let's 
assume that such a tax-increase proposal has come up in your 
community. The public-at-large seems to oppose it. But you 
personally favor it because of your knowledge of the commun­
ity's needs and problems. Which of the following statements 
would best describe the way that you would react to the 
proposal: (Pick one!)
6a.______ I would publicly support the proposal
because I have a duty to improve my com­
munity now and for the future.
6b.______ I would publiclv disapprove of the proposal
because the citizens seem to be against it.
6c.______  Other (specify what you would do) :________
7. How do you personally feel about the taxes you pay for 
local government, that is, the taxes that support your city
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government, the county, and the school system? Are they: 
(Select one!)
7a.______ Much too high?
7b.______ A little too high?
7c.______ About right?
7d.______ A little too low?
7e.______ Much too low?
8. What about the average citizen in your town? How do you 
think he feels about local taxes? (Select one!)
8a.______ Much too high.
8b.______ A little too high.
8c.______ About right.
8d.______ A little too low.
8e.______ Much too low.
9. Which of the following statements most closely corresponds 
to your opinion? Check only one!
9a.______ The city should drastically cut services
and reduce spending.
9b.______ The city should reduce spending somewhat
by cutting out expensive "frills."
9c.______ The city should maintain its present level
of services and spending.
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9d.______  The city should increase spending enough
to provide a few more services or improve 
present ones a little.
9e.______ The city should drastically expand its
services and spending.
10. Now, how do you think the average citizen feels about
local services and spending? Again, check only one.
10a.______ Reduce them sharply.
10b.______ Reduce them a little.
10c.______ Keep them where they are.
lOd.______ Increase them a little.
lOe.______ Increase them a great deal.
IV
Here are some statements about tax and revenue matters as 
they apply to your community. Please mark each statement 
according to how much you agree or disagree with it. In other 
words, for each statement, circle one number which corresponds 
to the one answer most nearly describing how you feel— do you 
(1) strongly agree, (2) pretty much agree, (3) agree a little,
(4) disagree a little, (5) pretty much disagree, or (6) 
strongly disagree?
11. The city can and should obtain financial STR.
STR. DIS-
support from county, state, and federal AGR. AGR.
agencies. 1 2  3 4 5 6
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12. In general, people here support the STR.
STR. DIS-
efforts of their city officials to AGR. AGR.
cope with the problems facing the city. 1 2  3 4 5 5
13. In general, people here will support a 
tax increase if their city officials
show them the need for one. 1 2  3 4 5 6
14. People here have a progressive spirit
and want to boost the community. 1 2  3 4 5 6
15. Basically, the city should be self- 
reliant and draw on its own resources 
when it comes to solving community
problems. 1 2 3 4 5 6
16. The people here have a good sense of 
civic responsibility when it comes to
facing up to community problems. 1 2  3 4 5 6
17. The average citizen in your city is as 
well informed on local government tax
and revenue matters as you are. 1 2  3 4 5 6
18. The city should be more aggressive in 
going after financial assistance from
county, state, and federal agencies. 1 2  3 4 5 6
19. People here understand that the taxes 
and charges they pay are related to the
city services they receive. 1 2  3 4 5 6
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STR,
20. People here would rather cut services STR. DIS-
AGR• AGR
than increase taxes. 1 2  3 4 5 6
21. Federal revenue sharing is a good thing
for this community. 1 2  3 4 5 6
V
Thank you very much. Now I need a little bit of background 
information.
22. Has your city ever tried unsuccessfully to pass a local 
sales tax (regardless of whether one was passed later on)?
22a.______ Yes.
22b.______ No.
23. How long have you served in your present public office 
(if you are no longer serving in a public office, give pre­
vious length of service)? ______years.
24. How long have you lived in the city where you now hold
(or have held) public office? ______years.
25. What is your occupation? Please be as specific as you 
can— for example, merchant, farmer, lawyer, plumber. _______
26. How did you first get in public office? Pick one.
26a.______ A friend or neighbor got me interested.
26b.______ Through work in a community organization
(what organization?_____________________
).
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26c.______ My active interest in a particular issue
or problem (what was the issue or problem?
 ) .
26d.______ The nature of my occupation got me involved.
26e.______ Other (specify:___________________________
 ).
27. If you would like to receive a copy of the results of
this study, please check here______ . PLEASE PRINT YOUR ADDRESS!
Send to:
28. If you would care to add some comments, please check
here______ . Please write on the next page. Don't feel that
you must limit yourself to these particular questions. I will 
be most interested in anything you have to say about the prob­
lems of city finances. I deeply appreciate your cooperation 
in helping with this research project. Please place the 
questionnaire in the enclosed postage-paid, self-addressed 
envelope and mail it right away! Thank you.
Charles B. Williams 
1105 Grover Lane 
Norman, Okla. 73069
312
COMMENTS
[%This page went to all officials 
except city managers
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SPECIAL NOTE FOR CITY MANAGERS 
PLEASE COMPLETE QUESTIONS 29 THROUGH 32 BEFORE ADDING COMMENTS 
AND MAILING THE QUESTIONNAIRE. THANK YOU.
COMMENTS
314
FOR CITY MANAGERS ONLY 
Part of this research project looks at the impact of city 
managers on local tax and revenue policies. To help me get at 
this sort of information, I am adding the following four items 
to the questionnaires sent to city managers. I would appre­
ciate your answering the questions as carefully as possible. 
Remember that your replies will be held in the strictest 
confidence.
29. Please indicate your chief source of new information and 
ideas on local tax and revenue matters. Check only onel 
29a.______ Other city managers.
29b.______ Other administrative personnel in your
city government.
29c.______ Members of the council or board of trustees,
29d.______ Citizens-at-large.
29e.______ Community interest groups.
29f.______ Professional education.
29g.______ Professional reading.
29h.______ Other (specify:__________________________) .
20. We hear a great deal about the city manager profession.
How do you feel about being a member of this particular 
profession? Is it: (Check only one!)
30a.______ Very important to you?
30b.______ Somewhat important to you?
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30c.______ A little important to you?
30d.______ Probably unimportant to you?
30e.______ Not very important at all to you?
30f.______ Quite unimportant to you?
31. City managers have a great many possible channels for 
exchanging innovative ideas. For example, they can maintain 
informal personal contacts, attend meetings and conferences, 
and read professional literature. You yourself probably get 
new ideas on local tax and revenue matters through these 
various channels. If we assume that you do acquire innovative 
tax and revenue ideas through professional channels, how many 
of them do you try to adapt to or implement in your own city? 
Select only one!
31a.______ All.
31b.______ Most.
31c.______ Many.
31d.______ Some.
3le.______ A few.
31f.______ None.
32. Finally, how would you characterize your participation 
in the tax and revenue policy-making process in your city?
Pick one!
316
32a.______  Advise the council or board (for example,
answer questions, give background informa­
tion) .
32b.______  Participate in the policy-making process
to some degree (for example, present pros 
and cons, provide guidelines) .
32c.______  Develop and recommend policy, but pri­
marily within well-defined policy areas.
32d.______ Act as a policy leader (that is, initiate,
recommend, and take a position on most 
policy matters).
Thank you for your assistance. Please send this supplementary 
information along with the basic questionnaire.
